# PARTIES, VOTERS, AND ACTIVISTS:

# BUILDING IDEOLOGICAL LINKAGE IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES

A Dissertation

by

SE JIN KOO

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|---|---|
| Chair of Committee, | Robert Harmel |
| Committee Members, | Dan Wood |
| | Marisa Kellam |
| | Hoi-Eun Kim |
| Head of Department, | William Clark |

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ABSTRACT

This study addresses the question of why ideological parties and party systems emerge in some democracies but not in others, with a special focus on developing democracies. In delving into this question, I highlight the functions of ideology as a multilevel phenomenon, and examined the party-voter linkage mechanism based on policy programs at various angles. I assume that a party has strong ideological linkage (a) when those in the electorate who support the party feel a close ideological affinity for the party, (b) when the party has a clearly defined and ideologically distinct program, and (c) when party activists are ideologically motivated and coherent within the party. Focusing on each dimension, each empirical chapter evaluates the effects of institutions, socio-economic conditions, and democratic conditions. The methodology used for this multilevel approach is 'tripartite,' combining statistical analysis (large-N cross-national comparison), content analysis (case study) and traditional surveys (inter- and intra-country comparisons). First, by examining ideological affinity between parties and voters in 46 democracies, I find that the extent of perceived ideological affinity is determined by the age, size, and ideological position of a party and that institutional and economic factors are more important than democratic conditions for the development of ideological congruence of a party system. Second, by analyzing South Korean party platforms, I find that parties in this developing democracy have evolved to programmatic ones over time since democratic transition. Lastly, by investigating the motivation and ideology of party activists in Mongolia and South Korea, I find little evidence that

activists who are wealthy or are living in a wealthy district or a country are more policy-seeking than those who are not, while activists in a wealthy district or country are more ideologically coherent as a group within the party. This study contributes towards a better understanding of party-voter linkage mechanisms: it proposed a conceptually-decomposed approach to linkage, provides novel measures for comparisons across parties, across countries and over time, offers a close examinations of Asian cases that were underexplored, and lastly illuminates the role of activists as a linkage themselves with the addition of a new survey dataset.

# DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my family, especially to my supportive husband, Donghyuk Kim, and our sweet little girl, Isabella Yoonha. I give my deepest expression of love and appreciation for their patience, understanding, and sacrifices during my graduate study.

I also dedicate this dissertation to my always encouraging, ever faithful mom, Songsook Hong. She is a bottomless source of inspiration, passionate teacher, and spiritual mentor.

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# CHAPTER I

# INTRODUCTION

Ideology can be defined as a system of ideas or ideals about good society, or Weltanschauungen, of which the coherence and specificity as well as the content vary across individuals and groups (Downs, 1957; Hinich & Munger, 1996).[1] This study addresses the question of why an ideologically-based party system emerges in some democracies but not in others. This question is of considerable importance because of the prominent role that ideology plays in party organizations and party systems. Ideology is related to a party's official goals, which are presented to the voters in a political market. Ideology provides identity and solidarity for a party: it provides organizational coherence to the party by "conceal(ing) selective incentives (material and status) whose excessive visibility could compromise the image of the party as an organization dedicated to a 'cause"' (Panebianco, 1988, p. 24). Also, ideology is a "means to maximize votes, weapons in the struggle for office" (Downs, 1957, p. 97) for parties dealing with the situation where most voters are imperfectly informed. For voters, ideology functions as an information 'short-cut,' which reduces the information costs

[1] In this study, I take this broad, spatial conceptualization of ideology. While ideology sometimes refers to a psychological trait attached to particular individuals or politicians, to a characteristic of a group, or to an abstract political tendency (for example, communism, liberalism, and nationalism), ideology is now used mostly in spatial terms in political science, with no requirement that ideology remains unidimensional (Knight, 2006). Among other definitions is a conceptualization of ideology as a consistent, institutionalized set of belief system for mass publics to be learned whereas the most sophisticated elites are able to produce and modify it (Converse, 1964; Sartori, 1969). The definition of ideology in this study is general and encompassing both the specific and concrete ideas that a party espouses and represents and voters' perception about "what is good, who gets what, and who rules" (Hinich & Munger, 1996, p. 11). Also, this definition encompasses an understanding politics in terms of spatial location both on a single (left-right, progressive-conservative, or liberal-conservative) dimension and on multiple issue dimensions.

associated with voting. With this short-cut, even uninformed voters can focus their attention on the broad policy differences between parties, discuss politics, and make choices given their preferred policy outcomes (Downs, 1957). In this way, elections work as meaningful guides to democratic government. Thus, not only is ideology a useful instrument to both the political life of the citizenry and parties, but it also helps promote democratic representation.

Furthermore, when politicians and the rank-and-file activists of a party are ideologically motivated, interested in the policy contents of the party, and share policy preferences within the party, such a party will be less likely to become a personal, electoral vehicle of one or a handful of charismatic politicians. With a significant number of policy-oriented activists, the power of party leaders will be constrained, and the instances of party system instability (such as high electoral volatility, appearance of new parties, or party splits and mergers) will be less common, and therefore, ultimately contributing to party system institutionalization (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006).[2]

The questions of how parties have ideologically distinct programs and how ideology works in voting behavior have been at the center of comparative politics literature. However, the relationships between parties and voters beyond established democracies have not been sufficiently explored (Randall, 2006). Although a sizeable literature on party politics in developing democracies emerged in the wake of the third wave of democratization, the literature clusters on a few topics, such as the level of

[2] However, normative judgment such as whether party-voter linkage based on policies is good or bad is beyond the scope of this study.

institutionalization in terms of electoral volatility (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Lupu & Stokes, 2010; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006), the level of partisanship (Tan, Ho, Kang, & Yu, 2000; Dalton & Weldon, 2007), issue structures in party competition (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2009; Huber & Inglehart, 1995), and the size of a party system (Hicken, 2009). Relatively, the nature of the party-voter relationships in developing democracies and how much they have in common with those of established democracies have not received enough attention.

In the Downsian (1957) model of democratic competition and the responsible party model, parties produce policy programs giving voters clear choice in an election, and voters decide how to vote based on parties' policy programs. Thus, it is critical for parties to have specific programs and for voters to be aware of differences between parties. Scholars of party politics, however, generally agree that political parties in non-Western democracies (as well as some Western democracies) lack policy programs compared to their Western counterparts, and that their citizenry generally vote based on clientelism, regionalism, or ethnic divisions (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Lupu & Riedl, 2013; Kim, 2000).

The problem of this conventional wisdom is twofold. First, there have been few explanations, particularly in an empirical manner, for the extent to which parties and party systems in developing democracies are (less) ideologically organized, compared to those in established democracies, and what causes these differences. Second, it is frequently ignored that the functioning of ideology in party politics is a multilevel phenomenon. While political parties can be defined as a group of elites who share some

common goals, a party is often observed in real politics in the form of its extension—for example, party activists and a group of voters supporting the party, as well as party elites. Although the core and the layers surrounding the core should be in a close and influential relationship, it may be too hasty to assume that the different strata of a party necessarily arrive at a state of agreement automatically, as assumed in many previous studies, especially those drawing on Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) research on party competition. In real politics, however, ideological linkage at one level of a party can be stronger or weaker than those at another level of the same party.

In the literature of political parties and party systems, the term "linkage" between parties and voters and "representation" are often used interchangeably, and linkage is generally understood as a key function of political parties to connect citizens to a government (see especially Lawson, 1980). The question arising from this general understanding, then, is how this connecting occurs. In delving into this question of mechanism, Kitschelt (2000) directly related the concept of linkage to the mechanisms that citizens hold parties politicians (or parties as teams of politicians) to accountable. According to Kitschelt and his coauthors (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt & Freeze, 2010; Kitschelt & Kselman, 2013), party-voter linkage is successfully formed when a party delivers what voters demand, and there are a variety of linkage mechanisms with policy-based linkage being only one of them. In this approach to linkage, exchange relationships between parties and voters are emphasized, with the type of goods provided by parties in exchange for votes largely determining the type of linkage.

More recently, Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister (2011) provided another refined conceptual framework for studying party-voter linkages. Specifically, they identified five forms of linkage between parties and voters, based on the model of representative party government, with each form of linkage corresponding to each of the functions of political parties: "campaign linkage" in managing electoral campaigns including candidate recruitment, "participatory linkage" in mobilizing voters in elections, "ideological linkage" in providing policy choices in elections, "representative linkage" in achieving policy congruence between citizens and the government through elections, and lastly, "policy linkage" in implementing the policies promised in the election (p. 7). In this approach, ideological linkage refers to a function of parties to aggregate voter interests to policy choices.

What is common in any of these approaches is that political parties are regarded as the primary representative agents connecting between citizens and elites. In line with the general understanding of linkage as a function of parties connecting between citizens and elites and the understanding of ideological linkage as a function of aggregating policy interests by parties, I propose a new model of ideological linkage, incorporating party activists that have been largely ignored in the existing literature on party-voter linkage. In the multilevel model of ideological linkage, ideology operates across different strata of party politics. Specifically, ideological linkage consists of three components: (1) there is strong policy-based affinity, in voters' perception, between voters and their preferred party, (2) parties present specific and distinct policy choices to voters, and (3) party activists are motivated by policy incentives and maintain

ideological coherence among themselves in the same party. The last component, ideological party activists, is as important as the first two components in this model, as party activists are a major component of party politics as much as party elites and voters, notwithstanding the observed variations in their relevance and functions within and across contemporary parties (Scarrow, 2014). Party activists help "define an organization as a community of a believers" (Blake, Carty, & Erickson, 1991, p. 17), and connect parties and ordinary voters in person.

South Korea's recent presidential election in 2012 well illustrates the aforementioned possible unevenness between voters and party elites in the strength of ideological linkages: two major parties (the Saenuri Party [SP] and the Democratic United Party [DUP]) competed for a presidential office, both with a party manifesto devoting an unprecedented amount of its space to social welfare. The outcome was the victory of the SP, which has traditionally been regarded as a conservative, right-wing party. This inter-party policy collusion contrasted with strong ideological polarization in the public. Many voters on each side felt that the other party was hiding its true policy positions to win the election. This episode suggests that ideological partisanship, ideological party programs, and ideologically oriented party activists may be neither naturally nor absolutely synchronized within a party or party system. Understanding ideological linkages as a multilevel phenomenon allows us to closely examine ideological linkages at the different levels of party politics—party leaders, party activists, and voters.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly review and discuss a recent effort to account for party-voter relationships in developing democracies, before describing how my approach is distinguished from the existing one, especially with respect to the use of the term ideological linkage. I then discuss the multilevel nature of parties. The final section outlines the contents of the remainder of the dissertation.

## Programmaticism and Ideological Linkage

Efforts accounting for the areas in which Western theories of party politics, or programmatic competition among parties, have limitations include recent work on a "variety of linkage mechanisms (VOL)" between citizens and parties (Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt & Freeze, 2010). Kitschelt and his coauthors classify party-voter linkages in democracies into programmaticism, clientelism, and other categories (affective, psychological linkages, charisma-based linkages, and so on). This categorization successfully characterizes different party systems and strategies that political parties use to attract voters, while also accounting for the nature of democratic accountability mechanisms beyond Western democracies.

However, the VOL thesis reveals its limitation when the problems associated with the levels of programmatic linkages are examined: for example, how programmatic is a party or party system? If most Western European party systems are programmatic, are their levels of programming similar or different across this region or over time within each country? The VOL's nominal approach has not fully addressed possible variations in programmatic linkages across parties and party systems or over time. In other words,

it may be too simplistic to define a party or a party system as either programmatic or clientelistic. Whereas conventional wisdom indicates that Asian or African party systems lack programmatic linkages, the patterns may appear more complex if these systems are closely examined and compared with others in the same continent as well as with those in Western Europe or Anglo-Saxon democracies.

Admittedly, the VOL thesis takes into account a portfolio of different types of linkages within a party system. However, it is certainly a challenging task to separately measure each type of linkages in determining the nature of a party system. When Kitschelt and his coauthors (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt & Freeze, 2010) discuss the relationship between programmaticism and clientelism as two major linkage strategies of parties, the two are assumed to be largely in an inversely proportionate relationship albeit not mutually exclusive. If so, focusing on only one of the two linkages would be a more feasible research strategy for identifying the nature of party-voter relationships than attempting to sort, measure separately, and aggregate various types of linkages.

The concept of programmatic parties and party systems that developed from Western experiences of party politics needs modification in order to be applied to relatively new, non-Western democracies. According to Kitschelt and Freeze (2010), programmaticism refers to the linkage strategies of political parties for the distribution of collective or public goods in lieu of club or private goods. The distinction between collective goods and club or private goods, however, is not so clear in reality. Is deregulation in the economic sector always collective goods, as Shugart (1999)

assumes? In real politics, it often produces winners and losers, and benefits a particular group of voters. Is the construction of a new international airport by the government a collective good? An airport certainly benefits a large percentage of the population, and individual use of the facility does not *ipso facto* limit the use of the facility by others. Nevertheless, even a public airport can function as a club good as long as it greatly benefits the landowners of the designated site, as well as some in the construction industry, while residents near the site may have to suffer from the noise. Many valence issues (e.g., defense and economic growth) are considered to be collective goods, but the distribution of such goods might disproportionately benefit particular interests. In short, the distinction between collective goods and club/private goods is not straightforward in politics, and thus, neither is the distinction between programmaticism and clientelism.

In this study, the definition of ideological linkages deviates from Kitschelt's programmatic linkages, in so far as ideological linkage is not related to the provision of universal collective goods. As briefly mentioned in the earlier section, I define ideological linkage as a multilevel concept, formed and observed at multiple strata of party politics. I also assume ideological linkage to be the property of individual parties. Hence, within a party system, the linkage may be strong for some parties but weak for others; the linkage may be weak or strong for some party systems depending on the parties' ideological linkage within the system.

Ideology does not necessarily refer to the left-right semantics so prevalent in Western democracies. All countries have country-specific meanings in their use of ideology. While the meaning and usages of ideology are fascinating topics of inquiry,

they are outside the scope of this study. Previous studies of ideology in a cross-national context strongly support the idea that in most democracies, citizens are aware of the left and right terms and are able to position themselves on the left-right scale (see especially Dalton, Farrell, & McAllister, 2011). Even when issues completely distinct from economic distribution are more salient, such as in Taiwan for example (Dalton & Tanaka, 2007), political parties are often found to be aligned on the left-right spectrum. Also, although multidimensional issue spaces are observed in many countries, the number of issue dimensions usually does not exceed two, and these are often significantly correlated (Dalton et al., 2011; Budge, 2006; Huber & Inglehart, 1995; Rosas, 2005; Wiesehomeier & Benoit, 2009; Colomer, 2005; Queirolo, 2009; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2009; Dalton & Tanaka, 2007; Jou, 2010).

## Three Competing Explanations

### Institutional Explanations

According to institutionalists focusing on different regime types, presidentialism hinders the development of party programs and responsible government (Linz, 1994; Mainwaring, 1998). Admittedly, both weak party programs—or weak ideological structuration of a party system—and a presidential system are simultaneously found in many less-advanced democracies. These include post-Soviet (most of which adopt semi-presidential systems), Latin American and African countries (most of which adopt pure presidential systems).

The institutionalist argument is that the separation of powers affects the nature of political parties by promoting "presidentialization" of parties, or "a de facto reversal of

the principal-agent relationship"; this creates incentives for presidents to diverge from their party (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). This argument is empirically supported by studies on policy-switching—making promise a certain policy during an election campaign but moving significantly away from it after being elected—occurs far more frequently under a pure or semi-presidential system than under a parliamentary system (Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Stoke, 2001), suggesting that a president is less likely to implement her party's platform and are more likely to engage in policy-switching than prime ministers. If not policy-switching, a president and his/her party often represent different locations in the policy space (Wiesehomeire & Benuit, 2009; Bruhn, 2004). Such ideological inequivalence between a chief executive and her party is less plausible when powers are fused than separated. In addition, major parties may want to downplay ideology when they seek to win a presidential election, facing trade-offs between policy-seeking and vote-seeking or between adhering to the party's ideology and wanting to actually win the election (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Hence, building ideological linkages may be a more challenging task and require more time for parties in a presidential or semi-presidential system than for those in a parliamentary system.

Another institutional argument comes from a group of scholars focusing on electoral rules. They argue that electoral rules that are likely to entail election campaigning led by parties, rather than by individual politicians, contribute to the development of impersonal relationships, while electoral rules which are more conducive to candidate-led campaigning are likely to enhance a politician's incentive to cultivate a personal vote, or to foster her personal vote-seeking behavior (Carey &

Shugart, 1995; Grofman, 2005). According to this theoretical supposition, electoral rules are likely to influence party-voter relationships: stronger ideological linkages between parties and voters are expected under party-centered rules than under candidate-centered ones.

The most common form of party-centered electoral systems is a closed-list proportional representation. Candidate-centered electoral systems include a variety of majoritarian systems, most of which are largely classified into either a single-member district plurality (SMDP) or a multimember-district plurality (MMDP) system. A single transferable system (STV), a single non-transferable system (SNTV), and cumulative voting are also closer to candidate-centered system, because they usually do not require the existence of parties. Under these rules, individuals vote for candidates, not for parties. Lastly, when both voters and parties express preference for a candidate (and, therefore, influence certain candidates' likelihood of being elected), such systems are placed in an intermediate category between candidate-centered and party-centered ones. This category includes a mixed system in which proportional and majoritarian rules are combined, and an open-list proportional representation system.

**Socio-economic Explanations: Modernization**

A widely shared, empirically robust hypothesis in comparative politics is that economic development goes hand-in-hand with political development. Empirically, socio-economic development is reported to be positively correlated with elite-mass congruence, promoting democratic representation (Luna & Zechmeister, 2005). When applied to the study of party-voter linkages, this hypothesis is that “poverty goes with a

predominance of clientelistic accountability strategies in competitive politics and high affluence goes with an emphasis on programmatic party competition" (Kitschelt & Freeze, 2010, p. 30). Kitschelt and his coauthors (Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt & Freeze, 2010) strongly support this modernization theory in explaining the development of programmatic linkages.

The modernization theory in party-voter relationships is grounded in the premise that it would be cheaper for parties in poor countries to simply buy votes from the needy, than to distribute the party's collective incentives by making programmatic efforts at least in the short-term. When monitoring voters is difficult for parties, clientelistic linkages are more fragile (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Parties dealing with voters who frequently move, and who have complex and sometimes contrasting interests in an industrialized society, will be more committed to developing ideological linkages which will function as an information short-cut.

Indeed, the existing studies provide a convincing theoretical basis for the idea that wealth promotes ideological linkages. However, the apparent plausibility between wealth and ideological linkages may be based on the fact that many less affluent countries with less programmatic parties are non-advanced and non-Western democracies, or are adopting a presidential system, which may in turn discourage the development of ideological linkages. Furthermore, a certain long-term trend inhibiting the development of ideological linkages has recently been observed in post-industrial societies (see especially Kirchheimer, 1966; Katz & Mair, 1995; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000). The signs of "party-in-decline" include ideological convergence among parties,

rising electoral volatility, and decreasing party membership and party identification in highly industrialized countries. These observations suggest that wealth and ideological linkages may not be in a simple positive correlation. To sum up, the relationship between modernization and party-voter linkages needs to be more rigorously tested, with other impinging factors simultaneously controlled.

Another approach pays attention to the effects of demographic factors, especially ethnic divisions, on party politics. Heterogeneous composition of ethnicity in a society has been considered to enhance clientelistic linkages of parties (Kitschelt, 2000; Fearon, 2003; Cox, 1997). When a salient ethnic group strongly favors a party or a particular group of parties, even if the ethnic group loyalty does not necessarily involve exchanging private goods for votes, the linkage is likely to be psychological rather than ideological. Social heterogeneity has been viewed as a deterrent, if not corrosive, in the development of ideological party attachments in the electorate.

Case studies support such a negative effect of ethnic divisions. The co-existence of ethnic-linguistic heterogeneity and low ideological salience in party competition is frequently observed in African party systems (Van de Walle, 2003; Posner, 2005). That is, election campaigns in African democracies are conducted largely based on non-ideological—such as ethnicity, region, or personal/charismatic—appeals for support.

In short, there is a convincing argument for believing that ethnic heterogeneity inhibits the development of ideological linkages. Ethnic parties often thrive in ethnically divided societies, and building ideological linkages might be less preferred priority for these parties and their electorate, compared with those in ethnically homogenous

societies. Still, the apparent relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and ideological linkages needs further investigation, in consideration with possible impinging factors such as institutional and democratic conditions.

**Democratic Explanations: Exceptionalism versus Maturation**

A classical thesis on party systems in developing democracies is that they are under-institutionalized. This was articulated most explicitly by Mainwaring and his coauthors (Mainwaring, 1998; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007). According to Mainwaring (1998), "party systems in the third-wave democracies are markedly less institutionalized than those in most long established democracies" (p. 67) and "personalities rather than party organizations dominate the political scene" (p. 75).

Party system institutionalization is a multidimensional concept; one of its components is the extent to which parties have strong roots in the society. Parties and party systems in developing democracies are described as lacking strong social roots, since their party attachment among voters is weak, and party competition based on policy programs is not visible in many of these countries (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Mainwaring, 1998; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007).

The arguments made by Mainwaring and his coauthors focus on the timing of democratization. By stating that "institutionalization is not an inevitable product of time," and that "the critical determinant of electoral competition is when democracy was born, not how old it is" (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007, p. 171), they suggested that a definite difference exists between established and third-wave democracies in terms of the nature of party-voter relationships. Recently, Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) reported no

clear downward trend in electoral volatility over time in Asian countries, claiming that the party-voter relationships in first and second-wave democracies are distinct from those in third-wave democracies.

Against this thesis of "exceptionalism," as labelled by Lupu and Stokes (2010), a number of scholars have emphasized the process through which party systems mature. Put simply, partisan attachments among voters, organizational structures of parties, and voters' acquisition of information about parties' ideological positions all take time to develop (Converse, 1969). In their cross-national analysis, Dalton and Weldon (2007) empirically found that repeated electoral experience in developing democracies increases the proportion of partisans, concluding that "it is not that citizens in new democracies are not learning partisanship, rather, it is that the conditions where partisan learning can occur are lacking" (Dalton & Weldon, 2007, p. 192). Lupu and Stokes (2010) also demonstrated that the democratic process encourages the spread of partisanship and hence the stabilization of electoral volatility over time, using longitudinal data of electoral volatility in Argentina. Studies in this line of argument, in short, suggest that the nature of party-voter relationship changes—not destined—with the passage of time, or with accumulation of electoral experiences by both parties and voters.

To sum up, the available evidence is at best mixed between the argument that time cannot fix the problem of the party systems in developing democracies and the one that it is only a matter of time before they assimilate to the structure found in those in established Western democracies. Furthermore, scholarship on democratic explanations for partisanship cannot fully explain the question of ideological linkages, because they

do not directly account for the nature of linkages between parties and voters. In short, the question of "Do the timing of democratization and the level of democracy promote ideological linkages?" has not yet been sufficiently addressed.

## Voters, Parties, and Activists

I assume a party as constituted by three groups of players, voters, party (elites), and activists. The atomic model of a party—party elites at the position of nucleus, activists moving in a circular orbit around the nucleus, and voters who support the party at the outermost orbit—has been deemed useful since Duverger's (1951) seminal work on electoral competition of political parties. Resting upon Duverger's concentric circles—electors, supporters, and members—Panebianco (1988) classified the layers of a party as the electorate (those both formally and factually outside the formal party organization), party members and activists, and party leaders. In European context, therefore, members are generally assigned to the intermediate area between the electorate and the party leaders plus activists. With formal membership, members limit themselves to paying dues and participating now and then in party meetings. Meanwhile, a slightly different understanding of the party has been developed in the U.S. Although the party in the U.S. has also been understood as organized around three core activities since Key's (1964) conceptual introduction of "party-in-the-electorate," "party-in-government," and "party-as-organization," members are not regarded as important actors. Partisanship, which is understood as a property of (mostly) members and activists in Western Europe, is a property of ordinary voters in the U.S., with parties helping lead the voters in making vote decisions as information short-cuts.

Admittedly, the layers of actors of the party need not be identical across countries. While membership (still) is meaningful in Western European and post-Soviet democracies, there are many democracies—and individual parties—where formal membership is not very relevant, e.g., the Philippines, South Korea and most of Latin American countries. Also, as Panebianco (1988) admitted, it is not possible to draw a clear-cut distinction between simple members and activists while we can speak of a `participation continuum'. For these reasons, I choose the most simple, and thus probably best-traveling, classification of the actors of the party, according to their main activities.

At the outmost circle, there are voters. Among the voters, there are activists who participate in the party's electoral activities. While some voters and some activists may have party membership, membership itself does not distinguish them from non-members. Activists are defined as the participants of campaigning activities of a party or a candidate who run with a party label. They work for the central party and meet voters on behalf of the party. In this way, they operate between the central party and voters. I define a central party as the central party organization composed of party leaders within-and-out-of the legislature. They are career politicians, and at the same time, the critical decision makers of the party's direction, such as the contents of party platforms and coalition strategy. The party leaders are, however, not assumed to have absolute autonomy from other parts of the party. They are rational actors, contemplating the distribution of ideological incentives and material incentives to activists and voters for the party's (and thus their) well-standing.

## Outline of the Dissertation

In exploring and explaining the variance in ideological linkage across parties, across party systems, and over time, I take a comprehensive approach that considers not just party elites (party platforms or legislators) or voters but also party activists. The next three chapters respectively focus on each of the three components of ideological linkage—ideological affinity between voters and parties from voters' perspective, specific and ideologically distinguishable policy choices offered by parties, and ideologically motivated and coherent party activists—in the multilevel model. The methodology used for this multilevel approach is 'tripartite,' combining statistical analysis (large-N cross-national comparison), content analysis (case study) and traditional surveys (inter- and intra-country comparison).

In Chapter II, I uncover cross-national variations in the nature of party-voter relationship and generalizable determinants of the extent to which voters perceive their ideological affinity to their favored parties in 46 democracies in the world. To do this, I provide novel measures of ideological linkages to compare party systems and parties across space and over time, using the cross-national public opinion survey data of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (1996–2011). Chapter III investigates whether and how programmatic parties emerge in developing democracies, by using a least likely case of South Korea and methods of content analysis. In this chapter, I focus on testing the effect of democratic conditions on the development of party programs. Chapter IV explores the structure of the motivation underlying partisan activities and examines the effect of economic wealth on the motivation and ideology of party activists, by using a

unique survey dataset on party activists in South Korea and Mongolia. The research design of this chapter is the most similar systems design combining inter- and intra-country comparisons, so as to test the effect of wealth—national-, local-, and individual-level wealth—extensively. Finally, Chapter V draws the main threads of my argument together to discuss implications of major findings. I also discuss limitations and directions of future research in studying the multilevel model of ideological linkage.

# CHAPTER II

# COMPARING PARTY-VOTER LINKAGES ACROSS PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS: IDEOLOGICAL PARTISANSHIP IN VOTERS' MINDS

Party-voter linkages can be regarded as a product of two-way interaction between parties and voters (with party activists or members acting as intermediaries). On the one hand, a party hiring a strategy of ideological appeal to voters may later find it ineffective, if the targeted group of voters do not positively respond to it by supporting the overall ideological or a specific policy position of the party. On the other hand, some parties seem to enjoy a high level of policy endorsement by their voters, even though the parties do not make a significant commitment to policy programs. In either case, answering to the question of whether the parties have strong ideological linkage is not so simple.

In this chapter, the primary research question of this study, why ideologically-based parties or party systems emerge in some democracies but not in others, is directly addressed *from the perspective of voters*. As elaborated in the previous chapter, the perception of voters that they are ideologically congruent with their favored party is among the key components of ideological linkage. Specifically, this chapter investigates the cross-party and cross-national variations in and the underlying conditions for ideological congruence between parties and voters, using a sample of 108 (election-specific) party systems in 46 democracies in the world.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents two sets of testable hypotheses to explain ideological congruence: a set of hypotheses to explain variations across different party systems by evaluating the three competing approaches in the comparative study of party politics reviewed in the previous chapter and another set of hypotheses developed to explain cross-party variations. The second section describes the data and two measures of ideological congruence, distance and dispersion, to test the hypotheses. The last two sections present and discuss the empirical findings.

## Hypotheses

### Hypotheses at the Party System Level

As reviewed in CHAPTER I, the major approaches in the comparative study of parties and party systems can be summarized with the institutional, socio-economic and democratic explanations, which emphasize different types of factors as forces shaping the preferences and behavior of politicians, individual citizens and group. The hypotheses to explain the variations in ideological congruence across different party systems are directly derived from the three competing approaches and formally summarized in Table 1. The years of democratic competition discussed in the previous chapter as one of the key democratic explanatory variables along with the timing of democratic transition is substituted with the level of democracy ($H_{2.3b}$) in this chapter for two reasons: First, when a regime experienced a democratic transition and how old the democracy is can be essentially the same indicator in a cross-sectional analysis. Second, a more effective way to test the impact of the passage of time under a democratic setting

will be a close examination over time by focusing on a single or small number of cases, which will be conducted in CHAPTER III by using the South Korean case.

Table 1 Formal Statement of Hypotheses: Ideological Congruence at the Party System Level

| All other things being equal, a party system has higher ideological congruence under the condition of: | | |
|---|---|---|
| Institutional Explanations | $H_{2.1a}$ | A parliamentary system than a pure- and semi-presidential system. |
| | $H_{2.1b}$ | A party-centered electoral system than a candidate-centered electoral system. |
| Socioeconomic and Demographic Explanations | $H_{2.2a}$ | High levels of modernization than low levels of modernization. |
| | $H_{2.2b}$ | Lower levels of heterogeneity in ethnicity than higher levels of heterogeneity. |
| Democracy Explanations | $H_{2.3a}$ | An old democracy than a new democracy. |
| | $H_{2.3b}$ | A more democratic country than a less democratic country. |

**Hypotheses at the Party Level**

Strong ideological linkage may not be attainable to the same extent across different parties in the same party system. While some parties may view diluting their ideological colors as a winning strategy, other parties seeking strong ideological linkage may find it hardly achievable. In any case, parties will face and deal with their own problems or advantages in building ideological linkages with the electorate.

### *Party Age*

Among such factors constraining or encouraging ideological linkages would be organizational maturation by time, or a process of learning about the electorate and adapting to the environment of political competition. Similar to other organizations, parties learn the rules of game, various strategies to survive or win, and the nature of voters from whom it wants to draw support, over time. Regardless of the type of party-voter linkages, it takes time for a party to earn the loyalty of voters (Converse, 1969) or to set up an elaborate organizational infrastructure for their linkage mechanisms (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 24). As much as for other types of party-voter linkages, repeated interactions are an essential way through which voters learn political orientation of a party and through which voters determine the extent to which their ideology and that of the party align. Also, with such repeated political experiences, voters supporting the same party will gain a shared view of a good society or desirable policies. Since the process of understanding ideological orientation involves an abstract thinking process, the length of time may be more important for the development of ideological linkages than that of non-ideological linkages. Thus, the years of party organization activities or participations in political competition (either truly democratic or not) are expected to be positively correlated with the strength of ideological congruence.

### *Party Size*

As a party grows, it requires more careerist-oriented organizational actors, which accordingly increases the prevalence of selective incentives (Michels, 1962; Panebianco, 1988). Large parties usually require commensurate bureaucratic development, while

solidarity and official aims are more emphasized in small parties (Panebianco, 1988, pp. 18–19). Also, large parties are more likely to experience "competition between diverging interests" (Panebianco, 1988, p. 18) within the parties, whereas small parties will reach an internal agreement more readily between their leaders and supporters, as well as among the supporters in the same party. Therefore, the size of a party is likely to be among the predictors of ideological congruence of the party (a negative correlate).

***Party's (actual) Ideology***

The relationship between ideological linkage and party ideology has not been directly assessed in previous literature. However, studies of party politics imply that some patterns may exist between the two. Historically, conservative parties were born as an elite organization, and leftist or workers' parties emerged from social movements to politically mobilize the masses and the labor class (Duverger, 1951). Also, the right and the left have different positions on several socio-economic issues: in general, leftists tend to view economic inequality as a matter of structure and support government intervention to address the inequality, while rightists are less interested in ensuring equality through government intervention (Bobbio, 1996; Wiesehomeier & Doyle, 2012; Jahn, 2011). Such general differences in origin and policy focus lead us to expect leftist parties to have stronger ideological linkage than rightist ones: a linear relationship between party ideology (0 for the left and 10 for the right) and the ideological linkage, as depicted in the first plot in Figure 1.

Still, there are other ways of association in which party ideology and ideological linkage to voters may be related. Rather than linear, the relationship might be curvilinear

in nature. When voters support a party on an extreme point, the rationale for their support might be less ideological than the rationale of voters who support moderate parties. Some voters, for example, may be attracted to extreme parties as a result of their aversion to politics itself, rather than their support for certain policies of such parties. Some parties are (erroneously) viewed as ideologically extreme parties because of their strong orientation toward particular issues rather than broad national issues or toward the distribution of particularistic benefits for a narrowly targeted group of voters. Such extreme parties, as a result, would maintain weaker ideological linkages with their voters than centrist parties. The second plot in Figure 1 describes this negative curvilinear relationship between ideological linkage and party ideology.

Another possibility is that the curvilinear relationship might be convex rather than concave. Some parties may take a position around the center on a broad range of the ideological spectrum, because they want to attract as many voters as possible. By making vague ideological appeals, they may expect to achieve maximum electoral gains. Or, regardless of their electoral interest, centrist parties may find it more difficult to determine their targets among voters. As a result, such parties may fail to narrow down their pool of voters by advocating a strong ideological position. On the other hand, extreme parties might find it easier to determine who their voters are, and therefore, have advantages in forming stronger ideological linkages. In any of these cases, a positive curvilinear relationship between ideological linkage and party ideology should be observed as depicted in the third plot in Figure 1. As previous studies do not provide a

clear guide regarding which expectation is more plausible, these hypothesized relationships need to be tested.




*Figure 1.* Hypothesized relationships between party ideology and ideological congruence. Party Ideology is assumed to be at some point between a 0 (extreme left)–10 (extreme right) point scale.

Table 2 formally summarizes testable hypotheses derived from the theoretical discussion. In Table 2, four hypotheses ($H_{2.4}$, $H_{2.5}$, $H_{2.6a}$, and $H_{2.6b}$) have been formulated to explain ideological congruence at the party level. To test these hypotheses, I create the indices of ideological congruence for each party and each party system based on the post-election public survey data collected between 1996–2011 from Module I, II, and III of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). The indices cover 582 political

parties in 108 (election-specific) party systems[3] in 46 free and partly-free democracies (based on the assessment by the Freedom House).

Table 2 Formal Statement of Hypotheses: Ideological Congruence at the Party Level

| All other things being equal, a party has greater ideological congruence under the condition of: | |
|---|---|
| $H_{2.4}$ | An old party than a young, new party. |
| $H_{2.5}$ | A small party than a large party. |
| $H_{2.6a}$ | An extreme party than a moderate party in terms of its actual ideological policy position. |
| $H_{2.6b}$ | A leftist party than a rightist party. |

## Measures of Ideological Congruence: Distance and Dispersion

The CSES surveys include several questions, such as "Which party do you feel closest to?" and "Locate your ideology in a left-right spectrum on a 0–10 scale."[4] The CSES also includes questions asking respondents to place each of the parties in their country by using the same scale. I used these three questions—closest party (as a proxy

[3] The party systems in the sample are Albania (2005), Australia (1996, 2004, and 2007), Austria (2008), Belgium-Flanders (1999), Brazil (2002, 2006, and 2010), Bulgaria (2001), Canada (1997, 2004, and 2008), Chile (2005 and 2009), Czech Republic (1996, 2002, 2006, and 2010), Denmark (1998, 2001, and 2007), Finland (2003, 2007, and 2011), France (2002 and 2007), Germany (1998, 2002, 2005, and 2009), the United Kingdom (1997 and 2005), Greece (2009), Hong Kong (2008), Croatia (2007), Hungary (1998 and 2002), Iceland (1999, 2003, 2007, and 2009), Ireland (2002), Israel (1996, 2003, and 2006), Italy (2006), Japan (1996, 2004, and 2007), South Korea (2000, 2004, and 2008), Latvia (2010), Mexico (1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009), Netherlands (1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010), New Zealand (1996, 2002, and 2008), Norway (1997, 2001, 2005, and 2009), Peru (2000, 2001, and 2011), Poland (1997, 2001, 2005, and 2007), Portugal (2002, 2005, and 2009), Romania (1996 and 2004), Russia (1999 and 2004), Slovakia (2010), Slovenia (1996, 2004, and 2008), South Africa (2009), Spain (1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008), Estonia (2011), Sweden (1998, 2002, and 2006), Switzerland (1999, 2003, and 2007), Taiwan (1996, 2001, and 2004), Thailand (2007), Turkey (2011), Uruguay (2009), and the United States (2004 and 2008).

[4] In the CSES survey question, "left" and "right" terms were replaced with "progressive" and "conservative," respectively for Japan and Taiwan.

of partisanship), self-placed ideology, and parties' ideological placement by respondents—to construct my measures of ideological congruence.

In measuring the ideological congruence of a party system, I consider the 'relevance' of the parties within a party system. If a party is chosen by only a handful of voters as their closest party, any measures based on the judgment of such small number of respondents are likely to be biased. Also, it is possible that some parties failed to win a seat in the legislature, and they did so because they have little electoral interest. I assume these parties are not important parties in democratic competition, and drop them from the sample to prevent their scores from distorting the value of the ideological congruence of the party system. Specifically, I include in the sample only parties that have a minimum of ten voters (ten respondents who answered that they feel closest to the party), and at the same time, have seats in the legislature.

The ideological congruence of a party system is measured in terms of the weighted sum of the ideological congruence of all the relevant parties in the party system. I calculate the measures of ideological congruence of a party and a party system as follows: Consider a polity with $J$ parties and a unidimensional space of ideology. I denote the self-placement of the $i^{th}$ supporter of the $j^{th}$ party as $E_{ji}$, and the placement of the $j^{th}$ party by the $i^{th}$ supporter of the party as $P_{ji}$. The distance between a respondent and her closest party on the ideological spectrum is gauged by simply examining the absolute distance between them ($\left\|E_{ji} - P_{ji}\right\|$). To determine the ideological congruence of the

party, I compute the mean distance between a party and its supporters on the left-right spectrum, ($\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_j}\|E_{ji}-P_{ji}\|}{n_j}$).

While this quantity, ideological distance of a party, can be used to compare parties within the party system, there is a potential problem when it is used to obtain the ideological congruence of a party system without consideration of the relative importance of the party in the party system. Minor parties, which may have a higher or lower level of ideological congruence with their supporters than major parties, can bias the score of an entire party system. Thus, I take into account the seat share of the parties when computing the ideological congruence of a party system. This seat-weighted ideological distance of a party system with J relevant parties is calculated as:

$$\text{Ideological Distance}_{\,party\ system} = \sum_{j=1}^{J}\left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_j}\|E_{ji}-P_{ji}\|}{n_j}\right)S_j \quad \forall\, i,j$$

where

• $S_j$ = party's seat share in the legislature.

• $n_j$ = the number of the $j_{th}$ party's supporters (respondents).

Although ideological distance is an intuitive measure with strong validity in capturing subjective ideological distance between parties and voters, there is a drawback associated with the use of this measure. Ideological distance does not take into account the variation in the self-placed ideology of supporters of a party ($E_{ji}$) and the variation in the ideology of the party assessed by their supporters ($P_{ji}$). For instance, it does not distinguish between the cases when most supporters place their own ideology and their

party's ideology on the same position while supporters' ideology and the party's ideology are both highly dispersed–such as when most points of $(E_{ji}, P_{ji})$ are located on/around the 45' line–and the cases when the points of $(E_{ji}, P_{ji})$ are greatly concentrated around a particular point. In both cases, the value of ideological distance approaches to zero, indicating ideal and complete congruence.

For this reason, I devise an alternative measure that considers how both the self-placed voter ideology and the party's ideology assessed by the voters are spread on a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate plane. Ideological dispersion is obtained from the mean of Euclidean distances between $(E_{ji}, P_{ji})$ and $(E_j, P_j)$—the mean point of $(E_{ji}, P_{ji})$ for the $j_{th}$ party—for all $i$. Hence, the seat-weighted ideological dispersion of a party system which has J relevant parties is:

$$\text{Ideological Dispersion}_{\,party\ system} = \sum_{j=1}^{J}\left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_j}\sqrt{(E_{ji}-E_j)^2+(P_{ji}-P_j)^2}}{n_j}\right)S_j \quad \forall\, i,j$$

where

•$E_j$ = mean of self-placed ideology of the $j_{th}$ party's supporters.

•$P_j$ = mean of the $j_{th}$ party's ideology placed by the $j_{th}$ party's supporters.

A small ideological distance indicates that the people who support a particular party views themselves to be ideologically close to their party, and thus, that such parties have higher levels of ideological congruence than parties with a large distance. Likewise, a smaller dispersion indicates greater congruence in that voters supporting the party exist as an ideologically-coherent group, whereas a larger dispersion implies

weaker congruence. If the ideological congruence of parties in a party system is large overall, the party system would have a small distance or dispersion.

There is a moderately positive correlation between dispersion and distance values of the 582 parties in the sample, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.45. The correlation coefficient rises to 0.83 at the party system level. Such a moderate to high level of correlation implies that the two measures do not represent completely identical aspects of ideological congruence, and at the same time, that there is a great deal of overlap between the aspects captured by each of the two measures, validating the necessity of both measures in examining ideological congruence.[5]

At a glance, as shown in APPENDIX A,[6] the ideological distance values of the parties in the sample range from 0.13 (the Left Bloc in Portugal [2002]) to 8.26 (the Civic Democratic Party in Czech Republic [2010]), with 1.34 being the average. The dispersion values, on the other hand, range from 0.6 (the Union Progress and Democracy in Spain [2008]) to 5.74 (the Democrats, or ex-PEL, in Brazil [2010]), with 2.35 being the average. From both measures, nine out of the ten lowest values are earned by parties

[5] These two measures of ideological congruence have a potential problem arising from the fact that it does not take into account the possible misplacement of ideology by respondents. Uninformed voters often misperceive their party's position as well as their own ideological position, and tend to place a party at the middle of the scale (Alvarez & Franklin, 1994). For this reason, a more objective measure might be to replace $P_{ji}$ (the $j_{th}$ party ideological position placed by the $i_{th}$ supporter of the party), which varies across supporters of a party, with $Q_j$ (experts' placement of the $j_{th}$ party), which is constant for each party. However, my measures capture better "the distance between a voter and her party from the voter's perspective," a subjective determination by the voters about the extent to which the party they support is congruent with themselves. By the same token, how voters view the ideology of their supporting party is a critical component in measuring the extent to which the party-in-the-electorate exists as an ideologically-coherent group.

[6] The index of ideological congruence for the parties and party systems in the sample of this study is provided in APPENDIX A.

in Western Europe, such as Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Norway.

Alluded in the small values of their many individual parties, most party systems in Western Europe appeared to have small values of ideological distance and dispersion. As expected, eight out of the ten countries with the smallest distance and seven out of the ten with the smallest dispersion are West European democracies, such as Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway. The lowest values are found in Denmark (1998) (0.610), and next Spain (2000) (0.639).

However, Italy in 2006 (2.070 for distance and 2.914 for dispersion) and Belgium in 1999 (1.661 for distance and 2.622 for dispersion) stand out as exceptions from this thread. Their high values of distance and dispersion support the validity of the measurement, as both countries are well-known examples of non-ideological politics. Italy (2006) recorded the largest distance in the sample, equal to that of South Africa (2009), as depicted in the upper box-plot in Figure 2.[7]

Following West European democracies, many East European democracies rank in the middle. Interestingly, Anglo-Saxon countries (New Zealand, Ireland, Great Britain, Canada, the United States, and Australia) are ranked amongst those mid-ranged party systems, instead among the other Western democracies. On the other hand, most

[7] The countries in the category of Africa and the Middle East are Israel (1996, 2003, and 2006), South Africa (2009), and Turkey (2011). As to whether Israel and Turkey should be regarded as African or Middle Eastern is somewhat controversial, the results in the box-plots for this region is subject to problems of a biased sample in this study. Anglo-Saxon countries in the sample are Australia (1996, 2004, and 2007), Canada (1997, 2004, and 2008), Ireland (2002), Great Britain (1997 and 2005), and the United States (2004 and 2008).

Latin American party systems (except for Chile) appear to have weak ideological congruence, with large values of distance and dispersion.




*Figure 2.* Ideological distance of party system in 46 democracies, by region.

Following West European democracies, many East European democracies rank in the middle. Interestingly, Anglo-Saxon countries (New Zealand, Ireland, Great Britain, Canada, the United States, and Australia) are ranked amongst those mid-ranged party systems, instead among the other Western democracies. On the other hand, most Latin American party systems (except for Chile) appear to have weak ideological congruence, with large values of distance and dispersion.

Among several noticeable cases are Taiwan and South Korea, two third-wave democracies with Confucian traditions. Confucianism is known as an adverse condition to the development of ideological discourse, as it encourages harmony and the middle way ("the golden mean"). Contrary to conventional expectations, the distance values for Taiwan are equal to or lower than those for some Western democracies, especially Anglo-Saxon ones. In South Korea, ideological discourse has been not only culturally but also somewhat institutionally inhibited (e.g. the National Security Law) since the Korean War (1950–1953). Nonetheless, the decreasing values of distance and dispersion between 2000 and 2008 suggest an overall trend of growing ideological affinity in this country. The Taiwanese and Korean cases call attention to non-Western party systems, especially those which have been considered as the least likely cases for the formation of an ideological structure in politics. They also imply the possibility for factors other than the timing of democracy and region/culture to influence the growth and dynamics of ideological congruence.

## Analysis and Findings

### Model of Ideological Congruence at the Party Level

I first examine whether certain characteristics matter for a party to have strong ideological congruence, and thus make a difference in the level of ideological congruence across parties. Using the party-level measures as dependent variables, I test the four hypotheses presented in Table 2.[8] The equation for the party-level model is as follows:

$$\textit{Ideological Congruence}_{\text{party}} = \alpha + \beta_1 * \textit{Party Age} + \beta_2 * \textit{Party Ideology}^2 + \beta_3 * \textit{Party Ideology} + \beta_4 * \textit{Seat Share} + \beta_5 * \textit{Regional Dummies}$$

Table 3 presents the results of my analysis of ideological congruence at the party level. To control for regional/cultural factors, the four models include regional dummies. Models 1 and 2 test the effects of party age ($H_{2.4}$), size ($H_{2.5}$), and ideological position ($H_{2.6a}$ and $H_{2.6b}$) on ideological distance; Models 3 and 4 present the results of the identical models, with dispersion being used as a dependent variable. In Models 1 and 3,

[8] The CSES dataset for Module I (1996-2001) and II (2001-2006) provides the data on the year of party foundation. I collected the data for Module III (2006-2011) by checking official party websites when they are available and through reference to Wikipedia. The CSES also includes the data on the seat share in the legislature and the ideological position of parties (experts' assessment which I use as a proxy of actual party ideology). For cases of electoral coalitions which act like a single party in an election, I assessed the year of foundation and the actual ideological position, by checking the official website of such coalitions and of the parties in the coalitions, as well as secondary literature, to compare the scale and strength of parties within their coalition.

the curvilinear relationship between party ideology and ideological congruence ($H_{2.6a}$) is tested; Models 2 and 4 test a linear relationship ($H_{2.6b}$).[9]

Table 3 Explaining Ideological Congruence of Party (Generalized Linear Models)

| | Ideological Distance | | Ideological Dispersion | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Dependent Variable | Coeff (SE) | Coeff (SE) | Coeff (SE) | Coeff (SE) |
| Age[a] | -.002 (.000)** | -.002 (.000)** | -.002 (.001)** | -.002 (.000)** |
| Party Ideology$^2$ | .008 (.006) | | -.002 (.006) | |
| Party Ideology | -.073 (.062) | .005 (.011) | -.010 (.060) | -.026 (.012)** |
| Seat Share | .002 (.001) | .002 (.001) | .007 (.002)** | .007 (.002)** |
| East Europe & Former Soviet | .395 (.108)** | .401 (.112)** | .403 (.096)** | .403 (.096)** |
| Asia | .427 (.098)** | .433 (.096)** | .469 (.085)** | .469 (.086)** |
| Latin America | .640 (.092)** | .628 (.092)** | 1.209 (.156)** | 1.212 (.154)** |
| Africa & Middle East[b] | .294 (.123)** | .280 (.121)** | .389 (.128)** | .392 (.129)** |
| Constant | 1.322 (.127)** | 1.167 (.069)** | 2.145 (.144)** | 2.177 (.081)** |
| Log pseudolikelihood | -701.18 | -701.46 | -1012.80 | -1012.80 |
| AIC, BIC | 2.59, -3330.94 | 2.58, -3336.68 | 3.72, -3372.08 | 3.72, -3378.38 |
| *p<.1, **p<.05; | N=550 | N=550 | N=550 | N=550 |

*Note.* a. Although the coefficients of Age from both sets of models are same after being rounded to three decimal places, their actual values (and also p values) are not identical. The same applies to the coefficients and standard errors for Seat Share for each set of models. b. The countries in this category are Israel (1996, 2003, and 2006), South Africa (2009), and Turkey (2011).

In all the four models, party age has a statistically significant effect, with other variables being held constant ($H_{2.4}$). Substantively, this means that a party founded years ago tends to be more ideologically linked to its voters than a newly established party, and that the voters supporting an old party tend to be ideologically more homogeneous

[9] All the models in Table 3 and Table 4 are generalized linear models (GLMs) with a gamma distribution. The gamma GLM is ideally used with a skewed, positive continuous dependent variable, such as the ideological distance and coherence variables in this chapter. For these gamma GLMs, I used the identity link as a link function. A link function describes how the mean of $Y_i$, E($Y_i$), depends on the linear predictor, g($\mu_i$), where E($Y_i$) = $\mu_i$ and g($\mu_i$) = $\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + ... + \beta_p x_{pi}$. Using a different link function—log (ln μ) or inverse links (1/ μ) in the case of gamma models—did not change the regression results.

in terms of both how they view their own ideology and how they view their party's ideology. This finding supports that, with the passage of time, parties improve its ability to build ideological linkage, by accumulating the knowledge about their environment of political competition and about the characteristics of the voters to which they want to appeal. In this way, time helps narrow the gap between a party and voters. Also, through repeated experiences of voting for and other political interactions with the same party, the supporters of an old party achieve a high level of ideological coherence among themselves.

Little surprisingly, non-Western parties are found to have a greater value in both distance and dispersion than Western parties. Yet, the variation among non-Western parties is notable. Compared to their Western counterparts, parties in East European and former-Soviet democracies and in Asia have a greater ideological distance by approximately 0.4, while those in Latin America have an even greater distance by 0.6 points. The significant weakness in ideological congruence of Latin American parties is apparent in Models 3 and 4, where dispersion is used as a dependent variable. For Latin American parties, the self-placed ideology of voters and the party's ideology placed by the voters are widely spread, lacking a shared view among them. This finding is consistent with the observations by scholars of Latin American party politics that many of the parties in that region have failed to establish strong social roots (see especially Mainwaring, 1998).

Nevertheless, the statistically significant effect of regional dummies should not be seen as conclusive evidence of the importance of neighborhoods or cultures in the

development of strong ideological congruence. The weak congruence in non-Western parties may be due to some external constraints related to the country's delayed democratization and/or institutional features. Given that many of the non-Western democracies have either a presidential or semi-presidential system, it might be hasty to conclude that differences in culture or neighborhood are critical in explaining ideological linkage.

On the question of the effect of party size ($H_{2.5}$), contrary to expectation, a significant difference was not found between large parties and small parties in their values of ideological distance. This suggests that, regarding party size measured by seat share of a party, large parties maintain ideological distance as much as small parties. While the reason is not clear, this may be because large parties are often covered by the media, so that voters would have a higher level of familiarity with such parties. Voters who support large parties, accordingly, might perceived themselves to be closely aligned with the parties as much as those who support small parties.

While the models of ideological distance fail to reveal the effect of party size, the models of dispersion supports that a group of voters who support a party with a smaller number of legislative members is ideologically more homogeneous. In Models 3 and 4, party size in the legislature is clearly associated with the extent to which voters supporting the same party are dispersed in terms of their self-assessed ideology and the assessment of their party's ideology. The positive coefficients of party size indicate that small parties have a more ideologically-coherent group of voters than large parties. In Panebianco's (1988, pp. 18–19) term, "a system of solidarity oriented to realization of its

official aims" prevails in minor parties, whereas the parties are transformed to "a system of interests oriented toward its own survival" as their electoral gains grow. More generally, this finding confirms that the level of internal agreement is higher in small groups than in large groups, even when the group members do not directly interact with each other.

Lastly, none of the hypothesized relationships between party ideology–ideological position placed by experts on a 0 to 10 scale–and ideological distance of the party ($H_{2.6a}$ and $H_{2.6b}$) are supported by the statistical results. From Models 1 and 2, both party ideology and squared party ideology are not found to be associated with ideological distance. While the results of the distance models provide few clues as to how the level of ideological congruence is related to an actual ideological stance of a party, the relationship appears clearer in the models of ideological dispersion. Consistent with the results from the distance model, evidence of curvilinear relationship between ideological dispersion and party ideology is not detected (Model 3). On the other hand, the linear relationship is statistically significant (Model 4). Unexpectedly, party ideology appears to have a negative sign, indicating that voters from leftist parties are more widely dispersed along the ideological spectrum than voters from rightist parties. In other words, voters supporting a rightist party maintain a greater level of ideological congruence than those supporting a leftist party, with respect to ideological coherence.

This finding is somewhat surprising, given that leftist parties are traditionally known to invest in grassroots meetings and mass education, making a deeper commitment to intra-party unity. Rather, leftist parties may have to emphasize unity

because of their lack of ideological coherence within their parties. The result calls further attention to the relationship between party ideology and ideological linkage for the association to be more clearly understood.

**Model of Ideological Congruence at the Party System Level**

From the three competing approaches in the study of party politics, I have developed six hypotheses as presented in Table 1. To test the hypotheses, I set out the equation of the model of ideological congruence at the party system level as follows:

$$\textit{Ideological Congruence}_{\text{party system}} = \alpha + \beta_1 * \textit{Regime Type} + \beta_2 * \textit{Electoral System} + \beta_3 * \textit{Ethnic Heterogeneity} + \beta_4 * \text{Modernization} + \beta_5 * \textit{Third-wave Democracy} + \beta_5 * \textit{Level of Democracy}$$

For the regime type variable, I assign 1 to parliamentary systems, 2 to semi-presidential systems, and 3 to presidential systems. In a similar manner, I assign 1 to candidate-centered systems, 3 to party-centered systems, and 2 to any electoral systems between the two. For socio-economic variables, I use the square root of Growth Domestic Product per capita (in ppp terms, constant 2005 international dollars) as a measure of modernization, and ethnic fractionalization scores formulated by Fearon (2003) as a measure of ethnic heterogeneity. To test if being a third-wave democracy makes a difference in ideological congruence, I create a dichotomous variable in which third-wave democracies are assigned 1 and all others receive 0. Lastly, I use Freedom House scores as a measure of the level of democracy, which ranges from 1 to 5 for the sample countries.

Table 4 presents the results of three linear models to explain the ideological distance at the party system level, with a sample of 108 (election-specific) party systems in 46 democracies. I ran the same models using ideological dispersion of party system as a dependent variable, and obtained almost identical results. From all the three models, the results provide consistent evidence supporting institutional and economic factors. Both institutional variables, regime type and electoral system, have a statistically significant effect on ideological congruence of party system with other variables being constant: Presidential systems tend to have weaker ideological congruence than parliamentary systems; the ideological distance (and dispersion) is larger for party systems in a presidential system than those in a parliamentary system, demonstrating how the methods of selecting and dismissing chief executive(s) serve to shape party-voter relationships ($H_{2.1a}$). Also, the results support that the extent to which an electoral system provides incentives to cultivate personal votes affects the growth of ideological congruence. Ideological distance (and dispersion) is smaller under a party-centered electoral rule than under a candidate-centered rule ($H_{2.1b}$).

Amongst the socio-economic and demographic variables, only wealth is found to have a significant effect, supporting the contention that the economic development of a country goes hand-in-hand with the development of ideological congruence ($H_{2.2a}$). Specifically, if GDP per capita increases from 10,000 to 40,000 dollars, the ideological distance of the country will decrease by approximately 0.3 points. On the other hand, no significant relationship is found between ethnic heterogeneity and ideological congruence ($H_{2.2b}$). This suggests that ethnic heterogeneity itself does not foster non-

ideological linkage as commonly presumed. The key to the development of ideological congruence at the system level lies in economic development and political institutions.

Table 4 Explaining Ideological Distance of Party System (Generalized Linear Models)

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Coeff (SE) | Coeff (SE) | Coeff (SE) |
| Regime | .077 (.037)** | .080 (.036)** | .072 (.036)** |
| Electoral System | -.078 (.028)** | -.081 (.028)** | -.082 (.028)** |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -.036 (.150) | -.033 (.149) | -.036 (.151) |
| Modernization | -.003 (.001)** | -.003 (.001)** | -.002 (.001)** |
| Third-wave Democracy | -.046 (.066) | -.044 (.065) | |
| Level of Democracy | .017 (.040) | | .015 (.041) |
| Constant | 1.77 (.266)** | 1.832 (.240)** | 1.709 (.254)** |
| Log pseudo-likelihood | -127.651 | -127.654 | -127.659 |
| AIC, BIC | 2.49, -468.01 | 2.48, -472.68 | 2.48, -472.68 |
| *p<.1, **p<.05; | N=108 | N=108 | N=108 |

*Note*. I classify Greece, Spain, and Portugal into third-wave democracies; they are the only three countries which are Western, but non-established democracies in the sample of this study.

Lastly, there is little supporting evidence for democratic explanations ($H_{2.3a}$ and $H_{2.3b)}$. Although the negative coefficient of the level of democracy corresponds with the expectation that more democratic polities have greater ideological congruence, neither the dummy variable for third-wave democracies nor the level of democracy has a significant effect. This finding certainly undermines the democratic explanations on party-voter relationships that have been widely endorsed by scholars in comparative politics. In short, the statistical analysis indicates that the ideological congruence of a party system is determined by institutional and economic factors, rather than by when the polity experienced democratic transition or how democratic the polity is.

## Conclusion

By providing new measures of the party-voter relationship based on ideology, this analysis allows a close examination of the variations in ideological congruence across parties and party systems and of its determinants. The findings suggest the relevance of political institutions and economy in the growth of ideological congruence in voters' perception, and discount the importance of ethnic and democratic conditions. In particular, political institutions as a shaping force on the preferences and behavior of politicians, individual citizens, and groups seem to serve to overcome the 'doomed destiny,' if any, of late democratizers. However, it is not straightforward in this analysis how economic development affects the growth of ideological linkage, albeit the evidence of positive association. The effect of modernization will be discussed further in CHAPTER IV, by using a small-N method of comparative analysis.

I also found that how old and large a party is matter for the development of ideological congruence. Party age, in particular, is an interesting factor, having a significant effect independent of the democratic conditions of the country. This finding calls for further research on ideological linkage of 'old' parties in the context of developing or new democracies. Lastly, the finding that it is not left-wing parties but right-wing parties that maintain greater ideological congruence opens several new questions, such as whether the policy programs of leftist parties are generally less inclusive than rightest parties, resulting in their ideological isolation from voters and whether this tendency is stronger in some democracies and weaker in others. While answering these questions is beyond the scope of this study, I will focus on the effects of

the passage of time and the growth of economy on the development of ideological linkage through the following chapters.

# CHAPTER III

# PROGRAMMATIZING PARTIES IN THE LEAST LIKELY PLACE: THE SOUTH KOREAN CASE

This chapter focuses on the questions of whether and how ideological party-voter linkage has emerged in South Korea. In CHAPTER I, I have explained why the functioning of ideology should be understood as a multilevel phenomenon in party politics and discussed potential benefits of such understanding. While an ideological party at the voter level has a group of voters or supporters with a strong ideological affinity for the party, the component of strong ideological linkage at the party elite level is to have clearly defined and ideologically distinct policy programs. In this chapter, I investigate ideological linkage at the party elite level, with a special focus on South Korean parties.

Specifically, I examine whether and how political parties in this new democracy have developed their programs, using the South Korean case. I analyze fifteen party manifestos published since the country's democratic transition in 1987 with respect to both "distinctness" and "unequivocalness." To determine the extent to which parties have distinct stances on key national issues, I employ the subjective coding method used by Harmel and Janda's Party Change Project. To determine how specific the contents of these programs are, I employ Pomper's (1971) coding scheme.

Party-voter relationships based on policies are often regarded as weak to nonexistent in developing democracies (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006), in East Asian

countries in particular (see especially Dalton et al., 2007). Through examining platforms of political parties in South Korea, I argue that ideological linkage from the side of political parties does grow over time, albeit not in a clear linear pattern, in developing democracies and that there are significant variations in the efforts to make programmatic appeals to the electorate across parties within the same country.

## Case and Methods

South Korea is an effective case to see whether and how political parties in new democracies assimilate to "western" style party-voter linkages, when key conditions, especially socio-economic conditions, are met. These include relative ethnic homogeneity (with the ethnic fractionalization score of 0.004 (Fearon, 2003)) and high modernization (ranked twelfth in Human Development Index score in 2010). At the same time, apart from its socioeconomic conditions of advanced industrial democracies, South Korea must be considered a critical case because of its historical path: massive military mobilization and exploitation under Japanese colonial rule from the early 1930s and 1945, confrontation with communist and autocratic North Korea since the independence, and personalized military authoritarian regime between 1961 and 1987. These historical developments were sufficient to lead the government to devise various

formal and informal institutions to suppress ideological discourse from being embedded in this country.[10]

South Korea is a presidential democracy with multiparty system since its democratic transition. It has a moderate multiparty system with 2.36 (in 2004) and 2.87 (in 2008) effective number of parties by seat in recent elections. Among the parties in the party system, I focus on two major parties that have—despite their relatively frequent organizational changes involving a party name change—endured over parties: the Grand National Party (GNP, or Hannara) and the Democratic Party (DP, or Minju). It is important to know that their platforms are not election-specific. While many Western European and the Unites State's parties have produced electoral manifestos, equivalent electoral manifestos were not institutionalized in South Korea until 2008 during the National Assembly election held in that year. The platforms I used for this study, however, should be regarded as the parties' official document expressing their identity and pledges. Even though the internal democracy of political parties in general is often considered suspect (regardless of the country level of democracy), the platforms of the two South Korean parties have been adopted and changed in accordance with party

[10] For example, National Security Act which was legislated in 1948 for the purpose of regulation of anti-government organizations has been one of the effectively used to legal institutions in the suppression of ideological discourse. According the Act's Article 2 (Definition), "the term 'anti-government organization' means a domestic or foreign organization or group which uses fraudulently the title of the government or aims at a rebellion against the State, and which is provided with a command and leadership system" (Statues of the Republic of Korea website; http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor/main.do). North Korea is such an organization and the Act can apply to any person who involves in activities of praising, advocating, or justifying it. Precedents of punishment include cases in which a person or a group criticized the government of South Korea in a casual occasion. The National Security Act was drafted based on Public Order Maintenance Act of Japanese rule used to suppress political freedom of South Korea, when it was a colony of Japan.

constitutions and rules during parties' official meetings, such as a party congress and/or party supreme committee in which party leaders and other elites are assembled.

I analyze two major parties' platforms published between the years of 1987 and 2010—seven platforms for the GNP (published in 1987, 1990, 1995, 1996, 2003, 2004 and 2006) and eight platforms for the DP (published in 1987, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010) in two ways. According to the Downsian model of electoral competition (Downs, 1957), party programs should have two virtues in their program: they should be distinct from platforms of other parties, and thus, provide voters with meaningful alternatives; and they should be specific enough for voters to recognize the contents as distinctive. I judge the strength of ideological linkages of a party based on these two dimensions. In other words, the ideological linkages in a party are considered to be strong at the party level when the platform of a party is highly distinct and unequivocal. Hence, both "distinctness" in the unidimensional space of ideology, and "unequivocalness (or specificity)" in policy contents, on the other hand, will be investigated separately. In this way, whether and how democratic maturation promotes ideological linkages in third-wave democracies can be ascertained with some certainty.

First, to address the extent to which the stances that parties have on key national issues are distinct from those of other parties, I employ the subjective coding method of

Harmel and Janda's Party Change Project (PCP). The PCP coding measure policy positions by analyzing political texts, party manifestos specifically.[11]

In consideration of the Korean context, I have tailored the PCP method by selecting three relevant issues from an issue list (total 19 issues) of PCP, which was originally devised for established party systems, and use the coding schemes. The issues selected from PCP are (1) the range of governmental provision of social service, (2) agricultural support by government, and (3) limits of defense spending. In addition to the three issues, I devised a coding scheme for a Korea-specific issue, (4) North Korea/unification, and evaluate whether Korean parties have distinct positions on these four issue areas. The coding schemes for North Korea/Unification issue and one of the three PCP issues (social service: range) is found in APPENDIX B.

Next, to address the issue of specificity in the contents of party platforms, I employ Pomper's (1967) coding method for party platforms. By reading platforms sentence by sentence, to extent to which a platform presents specific programs versus vague, meaningless rhetoric to the party's elites, activists, and voters can be gauged. In investigation of how much the U.S. party platforms have policy significance, Pomper (1967) classified each sentence of the platforms of Republican Party and Democratic

[11] A more popular dataset of party position estimates has been generated by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG)/Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). PCP estimates political parties' relative positions on particular issues, not relative salience of the issues as CMP does (for a more detailed discussion of problems in using CMP data, see Harmel et al., 1995). The strength of PCP lies in such direct measurement of party positions by combining expert opinion approach and manifesto analysis, while risk of human error exists due to its heavy reliance of judgmental procedures on the ability of the coder who assigns the most appropriate numerical code (among 11 values from -5 to +5) for each issue for each platform. Thus, coders should be well-trained in use of the relevant coding schemes and carefully read all statements pertaining to a particular issue in a given platform.

Party published between 1944 and 1964 into one of the categories he designed: three principal categories—(1) Rhetoric and Fact, (2) Evaluation of the Parties' Past and (3) Future Policies—and six sub-categories under the third principal category (Future Policy)—Rhetorical, General, Continuity, Goals and Concerns, Action, and Details. I present some example statements of each category for the case of South Korean party platforms in APPENDIX C.

## Hypotheses

A conventional wisdom on political parties and party systems in developing democracies is that they are not institutionalized to the same extent as their Western counterparts, lacking the stability and regularity in patterns of electoral competition. The observed signs that parties in developing democracies are not comparable to established Western democracies include high electoral volatility, frequent party mergers and splits, legislators' party switch (switching their party affiliation), personalization of a party, and the lack of the political competition generated through the policy commitment of parties. As elaborated in CHAPTER I, scholars of comparative politics have attempted to explain the seemingly under-institutionalized properties of parties in developing democracies. Among the several approaches is the democratic explanation, which seems largely divided into two groups.

On the one hand, Mainwaring and his coauthors (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Mainwaring, 1998; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007) focused on the timing of democratization. Specifically, it was claimed that most properties of electoral competition in a democracy is determined by when the country experienced the

transition to democracy, and not critically affected by the passage of time since the transition (Mainwaring, 1998; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007; also see Hicken & Kuhonta, 2011 for East Asian cases). On the other hand, recent studies examining the democratic consolidation process of the post-1970s democracies asserted that partisan attachment among voters grew and electoral volatility was diminished in these countries, with repeated experiences of democratic election (Dalton & Weldon, 2007; Lupu & Stokes, 2010). In short, literature suggests mixed evidence for the effect of the passage of time, or the repeated experiences of democratic election on the organizational structure of a party, party-voter relationships, and the stability of parties and party systems.

While previous literature remains inconclusive regarding how democratic conditions influence party and party system institutionalization, the democratic approach has an important implication for the study of party-voter linkage mechanisms. Specifically, how are democratic conditions related to a certain type of linkage mechanisms—in this case, ideological linkage mechanism? If partisan learning occurs and parties are institutionalized as time goes by even in a newly democratized country, parties may take steps towards cultivating new (or previously weak) linkage mechanisms in electoral attempts to attract voters outside their traditional electoral base. When political parties try to diversify their linkage strategies to maximize their electoral gains, programmatic efforts and skills are also likely to be accumulated—even if the change is slow and sometime hardly perceivable—within party organizations, as elections are repeated. Even when parties hesitate to make more policy commitments, the recognition

of the importance of electoral competition based on policy programs may grow among the electorate as democracy is maturing.

Reduced to concise hypotheses, I will test the following hypotheses on ideological linkage mechanism.

$H_{3.1}$ Ideological linkages mechanism grows over time. Specifically,

$H_{3.1a}$ Party platforms will show increasing policy specificity over time. Issue positions will be distinct between parties, and the distinctness will gain consistency and stability over time.

$H_{3.1b}$ Issue positions will be distinct between parties, and the distinctness will gain consistency and stability over time.

If $H_{3.1}$ is demonstrated by the platform analysis of South Korean parties, my analysis will provide empirical support for the democratic explanations of ideological linkages. Specifically, the hypothesis will provide more support for the maturation explanation (ideological linkage develop as democracy matures), and will subsequently call into question the exceptionalism explanation (ideological linkages do not or only marginally grow as democracy matures in new democracies). If my analysis results in the rejection of $H_{3.1}$, however, then the argument that the nature of a party system in late democratizers, and East Asian democracies in particular, are systematically different from that in early democratizers will be furthered.

It is unlikely that party-voter linkage mechanisms necessarily develop evenly across parties in a party system, as Randall and Svåsand (2002) critique of undifferentiating usage of party system institutionalization and party institutionalization

demonstrates. In a party system, there are both established parties and relatively new ones: stable parties which have not experienced leadership changes; parties subject to wide organizational changes due to a recent leadership change; parties with strong grassroots organizations; parties without such resources. Even if a party system is highly institutionalized, the levels of institutionalization of each party in the party system are often observed to vary. In Germany, for instance, the Left (Die Linke) is a less institutionalized party within as a highly institutionalized party system. The party was founded in June 2007, as the merger between the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and the Electoral Alternative for Labour and Social Justice (WASG). The share of votes the party gained in previous elections in the 1990s and 2000s was not very stable, with a significant increase during the 2000s, from 4.0 in 2002 to 11.9 percent in 2009. Along with the high electoral volatility, the party also had to undergo a drastic change in identity from a Marx-Leninist to social democratic party in the wake of German reunification in 1990. As individual parties influence each other through electoral and governing interactions, the dynamics at the individual party level cannot be completely autonomous from the dynamics at the party system level. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the former and the latter do not necessarily have to be synchronized, and thus, the development of ideological linkage can vary across parties within the same party system.

To explain such uneven development of ideological linkages within a party system, recent works on East Asian democracies illuminate the critical role of historical path (Hicken & Kuhonta, 2011). In analyzing party system institutionalization in East Asia, Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) argue that the concept of institutionalization needs to

be strictly separated from the concept of democracy, as suggested by Huntington (1968). After examining electoral volatility in Asian countries, they conclude that "it is the authoritarian, institutionalized parties that are now democratic, or maintain some aspects of democracy that serve as the anchor for emerging democratic, institutionalized party systems or semi-democratic systems" (Hicken & Kuhonta, 2011, p. 4). In short, historical legacies account for the current nature of a party and a party system, and in the case of many developing democracies, the legacies rooted in some element of authoritarianism are a crucial variable. The second hypothesis of this study is to test the effect of historical legacies on the development of ideological linkages at the party level. In a testable form, I test the following hypothesis that ideological linkages mechanisms are formed asymmetrically among parties within a party system, and that these linkages are stronger for a party with authoritarian legacy.

$H_{3.2}$ Parties with authoritarian legacies will have more consistent platforms over time for each key issue than other parties.

That said, these parties, nevertheless, do not necessarily have more specific programs, because it is often observed that such parties enjoy an electoral advantage, for a number of years after a democratic transition. When the chance of winning is low, especially due to structural constraints, strong policy commitment can be a relatively cheap and feasible strategy in electoral competition. However, when the chance of winning is high, a party would have less incentive to make commitment on policy programs. These characteristics are found in the platforms of the Democratic Party (DP-Taiwan) and the Kungmintang (KMT) during the early years of democracy in Taiwan—

in other words, we see lengthy platforms of DP-Taiwan and short ones of the KMT. Even in the U.S., party platforms are a less specific in contents when their presidential candidate is a strong incumbent (Pomper, 1967).

## Analysis and Findings

Before measuring ideological linkages of South Korean parties and testing the hypotheses discussed above, it is necessary to briefly discuss some preliminary facts pertaining to the platforms of the parties. There are seven platforms for GNP and eight for DP in this analysis. I collected party platforms published since 1987, the year of democratic transition as the Constitution was amended for direct presidential vote. The list of platforms is presented in Table 5, with the time of publication and the official name of the party at the time of publication.[12]

Table 5 Platforms of Two Major Parties in South Korea Since 1987

| List of Party Platforms (month and year of publication) | |
|---|---|
| GNP Family | DP Family |
| Democratic Justice Party (N/A 1987) | Democratic Peace Party (Nov 1987) |
| Democratic Liberal Party (May 1990) | Democratic Party (N/A, 1992) |
| Democratic Liberal Party (Feb 1995) | New Politics National Conference (Sep 1995) |
| New Korea Party (Feb 1996) | New Millennium Democratic Party (Feb 2000) |
| Grand National Party (Jun 2003) | Uri Party (Nov 2003) |
| Grand National Party (Mar 2004) | Democratic Party (Aug 2007) |
| Grand National Party (Jan 2006) | United Democratic Party (Feb 2008) |
| | Democratic Party (Oct 2010) |

[12] As can be seen in Table 5, two platforms of a party in DP family, namely the Democratic Party's platforms published in 1995 and in 1996, are excluded from the list of DP platforms. Democratic Party was divided by the political comeback of Kim, Dae-joong (a former president between 1997 and 2003), three years after he declared retirement from politics following his defeat in the 1992 presidential election. Admittedly, determining which party is a legitimate heir of DP family is not always straightforward in cases of party split. Despite the potential risk of bias, I chose to rely on common, conventional understanding of this split, from the point of view of ordinary voters.

In Figure 3, I compare the length of the fifteen platforms by counting the number of sentences in each platform. It is apparent from Figure 3 that GNP platforms were consistently shorter than DP platforms until the late 2000s, when the length of DP platforms dropped to their minimum (67 and 49) since 1987. On average, the length of platforms (in terms of the number of sentences) of parties in GNP family is almost three times longer than those of the parties in DP family, with an average of 50.57 sentences for the GNP and 148.5 sentences for the DP. The stark difference in length between the two parties may indicate that the DP outperforms the GNP in platform specificity, and therefore ultimately, in ideological linkages. However, platforms can be filled with rambling rhetorics without meaningful policy programs, and consequently become quite lengthy. Notwithstanding that DP parties outnumbers GNP parties, the platforms therefore requires inspection in detail to reveal to what extent the parties make policy commitments in their platforms.




*Figure 3.* The length of party platforms in South Korea between 1987 and 2010.

One conventional wisdom about parties in many developing democracies, including South Korea and other East Asian countries in particular (Dalton, Russell J. et al. 2007), is that their policy programs are only peripheral and their electoral competition is characterized by personalism, regionalism, or clientelism. I compare the content distributions of party platforms in South Korea to those in the Unites States (the Republican and Democratic parties) in Table 6. Unexpectedly, the proportion of specific policy statements in the platforms of South Korean parties is not smaller than the US parties, which are generally known to be more programmatic than most parties in developing democracies. Compared to parties in other established Western democracies, US parties have been regarded to be "pragmatic" with greater flexibility in adjusting their policy positions. However, Kitschelt and Kselman (2013) claimed that US parties have the strongest policy-based linkage in the world, by using the measure of

programmaticism based on experts' evaluation. On average, the majority of the US platforms are non-specific statements (rhetoric and facts, past evaluations, future-rhetoric, future-general, future-policy continuity), whereas the platforms of both South Korean parties skew towards more specific statements—future policy direction (goals and concerns in Pomper's (1967) terminology), actions, and details.

Table 6 Content Distributions of the South Korean Parties in Comparison with the US Parties

| Content | GNP Family | DP Family | US Parties |
|---|---|---|---|
| Non-specific | 46.2 (7.84) | 30.09 (16.84) | 75.4 (8.25) |
| Policy Direction | 50.08 (5.11) | 49.17 (14.96) | 8.14 (3.78) |
| Policy Action or Details | 3.72 (4.22) | 20.74 (18.67) | 16.46 (6.07) |

*Note*. Entries are the mean proportions of each big category in party platforms with standard deviations in parentheses. The 1987 platforms of both GNP and DP are not included as these platforms in the very initial year of democracy are in fact at the extreme in content specificity, which may produce bias in understanding overall tendencies. I used Pomper's (1967) data for the platform contents of the US parties (12 platforms produces from 1944 to 1964).

Figures 4 and 5 present the content distributions of statements in the platforms between 1987 and 2010. In general, the DP platforms are more specific than the GNP platforms. The most striking difference between the two parties lies in the initial stage of democracy through the early 1990s. In particular, the 1987 and 1990 platforms of the GNP do not have a single statement pertaining to policy actions and policy details. In contrast, about 90 percent of the 1987 and 1992 platforms of the DP refer to policy direction and policy actions/details, with a minimum proportion of rhetorical and general statements.

Beginning with the first hypothesis—the specificity of platforms will increase over time as a democratic regime matures ($H_{3.1a}$)—there is weak, or at best, mixed support for this hypothesis. For the GNP, the proportion of policy direction and actions/details shows a slightly increase following democratic transition. Rhetorical and general statements were kept to a minimum between 1987 and the late 1990s; while this trend became static during the early 2000s, the proportion of rhetorical and general statements were reduced again in 2006. Nevertheless, it is hard to find a clear trend over time for the DP platforms. Obviously, from Figure 5, the proportion of policy actions/details have largely decreased, from 63.2 percent in 1987 to 19.5 percent in 2010, despite periodic fluctuations. An examination of the proportion of rhetorical and general statements reveals, however, much wider fluctuations, with a peak in 1995 (58.8 percent) and a plunge only five years later in 2000 (20.4 percent). Yet, upon closer inspection, recent years have witnessed a consistent decrease in rhetorical and general statements along with a significant rise in specific content in DP platform statements. In sum, my analysis does not provide strong evidentiary support for the democratic maturation hypothesis in South Korean parties—especially for the DP (although this hypothesis is weakly supported for the GNP).




*Figure 4.* Content distributions of the GNP platforms between 1987 and 2010.




*Figure 5.* Content distributions of the DP platforms between 1987 and 2010.

Apart from content specificity, the hypothesis on democratic maturation can be also tested in terms of distinctness in party positions ($H_{3.1b}$). Evidentiary support for $H_{3.1b}$

is observed if issue positions are distinct between parties, and the distinctness gains consistency and stability over time. Figure 6 presents the positions of the two parties on four issues. One clear pattern in this data is that the ideological distance between the DP and the GNP varies according to issues. On the one hand, the range of governmental social service provisions and defense spending are the issues on which the two parties have similar positions or even occasionally reach a complete agreement on the centrist/neutral position. On the other hand, they have divergent views on governmental support on agriculture and even more conflicting views on the issues of North Korea/unification.

On the whole, it is clear from Figure 7 that the two parties are certainly distinct in issue positions, with the GNP consistently taking the center-rightist position (a mean of 0.55 and standard deviation of 0.33 when the 1987 platform is excluded) and the DP taking the center-leftist position (a mean of -0.88 and standard deviation of 0.57 when the 1987 platform is excluded). While the stability and consistency in policy distinctness between the parties over time are not obvious in each issue area (as can be seen in Figure 6), the average issue positions in Figure 7 suggest that ideological linkages grew at the party level during the first decade of the 21st century. At one point in the mid-1990s, the platforms of the two parties approximated each other, they have since diverged, gaining more distinctness over time in issue positions.




*Figure 6*. *P*arty positions on key issues between 1987 and 2010.

Another pattern observed from both Figures 6 and 7 is that the fluctuation in issue positions for the DP is wider than for the GNP between 1987 and 2010. Except for

the extreme 1987 platform, the positions of the GNP are relatively consistent over time moving 0 to 2 for agricultural support and from 0 to 1 for all other three issues. Across the four issues (as shown in Figure 7), the average issue positions of the GNP have ranged between 0 at minimum and 1 at maximum since 1990. In contrast, the positions of the DP have swung between -1 and 1 for defense spending and changed more irregularly for agricultural support. For social service, the DP moved drastically to the left in the latest platform. Consequently, the average issue positions of the DP range between -0.25 and -1.75, at an interval of 1.5 which is 50 percent bigger than the GNP's interval of 1. Specifically, the GNP shows more consistent issue positions since the 1990s with a standard deviation of 0.33 compared to 0.57 for the DP in the average platform position. This suggests positive evidence for the hypothesis that a party with authoritarian legacies will have more consistent issue positions over time than other parties since the GNP had closer ties to authoritarian elites, and as such, was rooted in authoritarian legacies, since it was born from a merger between some democratic forces and authoritarian leaders in 1990.




*Figure 7.* Average issue positions of the GNP and the DP between 1987 and 2010.

## Conclusion

Political parties and party systems in developing democracies have received considerable attention in the electoral and party politics literature over the last couple of decades. However, the comparability between parties and party systems in developing democracies and those in established democracies was often doubted. This resulted in analysis of party systems in developing democracies being left to area studies, given the scholarly consensus on the central distinction between Western—representing advanced industrialized democracies—and non-Western party systems that political parties in the

former compete for votes with distinct policy programs, whereas the latter are characterized as personalism, clientelism, or regionalism without ideological party-voter linkage. The purpose of this study is to cast some light on the causes and the development process of ideological linkage in developing democracies, through an analysis of a critical case, South Korea.

By directly applying the manifesto analysis methods used for the study of parties and party systems in established democracies to South Korea, this analysis examines the extent to which two major parties in South Korea have made commitments to policy programs over the last two decades. When parties make such efforts, they should have specific policies and distinct positions on issues from other parties; this ultimately means that they employ an ideological linkage strategy in their relationship with voters. Through my analysis of the party platforms of these parties since the democratic transition, it is evident that the ideological linkage of South Korean parties do exist at the party elite level, a finding that runs counter to the conventional wisdom pertaining to political parties in many developing democracies including South Korea. The party platforms of South Korean parties include a large portion of policy directions, actions, and detailed policies, and are not mostly filled with rhetorical and general statements. The GNP parties have been usually found to the right side of the DP parties in issue positions, despite the fact that the distance between the two parties is not so great that they are unable to reach a policy agreement. The largest and most persistent distance between the two parties is (predictably) found in the issue area of North Korea/unification.

# CHAPTER IV

# BRIDGING BETWEEN PARTIES AND VOTERS: LOCAL PARTY ACTIVISTS IN SOUTH KOREA AND MONGOLIA

This chapter explores the various motivations underlying partisan political activities and the factors leading an individual to be motivated by distinct political incentives, focusing on local party activists in South Korea and Mongolia. Specifically, in this chapter I attempt to provide some preliminary answers to the questions of what motivates partisan political activities, who are motivated by which incentives, and whether wealth enhances the ideological linkage mechanism among party activists. From my definition of ideological linkage as a multilevel phenomenon, party activists who are ideologically motivated and coherent within the party are among the key components of a party's strong ideological linkage with society. Party activists are between parties and voters in real politics; they are the front-line party that faces and deals with the voters in person in local communities. In this chapter, I investigate ideological linkage at the party activist level, using a unique survey dataset on local party activists in South Korea and Mongolia.

At the center of scholarly discussion in the studies of party politics in recent decades was a decline in the levels of party membership in Western democracies and beyond (Katz & Mair, 1992; Scarrow, 1996, 2000; Seyd & Whiteley, 2004; Whiteley, 2011). The attention has recently turned to questions regarding identifying who still wants to participate in party activities, what they seek from such participation and the

factors that encourage and discourage citizen participation. (Bruter & Harrison, 2009; Pederson, Bille, Buch, Elklit, Hansen & Nielsen, 2004; Cross & Young 2002; Young & Cross, 2002). Interest in the motivation and activism of party activists is not new; the motivational multidimensionality and heterogeneity in the hierarchy of a political party has been examined in the British (Whiteley, Seyd, Richardson, & Bissell, 1994) and the US context (Constantini & King, 1984; Constantini & Valenty, 1996). Nevertheless, comparative investigation on party activists, or members, is yet in an initial stage, largely limited to cases from Anglo-Saxon and Western European democracies. Therefore, examining party activists using cases outside of long-standing Western democracies will be a meaningful attempt at better understanding how party activists function as a link between parties and voters.

In addition to exploring the various motivations of those who are involved in partisan political activities, this study is explicitly designed to test the effect of economic wealth on the functioning of party activists in party-voter linkage mechanisms. In recent research on party-voter linkage mechanisms, scholars asserted that such policy-based relationships are most likely to thrive in economically affluent societies. Resting on the classic modernization theory—a positive association between economic and political development–, Kitschelt and his coauthors (Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt & Freeze, 2010; Kitchelt & Kselman, 2013) asserted that economic development is a key factor determining the development of policy-based relationships between parties and voters (or programmatic linkage mechanisms in their terms). Arguing that "poverty goes with a predominance of clientelistic accountability strategies

in competitive politics and high affluence goes with an emphasis on programmatic party competition," (Kitschelt & Freeze, 2010, p. 30) this group of the Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) provided evidence that national wealth is positively correlated with the level of programmaticism and negatively correlated with clientelism, by using the measures obtained from their expert survey data (Kitschelt & Freeze, 2010; Kitchelt & Kselman, 2013). In Chapter 2, I also found strong evidence of the association between party-voter relationship and national wealth. By measuring perceived ideological distance between parties and voters, I found that voters in economically affluent countries are ideologically closer to the political party they support than those in less affluent countries.

Indeed, in poor countries it might be cheaper for parties to simply buy votes from the needy than to distribute the party's collective incentives by investing their resources to develop policy programs. On the other hand, ideological linkages are expected to be stronger in modernized countries, as substitutes for clientelistic linkage. It will be harder to monitor voters who frequently move and have complex interests in a more industrialized society. As a result, parties in economically developed societies will make a stronger commitment to cultivating ideological linkages. In short, the existing studies claim that modernization promotes policy-based linkage mechanisms while it inhibits other, non-policy-based ones.

However, there are theoretical problems unaddressed in existing literature. First, the strong advocates of modernization theory in party-voter linkage mechanisms do not make it clear whether programmaticism (or clientelism) is a result of micro factors

defining individuals or contextual factors surrounding individuals with varying economic conditions. Specifically, there may be several reasons that clientelistic practice prevails: for example, poverty that individual voters face, cultural problems persisting in underdeveloped communities, and the administrative incapacity of the national government to implement policy programs promised during election campaigning, as Kitschelt and Kselman (2013) described. A question then arises whether the modernization theory holds (only) at the national level as a combined effect of the individual, local, and national factors, or whether it holds also at the local and individual levels, respectively, due to the factors at the corresponding level. In other words, due to the lack of conceptual disentanglement, there is insufficient research on the effect of wealth to draw any firm conclusions whether it is individual, community, or national conditions that inhibit the development of policy-based linkage.

The second theoretical problem lies in the lack of consideration of party activists in the existing research on party-voter linkage mechanisms. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) asserted that clientelistic parties have to "organize the flow of material resources across the complex, local exchange of client-broker-patron exchanges" (p. 8) and the "brokers will wish to divert as much as possible of a party's electoral resources to their private use rather than to confer them on lower-level brokers" (p. 8). In addition to the inevitable need for brokers, clientelistic strategy requires political parties to build a social-network-based monitoring system to prevent the defection of voters as well as brokers. On the other hand, they claimed that programmatic exchange relations with the electorate does not necessitate sizable intermediary organizations with a large number of

personnel between the central party and the electorate. What is important for programmatic parties is creating a common collective party program "against the centrifugal tendencies of all individual party activists to assert their own individual or factional preference schedules" (p. 9). Hence, in Kitschelt and his coauthors' discussion of party-voter linkage mechanisms, party activists are regarded either as brokers–for clientelistic parties–or as unnecessary, even potentially disrupting players–for programmatic parties.

Perhaps reflecting their lack of consideration of party activists, US parties appear to be the most programmatic in the world, according to their measures of programmaticism/clientelism from expert opinion surveys of the DALP. If not a validity problem, it is hard to accept without question their finding that political parties in the countries widely known as being less programmatic in party competition (e.g., South Korea, Belgium, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Serbia, Moldova, and Italy) are more programmatic than political parties in the countries known for participating in highly programmatic competition for several decades (e.g., Sweden, Finland, UK, and Norway). These results might be a sign that their definition of programmaticism is biased to the US case, and more generally speaking, to electoral-professional parties, discounting membership-based parties and grassroots-movement parties. In short, the existing research on linkage mechanisms does not seriously take into account the various roles of party activists between parties and voters.

However, from existing literature on linkage mechanisms some expectations are derived about party activists: There will be various types of party activists with different

kinds of motivation within parties, and various patterns of motivation across parties and across party systems. A party activist as a weak ideological link between her party and the electorate, if not a broker, is likely to be attracted by selective interests that are directly or indirectly related to her own benefits. Such selective incentives are not necessarily confined to material ones. Neither should they be directly and immediately given. On the other hand, a party activist in an ideological linkage mechanism will be more interested in policies and public issues than those in a clientelistic linkage mechanism. Furthermore, while the constant effort of programmatic parties to create a single collective voice may not always be successful, activists serving as strong ideological linkage between their party and voters are likely to maintain more ideological coherence among those within the party than those serving as weak ideological linkage.

Ideological structure in party systems or linkage mechanisms of political parties have been studied mostly either at the voter level or at the elite level (legislators' or experts' perspectives). Yet, attempts focusing on ideological linkage at the level of party activist, especially in the context of non-Western democracies, have been rare to non-existent. To fill the empirical as well as the aforementioned theoretical gaps in the study of party-voter linkage mechanisms, I examine the relationship between economic well-being and linkage mechanisms with a special focus on party activists in East Asian democracies. The modernization theory will be extensively tested by decomposition of economic wealth into individual-, local-, and national-level wealth. Towards this goal, I

conducted the Party Activist Survey in multiple districts in two developing democracies in East Asia, South Korea and Mongolia.

## Hypotheses

The following hypotheses thus will be tested:

$H_{4.1}$ Party activists under more economically affluent conditions will be more motivated by policy-interests than those under less affluent conditions.

$H_{4.1a}$ [Individual level] Holding all other national and district-level conditions (e.g., local culture) constant, wealthy party activists will be more policy-oriented in the motivation underlying their partisan political activities than poor party activists.

$H_{4.1b}$ [Country level] Holding democratic experience (e.g., timing of democratic transition, the years of democratic competition, and the level of democracy) and key national-level institutional conditions constant, party activists in a more developed country will be more motivated by policy-interests than those in a less developed country.

$H_{4.1c}$ [District level] Holding all other national-level conditions constant, party activists in a more affluent district will be more policy-oriented in the motivation underlying their partisan political activities than those in a less affluent district.

$H_{4.2}$ Party activists under more economically affluent conditions will be more ideologically coherent among themselves within the party than those under less affluent conditions. Specifically,

$H_{4.2a}$ [Country level] Party activists in a more developed country will be more ideologically coherent within the party than those in a less developed country.

$H_{4.2b}$ [District level] Party activists in a more affluent district will be more ideologically coherent within the party than their peers in the same party in a less affluent district.

In addition to the hypotheses about the effect of economic wealth, I will also test the effect of party size on the motivation of party activists. Because minor parties are relatively lacking in the capacity to deliver material or any other types of selective benefits to those working for the party, such parties are expected to focus their electoral effort more on providing collective incentives in the form of policy programs. Also those who are attracted by such parties in general are expected to be more policy-oriented than activists of major parties. Reduced to a concise hypothesis, I will test:

$H_{4.3}$ Activists of minor parties will seek selective incentives less (and policy-related incentives more) than those of major parties.

## The South Korean and Mongolian Cases

Conventional wisdom concerning political parties in developing democracies is that they do not compete over distinct policies, while only valence issues prevail in election campaigning in a way that 'our party can do anything better than others' (see especially Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). East Asian democracies, in particular, have been regarded as 'the least likely cases' for ideological parties and party systems to emerge because of the Confucian culture embedded in their political history (Kim 2000).

For this reason, scholars have paid little attention to party programs and party-voter relationships based on policies in East Asian democracies.

I compare party activists from multiple, economically contrasting districts in Mongolia and South Korea, with simultaneous consideration of inter-country and intra-country variations. In this way, I address the problem of generalizability, which is magnified in an intra-country analysis, and at the same time, reduce the concerns over comparability and ecological fallacy— in this case, the presupposition that ideological linkage will evenly develop throughout a country—that are magnified in an inter-country analysis.

In small-N comparison, cases must be carefully selected to avoid selection bias. Above all, I have in mind the comparative-case strategy that essentially tries to "maximize variance of key variables and to minimize the variance of the control variables" (Lijphart, 1975, p. 164). South Korea and Mongolia qualify for "the most similar systems" (Przeworski & Teune, 1970) in several aspects. Geographically, both are located in East Asia and thus share some common regional properties. Historically, Genghis Khan-led tribes from the Mongolian steppe invaded and ruled the Korean peninsula between the 13$^{th}$ and 14$^{th}$ centuries, which subsequently induced significant cultural exchange between the two regions.

In addition, both countries underwent democratic transition in the period of the third wave of democratization. In both countries, a combination of a series of mass demonstration and elite negotiations led to the introduction of a democratic constitution. As a result, a direct presidential election was held in 1987 for the first time since 1971 in

South Korea, and the first multi-party electoral competition was held in Mongolia in 1990. Due to their (relatively) peaceful process of democratic transition and their uninterrupted democratic continuity for the last quarter century, the two countries are often referred to as successful models among third-wave democracies. Their current levels of democracy measured by Polity IV are also similar, 8 for South Korea and 10 for Mongolia (10 means fully institutionalized democracy) since the late 1990s.

Institutionally, they are considerably similar in many ways: both have a unicameral legislature, a directly elected president, and a mixed electoral system. In fact, the democratic regime type is not exactly the same, as South Korea is a presidential democracy while Mongolia is a premier-presidential democracy.[13] However, their electoral systems for the legislative branch are strikingly similar in the way in which votes are translated into seats. Specifically, both countries have an independent mixed electoral system, a combination of district plurality (single-member district plurality, or SMD) and a nation-wide closed-list proportional representation (PR) system, not to mention having the same four years of electoral cycle. Furthermore, their electoral systems are also similar in that plurality seats greatly outnumber PR seats in the legislature. The only notable difference is in the district magnitudes of the majoritarian

[13] A premier-presidential system is one in which "the prime minister and cabinet are formally accountable exclusively to the assembly majority –and thus not to the president" (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 30).

component, single-member districts for South Korea and single- to multi-member districts for Mongolia.[14]

On the other hand, the two countries are greatly different in their level of economic growth. South Korea has been a high income OECD country since the late 1990s, while Mongolia has been a low-middle income country (by World Bank). Table 7 summarizes the attributes of the two countries in key explanatory and control variables. If not exhaustive, but with most key and control variables being considered, South Korea and Mongolia are probably among the most proper case combinations in testing the effect of modernization on the development of ideological linkages. Still, there is one potential problem. The levels of ethnic fractionalization are pretty distinct between the two countries. Ethnic diversity is, and should be, controlled when the effects of modernization are tested. I address this issue by choosing only ethnically-homogeneous districts from each country.

[14] The resemblance in electoral system between South Korea and Mongolia resulted from the recent electoral reform in each country. Before an electoral reform in the early 2000s, South Korea had a dependent mixed electoral system in which seat allocations at the PR level is dependent on the results of the plurality/majority (or other) district seats. The Constitutional Court had ruled that allocation of proportional representation seats by the result of plurality vote in single-member districts. Consequently, a new rule has been applied in South Korea since the National Assembly Election held in 2004, with 245 of the National Assembly's 299 members being elected by voting from SMD and the remaining 54 members elected proportionally by votes cast for political parties. In Mongolia, a similar mixed electoral system was first introduced in the 2012 parliamentary election, following the passage of a revision of the country's election law in Mongolia's Parliament, State Great Khural, on December 14, 2011. This amended law changed a majoritarian electoral system—MMDP in 1992, SMDP in 1996, 2000, and 2004, and again, MMDP in the 2008 parliamentary election) (Schafferer, 2005, p. 742; The International Republican Institute, 2008, pp. 10–11)—to the independent mixed one. According to this new rule, 48 of the total 76 seats are decided from one-, two, or three-member district plurality voting and the remaining 28 members are elected proportionally.

Table 7 Comparing South Korea and Mongolia

| | South Korea | Mongolia |
|---|---|---|
| *General Information* | | |
| Parliamentary Election Date | April 11, 2012 | June 28, 2012 |
| Population in 2007 [density][15] | 48,459,000 [486 per sq.km] | 3,133,000 [2 per sq.km] |
| *Political Institutions* | | |
| Regime type [PPI][16] | Presidential system [0.59] | Premier-Presidential system[17] [0.84] |
| Legislative structure [term; total seats] | Unicameralism [four years; 299] | Unicameralism [four years; 76] |
| Electoral system | Independent mixed electoral system biased towards the plurality rule: a combination of a single member district plurality system (245 seats) and a national-level closed-list proportional representation system (54 seats). | Independent mixed electoral system biased towards the plurality rule: a combination of a single to multimember district plurality system (48 seats; the district magnitude ranges from one to three) and a national-level closed-list proportional representation system (28 seats). |
| *Socio-economic Conditions* | | |
| GNI rank in 2009, Atlas method[18] | 13th (High income, OECD country) | 154th (Lower Middle income country) |
| GNI per capita in 2009, Atlas method[19] | $19830 | $1630 |
| GDP composition by sector[20] | Agriculture: 3%<br>Industry: 39.4%<br>Services: 57.6% (in 2008) | Agriculture: 21.2%<br>Industry: 29.5%<br>Services: 49.3% (in 2009) |
| Ethnic heterogeneity (Alesina et al., 2003) | 0.004/0.002 | 0.272/0.368[21] |
| *Democracy* | | |
| Democratic Transition[22] | 1987 | 1992 |
| Polity IV[23] | 8 since 1999 | 10 since 1997 |
| Level of Democracy as of 2010 (political/civil liberty)[24] | 1/2 | 2/2 |

[15] CIA World Factbook 2007 (population by country) and World Development Indicators 2007 (population density).
[16] Parliamentary Power Index Scores (Fish & Kroenig, 2009).
[17] Mongolian presidents are elected by popular votes, but possess only informal, partisan authority to fire the prime minister as other premier-presidential regimes. Mongolian presidents are allowed to run for reelection with a single time limitation and, once elected, must secede from their party.
[18] World Development Indicators from World Bank (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNI.pdf).
[19] World Development Indicators from World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD).
[20] CIA World Factbook 2009 (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook).
[21] According to Embassy of Mongolia in Washington, D.C., the composition of ethnicity is Mongol (predominantly Khalkha) 85%, Turkic (in which Kazakh is the largest group) 7%, Tungusic 4.6%, other (including Chinese and Russian) 3.4% in 1998 (http://www.mongolianembassy.us/about_mongolia/).
[22] I took the year of a new, democratic constitution being enacted as the time of democratic transition.
[23] Polity IV project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). The scores range from -10 fully institutionalized autocracy to 10 fully institutionalized democracy.
[24] Freedom House Index (http://freedomhouse.org/). The scores range from 1(the most free) to 7 (the least free).

I conducted surveys among party activists who are participating in electoral campaigning in multiple economically contrasting districts in each country. By party activists, I mean those who work for an election campaign camp of a candidate who runs for election with a party label. In consideration of the strict time window (the election campaigning period which is strictly restricted by law in both sample countries to two or three weeks before an election day), I focus on party activists from "relevant" parties in each national party system (both countries have a moderate multiparty system).

**Sample Districts**

In selecting sample constituencies, I took into account multiple considerations. Above all, constituencies with extreme values in any social and political aspects other than economic aspects were ruled out. Specifically, I ruled out constituencies in the capital (Seoul for South Korea and Ulaanbaatar for Mongolia), although the capitals are the most modern and economically prosperous at the aggregate level in the two countries–as often observed in countries where economic growth was led by the state. However, considering that the population is greatly concentrated in the capital in both countries, a significantly high level of heterogeneity among the population of the capital is expected in terms of any demographic conditions and political views as well as economic conditions. In addition, many party activists working in the capital are likely to be more involved in central party organizations, rather than in 'local' party branches.

Second, in sample selection from South Korea, I considered regionalism. Regionalism has long been the most important electoral cleavage in this country. The parties with a significant number of seats in the National Assembly have had a strong

regional base. Since the first National Assembly election (held in 1988) after the democratic transition, the GNP has gained 70-80 percent of all valid votes in the constituencies in southeastern provinces (Kyeongsang-nam-do and Kyeongsang-buk-do), and the UDP has been dominant in southwestern provinces (Joenra-nam-do and Joenra-buk-do).[25] Thus, whereas there are some micro-factors affecting individuals' voting decisions, regionalism is usually the only critical predictor in electoral outcomes in these regions. In consideration of regionalism, I exclude the regions in which a particular party has been persistently dominant.

Third, I excluded the regions in which ethnic composition is markedly different from other regions. In some aimags in western Mongolia,[26] a large proportion of the population is non-Khalkha (for example, Kazakh for Bayan-Ölgi aimag, Dörvöd for Uvs aimag, Darkhad and Khotgoid for Khovsgol aimag, Zakhchin and Kazakh for Khovd aimag). In these aimags, Mongolian is often spoken only as a second language.[27] Such aimags with high ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity were not included in the sample. Lastly, I considered accessibility to the region. While getting to any region is not a problem at all in South Korea, there is a huge variation in accessibility across regions in Mongolia. In many aimags, air transportation is not a reliable option since local airports do not have regularly operating flights (or the airports simply do not operate). To access some aimags, especially those in southwest Mongolia where the Govi desert is located, it

[25] South Korea is administratively divided into eight provinces (*do*), one special autonomous province (*teukbyeol jachido*), six metropolitan cities (*gwangyeoksi*), and one special city (*teukbyeolsi*; referring to Seoul).
[26] Mongolia is administratively divided into 21 provinces (*aimag*) and the capital (Ulaanbaatar).
[27] Khalkha consists of about 86 percent of the national population of Mongolia.

takes several days due to the nearly-unpaved road condition. In the sample, I excluded such aimags with difficult accessibility, because timely transfers from one sample district to another are crucial in this study. In both countries, the time window is very limited to the legal period of election campaigning. In most sample constituencies, I conducted the Party Activist Survey with multiple parties. This made the survey schedule even tighter, and thus, accessibility was a primary concern.

Table 8 Electoral Districts and Political Parties in the Sample

| Country | Electoral District | Relative Level of Modernization within the Country | Parties Participating in the Survey (Number of Respondents) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mongolia | Arkhangai | Low | Mongolian People's Party (23), Democratic Party (41), Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (5) |
| | Orkhon | High | Mongolian People's Party (45), Democratic Party (29) |
| South Korea | Boeun/Okcheon/Youngdong, Chungbuk-Do | Low | Saenuri Party (12) |
| | Pyeongtaek Gap, Gyeonggi-Do | Low | New Progressive Party (12) |
| | Icheon-Si, Gyeonggi-Do | Low | Saenuri Party (7), United Progressive Party (20) |
| | Jungwon-Gu, Sungnam-Si, Gyeonggi-Do | Low (but relatively higher than the above three districts in South Korea) | Saenuri Party (7), United Progressive Party (12) |
| | Uijeongbu-Si Gap, Gyeonggi-Do | Low | New Progressive Party (11) |
| | Yongin-Si Byoung, Gyeonggi-Do | High | Saenuri Party (7), Democratic Party (14) |
| | Boondang Gap, Sungnam-Si, Gyeonggi | High | Saenuri Party (3), Democratic Party (17), Liberty Forward Party (12) |
| | Seo-Gu, Daejeon-Si | High | Saenuri Party (8), New Progressive Party (16) |
| Total | | | 301 (296 if the Mongolian People's Party is excluded) |

According to the criteria, I selected multiple sample constituencies with varying levels of economic development within each country, as displayed in Table 8. The

surveys were conducted in the chosen constituencies during the official period of electoral campaigning before the 2012 legislative election in Mongolia (June 5–27, election held on June 28, 2012) and in South Korea (March 24–April 10, election held on April 11, 2012).

**Political Parties in South Korea and Mongolia**

Tables 9 and 10 present a brief description of the political parties that participated in the Party Activist Survey from South Korea and Mongolia, respectively. In the sample party I only included activists who work for 'relevant' political parties in national politics. Political parties that gained at least one seat in the legislature or those that have maintained some organizational persistence are included in the sample. The Party Activist Survey was conducted in close consultation with electoral camps of these parties in the selected districts. Unlike Western democracies, a membership-based party structure is not common in many third-wave democracies. Even when the political parties claim that they have sizable party membership, the figures are somewhat suspect and the proportion of members who pay membership dues is usually minuscule. This is the case in South Korea, in particular, where the two major parties, the SP and the DUP, have not developed the membership-based structure, while officially they have party rules regarding members. There have been occasional scandals in recent years such that some voters happened to find themselves being a member of a party without their agreement to join the party. This is because the major parties are now increasingly introducing more open candidate-selection procedures in a form of primary election in which party members as well as ordinary voters participate by a negotiated ration

between the two groups. The proportion of members who pay a membership fee to the parties is significantly low, as it is only recommended and not required. Membership-based parties began to appear in the South Korean party system only after early 2000 with the foundation of the Democratic Labor Party. The creation of the DLP was based on the organizational decision of a national labor union that had not gained a legal status until the late 1990s (Korean Confederation of Trade Unions). After going through severe internal conflicts over ideology and the resultant splits, however, the DLP was divided into the UPP and the NPP.

Thus, party members are relatively new in at least one of the two countries, and thus, exclusively focusing on party members is not very relevant in studying party activists in East Asia. Also, if a person is officially a party member but not active at all it would not make very much sense to examine motivation in partisan activities or ideological functioning for that party's linkage mechanism. For these reasons, I chose to contact activists in person at the very scene of partisan political activities and collected their survey responses.

However, because party activists are defined only by their campaigning activities, or at least by presence in an electoral camp (of a candidate with a party label), using party activists instead of members generates a problem of sampling. Specifically, the entire population from which the sample is drawn is unknown, and at the same time, it is hard to judge the representativeness of the sample. I have to admit the possibility that the activists who participated in the survey are more active than others or that they

have time to participate in the survey because of their less active role in partisan political activities.

Table 9 Political Parties in Mongolia

| Political Party | Seats from the Election in 2008 (Seat Share) | Seats from the Election in 2012 (Seat Share) | Party Ideology (experts' opinion) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | CSES (0–10)[28] | DALP (1–10)[29] |
| Mongolian People' Party (MPP) | 45 (59.2%) | 26 (34.2%) | NA | 3.3 (Social Democracy) |
| | History and Organizational Characteristics | - Created as a vanguard party in 1921, the party led the independence war against China and White Russia under the auspices of Soviet Russia, and remained as a ruling party—the only lawful party—in communist Mongolia until 1990.<br>- In 2010, the party reverted to its original name, the Mongolian People's Party, by dropping 'revolutionary.'<br>- Won the presidential elections held in 1997, in 2001, and in 2005. | | |
| Democratic Party (DP) | 27 (35.5%) | 34 (44.7%) | NA | 6.71 |
| | History and Organizational Characteristics | - Originated from the merger between parties that were created during the anti-authoritarian movement around the year of 1990.<br>- Won the presidential elections held in 2009 and in 2013. | | |

[28] The dataset of the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES) provides political experts' evaluation about the parties' positions on the left-right scale in their country of expertise. Currently, the latest available information on the party ideology of South Korean parties is the one around the time of the National Assembly Election in 2008, presented in Module III of the survey. Mongolia is not included in any of the CSES survey modules conducted so far.

[29] The surveys by the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project asked political experts to assess the parties and party system in their country of expertise, which included the overall left-right placement of the parties. The scale of this question in this survey is such that 1 if "party is best located at the 'left' of the national political spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework and 10 if "party is best located at the "right" of the national political spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework" (Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project. 2008-9 Dataset. http://www.duke.edu/web/democracy).

Table 10 Political Parties in South Korea

| Political Party | Seats from the Election in 2008 (Seat Share) | Seats from the Election in 2012 (Seat Share) | Party Ideology (experts' opinion) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | CSES (0–10) | DALP (1–10) |
| Saenuri Party (SP) | 153 (51.2%) | 152 (50.8%) | 7 | 7.53 |
| | History and Organizational Characteristics | - Organizationally rooted in the merger between the parties of authoritarian ruling elites and some democratic leaders in early 1990.<br>- Produced four out of six presidents of South Korea since the first presidential election held in 1987 under a new, democratic constitution. | | |
| Democratic United Party (DUP) | 81 (27.1%) | 127 (42.5%) | 4 | 4.4 |
| | History and Organizational Characteristics | - Produced two presidents (1998–2003 and 2003–2008).<br>- Traces its historical origin to the anti-authoritarian movement in the 1980s.<br>- Several major organizational changes (party mergers and splits) accompanied by party name changes since the early 2000s. | | |
| United Progressive Party (UPP) | 5 (1.7%) | 13 (4.3%) | 1 | NA |
| | History and Organizational Characteristics | - The Democratic Labor Party (DLP) that was founded in January 2000 changed its name to the UPP with a major organizational change (party merger) in Dec 2011.<br>- The DLP was created as a mass party, and essentially it was a membership-based party for the first time in South Korean political history. The UPP and the NPP largely inherited such organizational characteristics of the DLP. | | |
| Liberty Forward Party (LFP) | 18 (6.0%) | 5 (1.7%) | 8 | 8.31 |
| | | | | |
| | History and Organizational Characteristics | - The Liberal Democratic Alliance that was founded in March 1995 changed its name to the LFP with a leadership change in April 2006.<br>- While relying on electoral support strongly based on regionalism in Chungcheong-Do, it added overtly rightest ideological color in the 2012 election campaign.<br>- Absorbed into the SP after the debacle in the 2012 election. | | |
| New Progressive Party (NPP) | 0 from the 2008 election; 1 from the by-election in 2009 (0.3%) | 0 (0%) | 1 | NA |
| | History and Organizational Characteristics | - A group of factions left the DLP in reaction to the dominating Korean nationalist faction, and created the NPP in March 2008.<br>- After losing its key politicians—including its one representative in the National Assembly—to the UPP in early 2012, the NPP announced its merger with the Socialist Party. | | |

## Analysis and Findings

### Multidimensionality of the Political Motivation of Party Activists

Studies on the varieties of motivation suggest the existence of multiple types of motives when activists decide to be involved in organizational activities (Panebianco, 1988; Clark & Wilson, 1961; Constantini & King, 1984; Constantini & Valenti, 1996; Cross & Young, 2008; Whiteley, et al., 1994). First, some people will be more attracted by selective and tangible rewards for themselves, such as incentives that may help heightening their social, political, or economic status as well as materials or a job that will satisfy their immediate economic need. I regard this category of incentives as including clientelistic goods (e.g., jobs, service accessibility, and money) that will satisfy their immediate economic need.[30] Second, political activities might be meaningful for some people due to some of the fresh and unusual experiences the activities can provide. Through partisan political activities, they could gain the feeling of being connected to a bigger group of citizens in the country. In particular, participating in rare, national events such as legislative elections can be an exciting opportunity to escape from daily routine. Third, there will be activists who participated with policy purpose, rather than seeking selective incentives or fancying the joys of social relationships. These activists are interested in public issues and have a desire to influence or bring changes to public policies, even if they lack a clear picture of how they want to change the society. This type of incentives has also been called 'moral' (Bruter & Harrison, 2009), 'collective'

[30] Exchange between material benefits and votes can hardly be detected from survey methods as this practice is strongly banned by laws in many countries including South Korea and Mongolia. In addition, directly asking about interests in such material rewards is likely to be a source of social desirability bias.

(Panebianco, 1988), or 'ideological' (Whiteley et. al., 1994) incentives in previous literature. Fourth, there might be some party activists who decide to be involved in partisan political activities for affective reasons or because of their belief that the participation is simply a duty as a member of a party or a community to which they belong. Lastly, for some people, partisan political activities are no more than providing a favor to their friends and family members. They work for a party or a candidate because of friendship even if they have an ideologically different view from the party or the candidate or even if they are not interested in selective incentives.

Before testing the modernization theory, it is important to explore the patterns of political motivation among party activists in the two East Asian democracies and to determine if the conceptually different types of incentives are indeed empirically distinguished. To identify one's political motivation underlying her partisan activities, I asked each individual the following question: "The following are reasons given by political leaders for having first become involved in politics. How do they express your thoughts or feelings at the time which you decided to join this election campaigning? Indicate on a four-point scale the importance to you of each item." I provided 19 items describing incentives that may attract one to partisan activities, following Constantini and King's (1984) model of multidimensional political motives, as listed in the first column of Table 11. The series of items in their model is relatively more comprehensive than those of other models on motivation in participating organizational activities.

Table 11 Political Motivations of Party Activists in South Korea and Mongolia: Factor Loadings from an Item Bifactor Model (Full-information Bifactor Analysis for Ordinal Response Data)

| Motive | General | Self-Enhancement | Sociality | Purposive | Allegiance | Personal |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| An interest in enhancing my prestige in my local community and among my acquaintances. | .354 | .673 (.741) | . | . | . | . |
| An interest in being appointed to a government office. | .228 | .791 (.821) | . | . | . | . |
| The search for power and influence | .192 | .776 (.795) | . | . | . | . |
| An interest in running for public office | .197 | .780 (.801) | . | . | . | |
| Being close to influential people | .245 | .849 (.885) | . | . | . | |
| Making business or professional contacts. | .286 | .752 (.803) | . | . | . | . |
| Fun and excitement | .080 | . | .655 (.627) | . | . | . |
| Making social contacts and friends | .444 | . | .601 (.675) | . | . | . |
| To meet my friends, renew old acquaintances and generally enjoy a great Korean/Mongolian social occasion | .260 | . | .878 (.945) | . | . | . |
| A desire to change things in society | .705 | . | . | .440 (.825) | . | . |
| A sense of indignation over the current state of affairs | .514 | . | . | .623 (.820) | . | . |
| Concern for public issues | .543 | . | . | .762 (.901) | . | . |
| To exchange views on the issues of the day and to help define the program of the party | .720 | . | . | .450 (.814) | . | . |
| To demonstrate my loyalty to state and party leadership | .680 | . | . | . | .230 | . |
| Strong party loyalty | .902 | . | . | . | .406 | . |
| Sense of community obligation | .857 | . | . | . | -.051 | . |
| The attraction of a particular political leader | .512 | . | . | . | . | .588 (.679) |
| The influence of a friend or friends | .268 | . | . | . | . | .607 (.710) |
| Friendship with a particular candidate | -.058 | . | . | . | . | .785 (.651) |
| Empirical Reliability | .792 | .784 (.804) | .699 (.743) | .623 (.770) | .321 | .605 (.592) |

*Note.* Cell entries are factor loadings. The factor loadings and empirical reliability scores from the unidimensional IRT model for each of the Self-enhancement, Sociality, Purposive, and Personal dimensions are in the parenthesis.

To determine the dimensionality, I used an item bifactor model. The item bifactor model is a statistical method for measurement based on item response theory (IRT). In the item bifactor model, each item is constrained to load on one general dimension and one of sub-dimensions. Such restriction of nonzero loadings on the

general factor and only one group factor provides a computational advantage to the bifactor model (Gibbons & Hedeker, 1992). More importantly, various motivational dimensions cannot be thought of as completely independent from each other, and perhaps from the broader dimension of participatory motives. In that sense, the bifactor model is a useful measurement tool realistically reflecting the theoretically multi-dimensional nature of motivation in political participation.[31]

Specifically, to identify important dimensions of political motives of party activists and estimate the extent to which one is motivated by each conceptual dimension, I used the graded response model (GRM). The response choice to each item asking the motives in the Party Activist Survey questionnaires is polytomous ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). The GRM is a polytomous two-parameter IRT model, which is useful when item responses can be characterized as ordered categorical responses such as existing Likert rating scales (Samejima 1969;

[31] The item bifactor model, or the multidimensional item response theory (IRT) model, is an extension of the IRT model which is a measurement method increasingly used in recent years in the fields of social and behavioral sciences along with the categorical factor analysis. Like the factor analysis, the IRT model offers a statistical model for response behavior as a function of a latent trait (or set of latent traits). The multidimensional IRT model, in particular, summarizes a multitude of measurements with a smaller number of factors, identifying important dimensions of a theoretical concept of interest and producing a set of estimates for each of the latent traits, or abilities. The major difference between the traditional factor analysis and the IRT model, however, lies in the fact that the latter is a full-information method which uses the entire set of response data and directly deals with categorical data, while the former uses limited information relying on a (tetrachoric) correlation matrix.

The IRT model as a measurement method also differs from the classical test theory (CTT) model that is the most frequently used method in summarizing responses to a set of survey questions. In the CTT framework, true score estimates are obtained by summing responses across items, from the assumption of equivalent item properties, or no provision for possibly varying item parameters. Because item properties are omitted from the model without being linked to behavior, the items must be justified outside the mathematical model of the CTT. To the contrary, in the IRT model item properties such as item difficulty and item discriminating power are included in the model and explicitly linked to behavior (survey responses). In other words, the IRT model estimates trait level that is most likely to explain the person's responses, controlling for the characteristics of the items.

1996). In the GRM, the trait level estimates depend on exactly which categories for which items are answered.[32]

From the item bifactor analysis, the existence of four distinct dimensions are identified. As presented in Table 11, the dimensions are Self-enhancement, Sociality, Purposive, and Personal Relationship, with their factor loadings being consistently high within the dimension. Nevertheless, one of the five theoretically important dimensions of motives turned out to be not very fitting in South Korea and Mongolia. This seems to be because the three items supposedly in the dimension of Allegiance ("To demonstrate my loyalty to state and party leadership," "Strong party loyalty," "Sense of community obligation") are too content-heterogeneous to produce a single measure of 'allegiance,' if any. Indeed, while the existence of five dimensions including "allegiance," was claimed by previous research on political motives of US party activists using a series of survey datasets (Constantini & Valenty, 1996; Constantini & King, 1984), the low factor loadings and the reliability score on the measure of 'obligation of fidelity' in the South

[32] In the graded response model, a person's probability of responding in each category to a specific item i conditional on a respondent's trait level $(\theta)$—the degree to which one has a specific type of motivation in this case—is calculates as follows:

$$P_{ix}{}^{*}(\theta) = \frac{e^{\{\alpha_i(\theta-\beta_{xi})\}}}{1 + e^{\{\alpha_i(\theta-\beta_{xi})\}}}$$

$$P_{i1}(\theta) = 1 - P_{i2}{}^{*}(\theta)$$
$$P_{i2}(\theta) = P_{i2}{}^{*}(\theta) - P_{i3}{}^{*}(\theta)$$
$$P_{i3}(\theta) = P_{i3}{}^{*}(\theta) - P_{i4}{}^{*}(\theta)$$
$$P_{i4}(\theta) = P_{i4}{}^{*}(\theta)$$

where $P_{ix}{}^{*}(\theta)$ is the cumulative probability function, $\mathrm{i} = \{1, 2, 3..K\}$ (each item in a set of items consisting of each motivational dimension) and $\mathrm{x} = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ (each response category, or the degree of agreement with the statement of a specific item). $\alpha_i$ and $\beta_i$ denote the discrimination parameter and the difficulty parameter, respectively, in this two-parameter model. The probability curves for each item are determined by these two item parameters.

Korean and Mongolian cases suggest that comparative studies may have to consider '(fidelity) towards what' in order to study the allegiance motive.[33]

I performed separate, unidimensional item response analyses for each set of motives to create a set of item factor scores corresponding to each of the dimensions identified, with the exception of Allegiance. The separate unidimensional IRT analyses generated Bayes estimates of latent trait scores for each of the Self-enhancement, Sociality, Purposive, and Personal dimensions without imposing the restriction of nonzero loadings on the general factor and one group factor.

How are the different types of motivation related to each other? Is there any particular kinship among them, such that the desire for a certain type of incentive comes along with the desire for other types of incentive? Table 12 displays the correlation matrix of the four dimensions of motivation. At the significance level of 0.05, Self-enhancement is fairly positively correlated with the Sociality and with the Personal dimensions. This is predictable, because both cultivating social network and maintaining good personal relationships can indirectly increase the likelihood of success in one's business or political lives. However, the Purposive dimension is only weakly correlated with Sociality, and even uncorrelated with Self-enhancement and with Personal. In both the Mongolian and the South Korean samples, Purposive is consistently found to be

[33] Considering the possibility that one of the three items originally presumed to consist of Allegiance dimension, "Sense of community obligation" be more relevant to the Purposive dimension, I performed another item bifactor analysis in which the item is classified into Purposive. The results were an even lower reliability score for the Allegiance dimension and also a low, although slightly higher, factor loading for the community obligation item (0.217). In addition, the reliability score for Allegiance in which only "loyalty to state and party leadership" and "strong party loyalty" items remain is only 0.121, lower than the reliability score of 0.321 in the original bifactor model.

uncorrelated with Self-enhancement. This provides a firm evidence that there is a clear distinction between interests in policies and interests in clientelistic, or selective, rewards.

Table 12 Pairwise Correlation between Different Types of Motivation (Pooled Sample)

| Motivation | Self-enhancement | Sociality | Purposive |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sociality | 0.319* | | |
| Purposive | 0.035 | 0.164* | |
| Personal | 0.367* | 0.353* | 0.06 |

*Note.* Entries are pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients. *p<0.05.

**Selective-interest Seekers and Policy Seekers: Factors Associated with the Two Types of Motivation**

From the results of the item factor analysis, it seems now clear that activists are aware of the different kinds of incentives that they might gain from involvement in partisan political activities. One testable implication from this finding is that activists who are strongly attracted by a certain type of incentives would be distinct from those who are less attached by the same incentives. In particular, it is interesting to see what makes an activist serving as strong ideological linkage and what makes one directly or indirectly seek their own benefits (such as obtaining a public office or a public sector job, access to power, and benefits for their own business) more than other activists.

Are poor activists more self-interested and less policy-oriented, while wealthy activists are more attracted by purposive incentives and less by selective ones? If the developmentalist argument holds at the individual level, those with higher income, or

higher economic satisfaction, should be more policy-oriented than those with lower income, or lower economic satisfaction. To determine micro-level factors associated with each of the two types of motivation, I divided party activists into three groups according to their level of trait scores obtained from the unidimensional IRT analyses. Then, I examined whether there are notable differences among the three groups within each dimension in terms of demographic, economic, and attitudinal and behavioral aspects.

Table 13 Individual Characteristics, by Varying Degrees of Seeking Selective Incentives and Policy Incentives (Pooled Sample)

| Variable (range) | Self-enhancement | | | Purposive | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Top 33.3% | Medium 33.3% | Bottom 33.3% | Top 33.3% | Medium 33.3% | Bottom 33.3% |
| Age (1–10) | 3.93 | 5.23 | 4.47 | 4.09 | 4.85 | 4.67 |
| Household Income (1–9) | 4.44 | 4.41 | 4.46 | 4.11 | 4.50 | 4.69 |
| Economic Satisfaction (1–5) | 3.05 | 2.95 | 2.89 | 2.83 | 3.10 | 2.97 |
| Left-Right Ideology (0–10) | 6.18 | 5.87 | 5.23 | 5.58 | 5.87 | 5.82 |
| Political Efficacy (1–4) | 2.99 | 2.81 | 2.97 | 3.11 | 2.92 | 2.78 |
| Have read policy programs or electoral platforms of the party? (0–2) | 1.52 | 1.31 | 1.40 | 1.68 | 1.44 | 1.14 |
| Regularly read newsletters via email or mail from the party? (0–2) | 1.34 | 1.12 | 1.18 | 1.63 | 1.19 | 0.86 |
| Vote in the last election (0–1) | 0.86 | 0.86 | 0.86 | 0.91 | 0.86 | 0.81 |
| Participated in campaigning activities (-1–1)[a] | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.44 | 0.63 | 0.45 | 0.36 |
| Have participated in protests (0–1) | 0.42 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0.58 | 0.33 | 0.34 |
| Have attended local party meetings (0–2) | 1.12 | 0.94 | 1.1 | 1.51 | 1.09 | 0.63 |
| Have attended national party meetings or participated in the candidate selection process (0–2) | 0.62 | 0.60 | 0.75 | 0.95 | 0.58 | 0.46 |
| Status in the party hierarchy (1–6) | 2.81 | 2.08 | 2.27 | 2.91 | 2.68 | 1.73 |

*Note*. Entries are the mean value of each micro-level variable for the activists in the given category; [a] -1 for "having participated in the campaigning activities for a different party"; 0 for "this is the first participation"; 1 for "having participated in the campaigning activities for the same party."

There are several interesting findings from the comparisons between groups with different levels of self-interest seeking and policy seeking through Table 13. First, the common expectation that wealth will increase programmatic tendencies in individual attitudes–because material subsistence will be less of a day-to-day concern for those who are economically better-off–while the poor will be less responsive to policy incentives seems not to be supported in the South Korean and Mongolian cases. Both the level of income and subjective evaluation of one's own economic situation are not different across the three groups classified, according to the trait scores of Self-enhancement. Even contrary to the expectation, the most purposive activists are found to make less money than the moderate and the least purposive groups. Albeit preliminary, the individual-level hypothesis on the effect of wealth ($H_{4.1a}$) is not supported from these group comparisons.

Second, while it is not very clear whether ideologically leftist activists are more policy-oriented, self-interest-seekers are found to be more rightist than those who are less attracted by selective benefits in relation to their business or political profession. Third, activists who have strong policy-oriented motivations (predictably) tend to be more politically efficacious than the other groups with moderate to low policy-seeking motivation. The policy-seekers turned out to have relatively a strong belief that they can make some influence on the policy programs of their party. Fourth, the activists attracted by policy-related interests tend to be more exposed to the opportunities to read and discuss policy programs of the party. Regardless of the form and length of reading materials, the more exposure to such materials dealing with the party's latest concerns or

programs, the more policy-oriented an activist becomes. In addition, the attendance rate of party meetings both at the grass-root and the national levels significantly increases with the increase in the strength of policy motivations.

Fifth, strong self-enhancement seeking seems not to lead one to more participation in the conventional type of political activities such as voting and campaigning. No noticeable pattern is found in the level of such conventional participation in politics across the most, the moderate, and the least policy-seeking activists. In contrast, strong policy-seekers have a strong tendency to participate in both conventional and unconventional types of political activities compared to the moderate as well as the bottom group. In addition to the electoral and protest activities, the most policy-seeking group are noticeably more active in intra-party activism than activists who are less policy-oriented and also than the most self-interested ones. Overall, there is a clear tendency that those who are the most policy-oriented are at the same time the most active.

Lastly, it is notable that both strong policy-seekers and strong self-enhancement seekers appear to have a relatively high status within the hierarchy of a party. Regardless of the extent to which they are active in and out of the party, activists highly attracted by any of these two types of incentives are more likely to be in charge of the roles that guide or supervise grass-roots volunteers than those who are less attracted by them.

Table 14 Individual-level Regression Analyses (Attraction of Selective Incentives, by Party and by District-level Wealth)

| | Mongolian Parties | | | | South Korean Parties | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MPP | | DP | | SP | | DUP | UPP | | LFP | NPP | |
| Variable | Poor | Rich | Poor | Rich | Poor | Rich | Rich | Poor | Rich | Rich | Poor | Rich |
| Gender | -.39 | .17 | .36 | -.08 | -.04 | 1.29*** | .42 | .11 | -.66 | .51 | .19 | .36 |
| Age (root) | .26 | .21 | .12 | -.08 | .77** | -.78 | .09 | 1.02*** | .43 | -.48 | .03 | .24 |
| Income | -.01 | -.04 | -.08 | .05 | -.08 | -.44** | .02 | .08 | -.06 | -.04 | -.25** | -.25* |
| Economic Satisfaction | .12 | -.60 | .27 | -.05 | -.10 | -.83** | .06 | .22 | -.35 | .11 | -.55* | -.60 |
| Party Hierarchy | .18 | -.07 | -.14 | .23 | .14 | -.12 | .15* | -.50** | .03 | .08 | .28*** | .04 |
| Constant | 3.10 | -1.47 | 1.74 | -.58 | -1.90** | 1.59 | -.91 | -1.01 | -2.19** | 1.28 | -1.57* | -1.76 |
| $R^2$ | .25 | .11 | .13 | .11 | .30 | .63 | .243 | .58 | .53 | .34 | .49 | .52 |
| Obs | 17 | 41 | 28 | 26 | 25 | 14 | 29 | 18 | 12 | 12 | 21 | 16 |

*Note.* I included both measures of individual economic condition, household income and economic satisfaction in the model as the two variables are only weakly correlated with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.20 at the 0.01 level of significance. ***p<.01;**p<.05;*p<.1.

Table 15 Individual-level Regression Analyses (Attraction of Policy Incentives, by Party and by District-level Wealth)

| | Mongolian Parties | | | | South Korean Parties | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MPP | | DP | | SP | | DUP | UPP | | LFP | NPP | |
| Variable | Poor | Rich | Poor | Rich | Poor | Rich | Rich | Poor | Rich | Rich | Poor | Rich |
| Gender | .81* | .51** | .14 | -.02 | -.10 | 1.41*** | .13 | .65** | .04 | 1.65*** | .76* | .00 |
| Age (root) | -.23 | -.43* | -.02 | -.17 | .21 | -1.02 | .67* | -.52 | .47 | .61 | -.43 | -1.30 |
| Income | .05 | -.10** | .08 | -.04 | .18* | -.30 | -.01 | .09 | -.25 | -.01 | .02 | .20 |
| Economic Satisfaction | -.52 | .18 | .13 | .29 | .33 | -.46 | -.22 | .23** | .18 | -.03 | -.20 | .72* |
| Party Hierarchy | .10 | .20*** | -.04 | -.14 | .17 | .15 | -.01 | .15 | .09 | .09 | .12 | .02 |
| Constant | -2.19 | .97 | .60 | 1.81* | -.99 | 1.42 | -2.73 | 1.11 | .55 | -2.42 | -.17 | 4.32 |
| $R^2$ | .40 | .28 | .09 | .13 | .39 | .71 | .21 | .55 | .42 | .76 | .45 | .45 |
| Obs | 17 | 41 | 28 | 26 | 25 | 14 | 29 | 18 | 12 | 12 | 21 | 16 |

*Note.* ***p<.01;**p<.05;*p<.1.

To do a controlled test for the effect of micro-level wealth on the two types of motivation, I performed regression analyses. The results are presented in Table 14 (Self-enhancement as the response variable) and Table 15 (Purposive as the response variable). Holding both national- and district-level wealth and political party constant, neither self-interested nor policy-oriented motivation turned out to be significantly associated with the economic condition of an activist's own. From the regression analyses, the hypothesized (negative) effect of individual-level wealth (measured by income and economic satisfaction) on Self-enhancement is only partly detected for South Korean activists and not at all for Mongolian activists, holding gender, age, and the status within the hierarchy of their party constant. Specifically, individual economic conditions and Self-enhancement score are negatively associated for the SP activists in rich districts and the NPP activists in both poor and rich types of districts. However, the effect of individual wealth is not statistically significant for other party activists in both countries.

The relationship between individual wealth and policy-based motivation is found to be even more inconsistent. On the one hand, individual-level economic conditions, when their coefficients are statistically significant, have a positive association with policy motivation among some South Korean activists (income for the SP activists in poor districts and economic satisfaction for the UPP in poor districts and for the NPP in rich districts). On the other hand, the only significant coefficient of the economic variables for Mongolian activists has a negative sign (income for the MPP activists in a rich district). The sign of the economic variables is not even consistent across districts

and parties. Overall, I did not find strong evidence supporting the argument that, within the same party and under the similar national and district-level condition of economic development, poor activists are more attracted by selective incentives and less by collective and purposive incentives ($H_{4.1a}$).

**Effects of National and Local Wealth on Party Activist Motivation**

Do activists in a highly industrialized country have stronger policy-based motivation than those in an underdeveloped country if most of other key macro-level conditions are controlled? The core of the developmental explanation on party-voter linkage mechanisms is that voters in underdeveloped countries are more responsive to clientelistic forms of linkage and tend to discount policy programs that political parties promise to implement if they are elected (Kitschelt & Kselman, 2013). According to the developmental explanation, there are certain macro factors that affect a country's vulnerability to external climate, security or economic shocks (e.g. the national characteristics of the industrial structure and resources). Also, for parties to implement their promising policies, prerequisites are a large tax base and administrative apparatus (Kitschelt & Kselman, 2013). Facing a high level of uncertainty and the lack of financial and governmental infrastructure, citizens will not be willing to take programmatic statements of parties as credible and will instead be attracted to more short-term and private (whether material or status) incentives.

As in the case of district-level wealth, the hypothesized effect of national-level wealth, however, is only partly supported from the survey data on South Korean and Mongolian activists ($H_{4.1b}$). I compared the extent to which activists of major parties

from the two countries (the MPP and the DP in Mongolia, and the SP and the DUP in South Korea) are motivated on each incentive dimension in Table 16. I found the activists from Mongolia and those from South Korea are significantly different in the two dimensions of particular interest, the extent to which they are motivated by private incentives and the extent to which they are motivated by policy incentives. On the one hand, consistent to the expectation, Mongolian activists seek self-enhancement more than Korean activists when the activists of only major parties from the two countries are considered. On the other hand, Mongolian activists of major parties, at the same time, have more policy-based motivation than their Korean counterparts.

These results suggest the possibility that the two major parties in South Korea are indeed highly programmatic parties in terms of Kitschelt and his coauthors' definition of a programmatic party—that is, programmatic parties need fewer personnel to manage exchange relations, and party activists who assert their own (policy) preference are centrifugal forces inhibiting the party's ideology work to create a single collective voice (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Or, the weaker self-enhancement and purposive motivations of the activists from the SP and the DUP than Mongolian activists may indicate the evidence of being an electoral-professional party of the two Korean parties. In either case, from the definition of ideological linkage at the activist level that I provided earlier, the two Korean parties appear to have activists who are far from serving as strong ideological links between their party and the electorate, even though this may help strengthen ideological affinity at the voter level and make effective programmatic appeal at the party elite level. The activists of the Korean major parties

seem to focus more on winning in the election than on middle- and long-term policy changes the party can bring about, with their ideological role in connecting their party to voters thus being substantially limited.

Table 16 Comparing Motivation of Mongolia and South Korean Party Activists (Major Parties Only)

| Country | Self-enhancement | Sociality | Purposive | Personal | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mongolia | .265 | -.108 | .146 | .081 | 143 |
| South Korea | -.129 | -.034 | -.532 | .055 | 75 |
| t-statistic (**p<0.01) | 3.23** | -0.58 | 5.68** | 0.24 | |

*Note.* Entries are mean values of trait scores for each dimensional variable, measured by the unidimensional IRT model. Two-way t test.

While activists of the Korean major parties are considerably less attracted by both Self-enhancement and Purposive incentives than those of Mongolian major parties, there is an interesting variation in the motivational pattern across Korean parties as presented in Figure 8. Activists of smaller parties in South Korea are more motivated by policy incentives than the SP and the DUP. Also, the highest purposive motivation was found among the two minor parties, the UPP and the NPP. The two parties are different from the other parties in the country in several aspects. Their membership-based organizational structure has remained mostly unchanged since their foundational origin (the creation of the DLP in 2000); a majority of party members regularly pay membership fees to the two parties. Ideologically, the UPP and the NPP are leftist/social democratic parties that did not exist in the party system for several decades. Furthermore, the UPP and the NPP are relatively new, compared to the rest of parties

(the SP, the DUP, and the LFP) that have a history of several decades despite their frequent name change. Interestingly, a similar pattern is found in Mongolia with respect to party age. A relatively newer party, the DP, is more purposive than the old party, the MPP, which ruled the country as the only legal party for about 70 years. Not only is the DP far younger than the former communist party, but the DP is less resourceful than the MPP even after democratic transition. In short, I found evidence from the comparison across parties that smaller and younger parties have a stronger ideological group of activists (seeking private incentives less and collective policy incentives more) than larger and established parties ($H_{4.3}$).

The finding that Korean activists are less purposive and more self-interested than Mongolian activists, instead of the opposite that the modernization theory dictates, may be due to the lack of consideration of the different historical trajectories of Mongolian and South Korean parties. Although the two countries are relatively very similar in several aspects from government institutions and democratic experience to general culture, the MPP, the one of the two major parties in Mongolia, is distinct in origin and development process from the major parties of South Korea. The MPP was a vanguard party in its origin. At the center of the party-state system in Mongolia for 70 years, the MPP had made a strong hierarchical network throughout public and private sectors. And, for the DP that was created during the period of democratic transition, imitating the organizational structure of the MPP to some extent must have been certainly a viable option to survive and win in the competition with the still strong MPP.




*Figure 8*. Comparing the motivation of Mongolian and South Korean party activists, by party and by country.

In consideration of such differences between Korean and Mongolian parties, not just macro-level conditions but also the political party variable needs to be controlled in order to properly test the effect of economic development on the motivation of activists. Considering that there are often significant variations in the levels of economic development—and thus in the quality of a tax base and administrative capacity to implement party programs at least in the region, within a country, do activists in a rich district have stronger policy-based motivation than their party peers in a poor district? Table 17 presents the results of two-tailed t-tests for mean difference between more and less modernized districts in motivations of party activists. The results indicate that the local-level wealth is not identified in any of the political parties in the two countries. Within parties, there are no signs of motivational differences across districts with different economic conditions ($H_{4.1c}$).

Table 17 Local Wealth and Motivation of Party Activists

| Country | Party | Self-enhancement | Sociality | Purposive | Personal | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mongolia | MPP | -1.05 | -1.60 | -1.02 | -1.35 | 68 |
| | DP | 1.16 | 1.85 | 0.73 | 1.47 | 70 |
| South Korea | SP | 0.59 | -0.27 | 0.12 | 0.44 | 44 |
| | DUP | NA[a] | NA | NA | NA | . |
| | UPP | 2.92 | 0.99 | -1.21 | -0.09 | 32 |
| | LFP | NA[a] | NA | NA | NA | . |
| | NPP | 0.90 | 0.80 | -1.66 | 1.04 | 39 |

*Note.* Entries are t-statistics from two-way t-test for mean difference between poor and rich districts. None of the t statistics are statistically significant at the level of 0.05. [a] The survey responses were only collected from wealthy districts for the DUP and the LFP; [b] The UPP Party activists in Jungwon-Gu are compared to their fellow activists in Icheon, as the former district is relatively wealthy compared to the latter district.

## Local Wealth and the Level of Ideological Coherence within the Party

Do local party activists in a wealthier community maintain stronger ideological coherence within the party? To answer to this question, first, ideological coherence must be defined and measured first. Assuming a simple unidimensional space of ideology, a party is ideologically coherent at the party activist level if the party activists of this party are ideologically located in a close distance to each other, and at the same time, they share common perceptions about their party's ideological position. Hence, a party with strong ideological coherence will find that their activists are ideologically clustered rather than spread thin. I measure the ideological coherence of a party at the party activist level by using the following formula:

$$\text{Ideological Coherence of Party j} = \frac{n_j}{\sum_{i=1}^{n_j}\sqrt{(A_{ij}-A_j)^2+(P_{ij}-P_j)^2}}$$

Where

- $A_{ij}$=self-paced ideology of Activist i working for Party j.
- $A_j$=mean of self-placed ideology of party activists working for Party j.

- $P_{ij}$=ideological position of Party j evaluated by Party j's Activist i.
- $P_j$=mean of ideological position of Party j evaluated by Party j's activists.
- $n_j$= the number of Party j's activists.

The more scattered in the two dimensional space of ideology, the smaller the ideological coherence score is. The scores of ideological coherence among party activists by party, by district type and by country are presented in Table 18. Conforming to expectation, political parties in more developed South Korea are maintaining larger ideological coherence than underdeveloped Mongolia ($H_{4.2a}$). Also, three out of four data-available political parties from the two countries have the pattern of higher within-party coherence in rich districts and lower coherence in poor district ($H_{4.2b}$). In particular, such a pattern is more obvious in South Korea than in Mongolia, with the coherence scores of Korean parties being much higher than the scores of Mongolian parties in rich districts. This finding that party activists in a more modernized region (and country) form a more cohesive group in terms of ideology than those in an economically distressed region (and country) provides evidence supporting the developmental explanation of party-voter linkage mechanisms.

Table 18 Local Level of Modernization and Ideological Coherence of Party Activists

| Country | Party | Poor | Rich | Average | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mongolia | MPP | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 47 |
| | DP | 0.32 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 40 |
| South Korea | SP | 0.27 | 0.55 | 0.34 | 38 |
| | DUP | NA | 0.48 | 0.48 | 27 |
| | UPP | 0.38 | 0.53 | 0.42 | 28 |
| | LFP | NA | 0.30 | 0.30 | 11 |
| | NPP | 0.36 | 0.44 | 0.39 | 38 |

*Note.* Entries are values of ideological coherence. The higher the value the more ideologically coherent within the party.

## Conclusion

Party activists or members have been studied mostly in the European and the US contexts in existing literature. This study is an attempt to contribute to an existing body of knowledge by investigating party activists in two developing democracies in East Asia. While various self-perceived and expected roles of party activists may exist, a political party that has a large number of ideological activists is less likely to opportunistically switch its policy programs and to be controlled by a handful of politicians. Therefore, on the one hand, a party whose activists serve as a strong ideological link between the party and the electorate may lose the flexibility of party change/adaptation (whether organizational or policy changes) to some extent. Facing the trade-offs between electoral gains and organizational stability and between efficiency and democracy in intra-party decision making, such parties are likely to choose the former rather than the latter. On the other hand, however, an ideological party at the activist level will be more persistent in the party system, with the development of policy programs–as an official, written agreement within parties as well as a binding contract

between the parties and the electorate–being driven by ideological activists. In this way, activists serving as strong ideological linkage will ultimately contribute to party system institutionalization.

From this analysis of a unique survey dataset of Korean and Mongolian party activists, I identified four distinct dimensions of the motivation underlying partisan political activities among party activists in the two East Asian democracies. In the following tests of the modernization theory in party-voter linkage mechanisms, I found only partial evidence of the association between wealth and party-voter linkage mechanisms. Although poverty was often regarded as the major obstacle in the development of policy-based linkage mechanisms in existing literature, the results in this chapter show that individual-level economic conditions are not the determinant of party-voter linkage. Indeed, it is hard to think of a low-income activist with a clientelistic desire in her party activities as becoming more policy-oriented as she gets richer. In addition, I found no evidence that national- and local-level wealth make party activists more motivated by policy-related incentives and less by selective, private incentives. Nevertheless, both national and local wealth seem to be associated with the extent to which activists from the same party are ideologically coherent among themselves. The overall findings of this study suggest that the link between economic development and party-voter linkage mechanisms is more complicated than previously contemplated.

# CHAPTER V

# CONCLUSION

Parties and party systems in non-Western democracies have received considerable attention for the last couple of decades. However, the comparability between non-Western parties and party systems and their Western counterparts has often been questioned among scholars of comparative politics. As a result, the questions of how and to what extent parties and party systems in developing democracies are different from, or similar to, their established Western counterparts have been underexplored, especially in an empirical manner. Rather than being put to the test through systematic cross-national comparisons, party-voter linkage in developing democracies has largely been delegated to area studies, suffering from the lack of equivalent measures. The ultimate purpose of this study is to challenge the "incomparability thesis" by providing a basis for both cross-party and cross-national comparisons for future research in party-voter relationships.

This study has given an account of the development of the party-voter relationship based on policies, namely, ideological linkage. To answer the question of why strong ideological linkage is formed for some parties but not for others and in some democracies but not in others, I decomposed ideological linkage into three components and took a close look at each by using different methods and cases. The results of the analyses of ideological congruence in voters' perception in 46 democracies, of the development of party platforms in South Korea, and of the motivational and ideological

coherence of local party activists in Mongolia and South Korea revealed that building ideological linkage in developing democracies is a more complicated process than first thought. While some key macro variables are confirmed to have a robust impact on ideological linkage and others are invalidated in this study, the mechanism of their effect (or no effect) on the formation of ideological linkage at the certain level of party politics is identified as the area in need of further research in the future.

## Summary of Findings

From the analysis of ideological congruence between voters and parties in Chapter II, I argued the importance of institutional and economic factors in shaping the party-voter relationship based on ideology, and dismissed the relevance of democratic conditions. I found that the extent to which voters perceive that their favored party is ideologically close to them is determined by age and size of a party at the party level. Stronger ideological affinity is, expectedly, found among parties with a smaller number of representatives in the legislature than those with many representatives, and parties founded long ago than those recently founded.

Another important finding from the analysis of ideological affinity in voters' perception is that it is rightist parties whose voters maintain a more ideologically coherent group within their party. This runs counter to the common expectation that leftist parties will be more united than rightist parties, as leftist parties are known to make more ideological commitment in their policy programs, campaigning, and member education, and to stress the values of solidarity. From the analysis of ideological dispersion of parties, however, I argue that voters of rightist parties are found to share a

more common ideology and a more common perception towards their party's ideology. The implication of this finding is that the efforts in ideological work made by leftist parties may have been exaggerated; rightist parties appear to render their resources to ideological work endeavoring for ideological intimacy with the electorate as much as leftist parties. Or, the weaker ideological coherence of voters within leftist parties may not be the failure of ideological commitment of the parties but a cause of their ideological endeavor. As the early organizational consolidation of socialist parties as a mass party were related to the extension of franchise, especially in many Western European democracies, such parties had to focus on generating a single voice to bring together the electorate, then at the outside of political mobilization, with various interests and backgrounds. Also, it would be harder for leftist parties to receive material support from the bourgeoisie or from corporations as much as rightist parties promising a tax levy at a lower rate. Facing the resulting lack of resources and combined with the shrinking party membership in recent decades, struggling to enhance ideological linkage might be among the few viable strategies for leftist parties, while my analysis shows that this effort is not very successful.

At the party system level, I found that neither when the democracy was born (the timing of democratic transition) nor how democratic the regime is (the level of democracy) is as critical as institutional and economic factors. First, I confirmed the importance of political institutions and economy in ideological affinity between parties and voters. Under a presidential system, voters feel a farther distance ideologically towards the party that they support than voters under a parliamentary system. The

analysis also shows that the electoral systems that contribute to candidate-centered campaigning  undermine ideological linkage of the party system. Indeed, these rules have a distorting effect on seat allocation, inflating the seats of major parties, which are likely to have weaker ideological affinity with their voters. In addition, it is harder for parties to produce a single voice in policy programs under candidate-centered rules. Parties are not able to control the policy programs and the selection process of their candidates in candidate-centered rules as much as in proportional representation rules.

Next, I also confirmed the importance of (national) economic wealth in explaining the variance in ideological affinity at the party system level. Voters in a more developed context are found to feel that they are more ideologically intimate with their favored party than those in an underdeveloped context. This finding of the effect of economic development conforms to the argument in the previous literature of party-voter linkage mechanisms (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt & Freeze, 2010), verifying the validity of my measure of ideological linkage at the voter level. The institutional and economic factors also extended a robust impact on ideological party-voter relationship, with voters under parliamentary and more modernized conditions being found to have more shared ideological views (on both their own and the party's position) than voters in other institutional and economic conditions. Lastly, but not least, I found that democratic conditions appear not to be very relevant in how voters perceive congruence with their favored parties.

Taken together, the findings in the analysis of ideological congruence between parties and voters suggest that strong ideological linkages are by no means an exclusive

property of established Western democracies. This directly challenges the conventional wisdom in party-voter linkages that parties in developing, non-Western democracies are connected with the electorate on non-ideological bases, namely, clientelistic practices, ethnic affiliation, or regionalism.

Although the large-N cross-national analysis was useful to identify general determinants of party-voter linkages, it did not provide answers specifically to the questions of whether and how ideological linkage evolves in developing democracies. Hence, Chapter III shifted our attention from voters (ideological congruence between parties and voters from the voters' perspective) to political parties (programmatic commitment of party elites), in an attempt to explain the development of ideological linkage in the special context of developing democracies. Specifically, it focused on testing the effect of the passage of time on the development of programmatic parties in South Korea.

In this case study using the method of content analysis, I found that the party platforms of South Korean parties are neither devoid of nor mostly filled with vague messages. They include a large portion of policy directions, actions, and even detailed policies with specific provisions. While the high level of specificity in party platforms does not guarantee complete compliance of parties with the policy contents of the platforms, it would certainly limit the discretion of political elites. When voters notice that a party (or politicians who were elected with a party label) is violating platform pledges, the party's credibility is likely to be damaged. And the violation will look more apparent or be easily picked apart by political commentators and political enemies. In

this way, highly specific platforms play the role of compelling a party to observe the pledges, and ultimately, will contribute to programmatic practices being established. Indeed, even though the specificity in platforms has not monotonically grown since the democratic transition, in recent years both politicians and citizens in South Korea are increasingly recognizing the importance of providing party programs in election campaigning and of monitoring how the parties are fulfilling the pledges they made in the party programs. This suggests that detailed policy programs of parties drive the party system towards a stronger policy-based relationship with the electorate, although, of course, parties will strategically move between detailed policy pledges and rather ambiguous pledges based on their calculation of benefits and costs.

Furthermore, from the examination of the positions of two major parties in South Korea (the GNP and the DP) on four issue dimensions, the two parties are found to have maintained the most significant distance from each other on the issue dimension of North Korea and unification. While their policy positions vary over time, and their differences are sometimes hardly perceptible, the two parties have taken overall center-right and center-left positions, respectively, since the transition to democracy in 1987. Also, the sign of programmatizing parties has been more visible since 2000 when a party officially manifesting leftist pursuits (the Democratic Labor Party) was created. The manifesto analysis of South Korean parties demonstrated that there have been policy commitments of parties in this country, known for a long time for electoral competition, largely based on non-programmatic linkage mechanisms. South Korean parties have made commitments to policy programs, albeit not consistently, over the last two

decades, and ideological linkages have been certainly among their available options to employ.

In Chapter IV, I turned my focus specifically to testing the effect of economic variables. To do this, I first explored the motivations and ideology of local party activists in two East Asian developing democracies, South Korea and Mongolia. By using a unique survey dataset, I found that there are four distinguishable motivations in the citizen decision to join partisan political activities in these countries. In the following test for the effect of wealth, however, I found no evidence that the economic wealth induces the growth of policy-related interests among party activists. Party activists in South Korea, a high income OECD country, turned out to be less policy-seeking than their counterparts in Mongolia, a lower middle income country. In addition, even within the same country, the level of policy—seeking motivation is not higher in wealthy districts than in economically depressed districts. Even for individual-level wealth, no evidence supporting the link between wealth and party activists' policy-seeking motivation was found. This implies that a party activist who was once poor and far from policy-oriented would not be likely to change her mind towards policy-seeking motivation as she becomes rich.

Whereas the relevance of economic wealth in explaining policy-seeking motivation was not corroborated, activists in a wealthy district and country are found to form a more ideologically coherent group among their peers in the same party than those in a less affluent district and country. This finding of the association of wealth and ideological coherence among party activists is consistent with the finding of

ideologically coherent voters (low level of ideological dispersion) in wealthy countries in Chapter II. Activists who are ideologically coherent are expected to carry the programmatic messages of their party in a more effective way, and hence, will contribute to ideological congruence between parties and voters. Taken together, the theory of economic development was only partially supported when it was tested with the functioning of party activists as ideological linkage. The question of the mechanism by which economic variables shape the behavior and attitudes of party activists remained largely unanswered.

## Directions for Future Research

Several research questions that need further investigation are prompted by this study of ideological linkage between parties and voters. First, with the indices of party-voter ideological distance and dispersion provided in Chapter II, the question of how political institutions interact with socio-economic context in shaping the nature of party-voter relationships can be addressed. In addition, the dataset makes it feasible to delve into another fascinating question of how individual social and demographic factors (age, size and ideological position of the individual's favored party) and macro factors (institutional, socioeconomic and democratic conditions of a party system) interact to shape party-voter relationships. Second, the findings of the dynamic changes in ideological congruence between parties and voters over time, even in established Western democracies, call for a new research direction in the study of linkage mechanism. Specifically, why is ideological linkage of some parties or some countries more volatile than others? Not only temporally long-term and spatial variations, but also

short-term changes in party-voter linkage which have not received scholarly attention, need to be studied for a better understanding of party-voter relationships.

Third, such short-term changes in ideological linkage as a result of strategic choices of political parties are also among future research directions. As demonstrated in Chapter III, parties in developing democracies do not monotonically move towards programmaticism over time. The question of when parties decide to enhance their ideological linkage and when they retreat can be addressed by examining internal and external factors of parties. In short, based on the measures and findings from this research theories of ideological linkage should and can be built further.

Fourth, although I argued that democratic conditions are not critical for the development of ideological linkage, what matters might be the past, rather than the present, especially in the context of developing democracies. Specifically, current party-voter relationships of a developing democracy may be determined by the type of authoritarian regime the country experienced (Geddes, 1999). The Taiwanese case, for example, suggests the possibility that third-wave democracies with a certain type of authoritarian past—single-party regime in the Taiwanese case—have more favorable conditions for building ideological linkages than those with other authoritarian regime types, such as militaristic and personalistic ones. Indeed, although Taiwan and South Korea are common in several aspects from political culture and the level of economic development to democratic conditions, Taiwanese citizens appeared to have stronger ideological affinity with their parties than South Koreans (Chapter II). Furthermore, a South Korean party that allied with authoritarian elites in the process of democratic

transition are found to maintain more consistency in party platforms during the post-democratic era (Chapter III). As suggested by these findings, how pre-democratic rules are related to the ideological linkage in the period of post-democracy is also among the areas where further research is valuable.

Fifth, the analysis of party activists in Mongolia and South Korea (Chapter IV) implies that the link between economic development and party-voter linkage mechanisms is more complicated than previously contemplated. Further investigation will be required to reveal the mechanism of how modernization affects the relationship between parties and voters by interacting institutional and democratic conditions. Such more complex hypotheses can be tested by boosting the number of country cases and by combining the most similar and most different systems designs, which will maximize the effect of controlling macro variables. This research design will enable us to study how individual party activists are nested within their own party, institutions and social contexts.

Lastly, but not least, ideological linkage has been framed as a multilevel concept in this study. While ideological linkage reflected at the voter level can be measured by using public opinion survey data, studying ideological linkage at the party elite level and at the activist level requires different data and different research methods, as demonstrated in this study. By breaking up the concept of ideological linkage and examining it at various angles, we will be able to test theories more extensively, and thus, enrich our understanding of party-voter linkage. However, this conceptual decomposition and separate empirical examinations raise the question of how the

different components of ideological linkage are related to each other—if there is an arrow of influence from one level to another, for instance. Addressing their relationship will be critical to refine the multilevel concept of ideological linkage. Furthermore, the causes and consequences of possible, and often observed, disagreement between the different levels—for example, imagine a party that has achieved strong ideological party-voter congruence in voters' perception but lacked policy-motivated activists—should also be among the future research agendas.

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# APPENDIX A

# IDEOLOGICAL CONGRUENCE OF PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS IN 46 DEMOCRACIES

| Country | Year | Party | Party Level | | System Level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Distance | Dispersion | Distance | Dispersion |
| Albania | 2005 | Democratic Party | 0.9 | 1.7 | 0.894 | 1.642 |
| | | Socialist Party | 1.21 | 2.3 | | |
| | | Socialist Democratic Party | 2.36 | 3.19 | | |
| | | Socialist Movement for Integration | 1.49 | 3.18 | | |
| Australia | 1996 | Australian Labor Party | 1.11 | 2.25 | 1.060 | 2.305 |
| | | Liberal Party of Australia | 1.52 | 2.42 | | |
| | | National Party of Australia | 0.88 | 2.79 | | |
| | 2004 | Liberal Party of Australia | 1.31 | 2.37 | 1.233 | 2.370 |
| | | Australian Labor Party | 0.94 | 2.47 | | |
| | | National Party of Australia | 1.25 | 2.46 | | |
| | 2007 | Australian Labor Party | 1.34 | 2.45 | 1.176 | 2.455 |
| | | Liberal Party of Australia | 1.08 | 2.6 | | |
| | | National Party of Australia | 0.88 | 2.67 | | |
| | | Greens | 1.06 | 2.16 | | |
| Austria | 2008 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | 1.22 | 2.62 | 1.255 | 2.379 |
| | | Austrian People's Party | 1.05 | 2.08 | | |
| | | Freedom Party of Austria | 1.7 | 2.59 | | |
| | | Alliance for the Future of Austria | 1.35 | 2.46 | | |
| | | The Greens - The Green Alternative | 1.02 | 2.01 | | |
| Belgium-Flanders | 1999 | Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten | 1.54 | 2.49 | 1.661 | 2.622 |
| | | Christelijke Volkspartij | 1.64 | 2.67 | | |
| | | Socialistische Partij | 1.7 | 2.85 | | |
| | | Vlaams Blok | 2.03 | 3.02 | | |
| | | Anders Gaan Leven | 1.4 | 2.17 | | |
| | | Volksunie-Ideeen Voor 21st Eeuw | 1.64 | 2.28 | | |
| Brazil | 2002 | Workers' Party | 2.28 | 4.86 | 1.859 | 3.136 |
| | | Brazilian Social Democratic Party | 2.39 | 3.83 | | |
| | | Party of the Liberal Front | 2.44 | 4.65 | | |
| | | Brazilian Democratic Movement Party | 2.62 | 4.46 | | |
| | | Democratic Labor Party | 2.91 | 4.62 | | |
| | | Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro | 1 | 3.02 | | |
| | 2006 | Brazilian Democratic Movement Party | 1.84 | 2.86 | 1.273 | 2.327 |
| | | Workers' Party | 2.04 | 4.48 | | |
| | | Brazilian Social Democratic Party | 2.19 | 4.44 | | |
| | | Liberal Front Party | 1.83 | 2.91 | | |
| | | Democratic Labor Party | 2.33 | 3.49 | | |
| | 2010 | Workers' Party | 1.52 | 4.82 | 1.1 | 2.297 |
| | | Brazilian Democratic Movement Party | 1.76 | 3.19 | | |
| | | Brazilian Social Democratic Party | 1.8 | 3.14 | | |
| | | Democrats (ex-PEL) | 3.13 | 5.74 | | |
| | | Democratic Labor Party | 2.18 | 3.09 | | |
| Bulgaria | 2001 | National Movement Simeon the Second | 0.71 | 2.06 | 0.908 | 1.869 |
| | | United Democratic Forces | 1.28 | 1.74 | | |
| | | Bulgarian Socialist Party | 1.05 | 1.58 | | |
| | | Movement for Rights and Freedoms | 0.8 | 1.73 | | |
| Canada | 1997 | Liberal Party of Canada | 1.12 | 2.35 | 1.357 | 2.320 |
| | | Reform Party | 1.03 | 2.19 | | |
| | | Progressive Conservative | 1.05 | 1.98 | | |

Table Continued

| Country | Year | Party | Party Level | | System Level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Distance | Dispersion | Distance | Dispersion |
| | | New Democratic Party | 1.27 | 2.07 | | |
| | | Bloc Quebecois | 1.44 | 2.72 | | |
| | 2004 | Liberal Party of Canada | 1.04 | 2.46 | 1.011 | 2.317 |
| | | Conservative Party of Canada | 1.12 | 2.19 | | |
| | | New Democratic Party | 1.2 | 2.2 | | |
| | | Bloc Quebecois | 0.69 | 2.3 | | |
| | 2008 | Conservative Party of Canada | 1.15 | 1.96 | 1.121 | 1.979 |
| | | Liberal Party of Canada | 1.11 | 1.95 | | |
| | | Bloc Quebecois | 1.12 | 2 | | |
| | | New Democratic Party | 1.09 | 2.2 | | |
| | | Green Party | 1.13 | 2.12 | | |
| Chile | 2005 | Independent Democrat Union | 1.02 | 1.8 | 0.745 | 1.492 |
| | | Christian Democrat Party | 0.65 | 1.46 | | |
| | | Party for Democracy | 0.61 | 1.63 | | |
| | | National Renewal | 0.95 | 1.77 | | |
| | | Socialist Party of Chile | 0.79 | 1.51 | | |
| | | Communist Party of Chile | 0.61 | 1.27 | | |
| | 2009 | Independent Democratic Union | 1.19 | 1.61 | 1.024 | 1.627 |
| | | National Renewal | 1.1 | 1.72 | | |
| | | Christian Democratic Party | 0.9 | 1.65 | | |
| | | Party for Democracy | 1.09 | 1.77 | | |
| | | Socialist Party | 1.19 | 1.86 | | |
| | | Communist Party | 1.5 | 2.04 | | |
| Czech Republic | 1996 | Civic Democratic Party | 1.12 | 1.6 | 1.002 | 1.907 |
| | | Czech Social Democratic Party | 0.9 | 2.06 | | |
| | | Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia | 0.7 | 1.33 | | |
| | | Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party | 0.95 | 2.08 | | |
| | | Association for the Republic | 1.27 | 3.27 | | |
| | | Civic Democratic Alliance | 1.06 | 1.64 | | |
| | 2002 | Czech Social Democratic Party | 1.2 | 1.93 | 1.217 | 1.819 |
| | | Civic Democratic Party | 1.26 | 1.74 | | |
| | | Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia | 1.08 | 1.33 | | |
| | | Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak People's Party | 1.39 | 2.37 | | |
| | | Freedom Union - Democratic Union | 1.33 | 2.37 | | |
| | 2006 | Civic Democratic Party | 1.19 | 1.59 | 1.013 | 1.724 |
| | | Czech Social Democratic Party | 0.87 | 1.88 | | |
| | | Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia | 1.1 | 1.55 | | |
| | | Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak Peoples' party | 0.62 | 1.9 | | |
| | | Green Party | 0.86 | 1.87 | | |
| | 2010 | Czech Social Democratic Party | 2.67 | 2.23 | 1.063 | 1.680 |
| | | Civic Democratic Party | 8.26 | 1.7 | | |
| | | Tradition, responsibility, prosperity 09 | 7.89 | 1.71 | | |
| | | Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia | 1.21 | 1.93 | | |
| | | Public Affairs | 6.69 | 2.14 | | |
| | | Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak Peoples' Party | 5.36 | 1.79 | | |
| | | Green Party | 5.63 | 1.47 | | |
| Denmark | 1998 | Social Democrats | 0.66 | 1.71 | 0.610 | 1.540 |
| | | Left, Liberal Party | 0.55 | 1.75 | | |
| | | Conservative | 0.48 | 1.38 | | |
| | | Socialist People's Party | 0.61 | 1.35 | | |
| | | Danish People's Party | 1.18 | 3.02 | | |
| | | Center Democrat | 1.75 | 2.14 | | |
| | 2001 | Left, Liberal Party | 0.85 | 1.76 | 0.723 | 1.675 |
| | | Social Democrats | 0.67 | 1.8 | | |
| | | Danish People's Party | 0.92 | 2.08 | | |

Table Continued

| Country | Year | Party | Party Level | | System Level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Distance | Dispersion | Distance | Dispersion |
| | | Conservative People's Party | 0.7 | 1.35 | | |
| | | Socialist People's Party | 0.76 | 1.56 | | |
| | | Radical Left, Social Liberal Party | 0.29 | 1.25 | | |
| | | Red-Green Unity Party | 0.24 | 0.88 | | |
| | 2007 | Left, Liberal Party | 0.76 | 2.25 | 0.81 | 2.091 |
| | | Social Democrats | 0.79 | 2 | | |
| | | Danish People's Party | 1.17 | 2.77 | | |
| | | Socialist People's Party | 0.75 | 1.82 | | |
| | | Conservative People's Party | 0.68 | 1.9 | | |
| | | Radical Left, Social Liberal Party | 0.55 | 1.37 | | |
| | | New Alliance | 0.75 | 1.46 | | |
| | | Red-Greens Unity Party | 0.97 | 1.83 | | |
| | | Christian Democrats | 2.1 | 2.15 | | |
| Finland | 2003 | Center Party | 1.01 | 1.98 | 1.087 | 2.065 |
| | | Social Democratic Party of Finland | 1.29 | 2.55 | | |
| | | National Coalition Party | 0.85 | 1.62 | | |
| | | Left Alliance | 1.22 | 2.59 | | |
| | | Green League | 1.4 | 1.99 | | |
| | | Christian Democrats | 1.2 | 2.04 | | |
| | | Swedish People's Party in Finland | 1.02 | 1.59 | | |
| | 2007 | Centre Party | 1.17 | 2.08 | 1.133 | 2.000 |
| | | National Coalition Party | 1.17 | 1.54 | | |
| | | Social Democratic Party of Finland | 1.19 | 2.5 | | |
| | | Left Alliance | 0.98 | 1.82 | | |
| | | Green League | 0.96 | 2.07 | | |
| | | Swedish People's Party in Finland | 1.24 | 1.96 | | |
| | | Christian Democrats | 1.08 | 1.94 | | |
| | | True Finns | 1.07 | 2.23 | | |
| | 2011 | National Coalition Party | 1.09 | 1.47 | 1.078 | 2.044 |
| | | Social Democratic Party of Finland | 1.1 | 2.46 | | |
| | | True Finns | 1.15 | 2.74 | | |
| | | Centre Party | 0.94 | 1.76 | | |
| | | Left Alliance | 1.19 | 1.8 | | |
| | | Green League | 0.84 | 1.94 | | |
| | | Swedish People's Party In Finland | 1.23 | 1.75 | | |
| | | Christian Democrats | 1.26 | 1.95 | | |
| France | 2002 | Rally For the Republic | 1.35 | 2.25 | 1.299 | 2.265 |
| | | Socialist Party | 1.38 | 2.74 | | |
| | | Union for French Democracy | 0.83 | 1.84 | | |
| | | French Communist Party | 2.5 | 3.48 | | |
| | 2007 | Union pour un Mouvement Populaire | 1.11 | 1.76 | 1.105 | 1.832 |
| | | Socialist Party | 1.41 | 2.47 | | |
| | | Mouvement Democrate | 0.91 | 1.57 | | |
| | | Front National | 1.37 | 2.89 | | |
| | | French Communist Party | 1.47 | 2.38 | | |
| | | The Greens (Les Verts) | 0.97 | 1.75 | | |
| | | Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire | 1 | 1.5 | | |
| Germany | 1998 | Social Democratic Party | 1.22 | 2.27 | 1.129 | 2.064 |
| | | Christian Democratic Party | 1.09 | 2.17 | | |
| | | Christian Social Union in Bavaria | 1.11 | 1.79 | | |
| | | Alliance 90/Greens | 1 | 1.52 | | |
| | | Free Democratic Party | 0.94 | 1.46 | | |
| | | Party of Democratic Socialism | 1 | 1.62 | | |
| | 2002 | Social Democratic Party | 1.4 | 2.47 | 1.258 | 2.330 |
| | | Christian Democratic Union | 1.24 | 2.42 | | |
| | | Christian Social Union | 0.77 | 2.22 | | |
| | | Alliance 90/Greens | 1.07 | 1.82 | | |
| | | Free Democratic Party | 1.37 | 1.97 | | |
| | | Party of Democratic Socialism | 1.48 | 1.97 | | |

Table Continued

| Country | Year | Party | Party Level | | System Level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Distance | Dispersion | Distance | Dispersion |
| | 2005 | Social Democratic Party | 1.41 | 2.69 | 1.259 | 2.421 |
| | | Christian Democratic Union | 1.05 | 2.53 | | |
| | | Free Democratic Party | 1.06 | 2.13 | | |
| | | The Left Party. PDS | 1.69 | 1.95 | | |
| | | Alliance 90 / Greens | 0.98 | 1.72 | | |
| | | Christian Social Union | 1.41 | 2.44 | | |
| | | National Democratic Party of Germany | 2.73 | 3.71 | | |
| | 2009 | Christian Democratic Union | 0.75 | 1.7 | 0.802 | 1.612 |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 0.65 | 1.37 | | |
| | | Free Democratic Party | 0.71 | 1.57 | | |
| | | Left Party | 1.22 | 1.89 | | |
| | | Alliance 90 / Greens | 0.76 | 1.43 | | |
| | | Christian Social Union | 1.07 | 1.9 | | |
| Great Britain | 1997 | Labour Party | 1.42 | 2.85 | 1.284 | 2.515 |
| | | Conservative | 1.16 | 2.19 | | |
| | | Liberal Democrats | 1.18 | 1.97 | | |
| | | Scottish National Party | 1.38 | 2.98 | | |
| | 2005 | Labour | 1.46 | 2.57 | 1.211 | 2.189 |
| | | Conservative | 1 | 1.86 | | |
| | | Liberal Democrats | 1.06 | 1.53 | | |
| Greece | 2009 | Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement | 1.03 | 1.84 | 1.107 | 1.782 |
| | | New Democracy | 1.06 | 2.2 | | |
| | | Communist Party of Greece | 1.3 | 2.03 | | |
| | | Popular Orthodox Rally | 1.92 | 2.64 | | |
| | | Coalition of the Radical Left | 1.16 | 2.1 | | |
| | | Ecologists- Greens | 0.86 | 1.81 | | |
| Hong Kong | 2008 | Democratic Alliance For Betterment of Hong Kong | 2.51 | 3.2 | 1.237 | 2.053 |
| | | Democratic Party | 1.77 | 3.01 | | |
| | | Civic Party | 0.78 | 2.09 | | |
| | | League Of Social Democrats | 1.36 | 3.27 | | |
| | | Liberal Party | 1.78 | 3.03 | | |
| Croatia | 2007 | Croatian Democratic Union | 1.1 | 2.7 | 1.08 | 2.316 |
| | | Social Democratic Party of Croatia | 1.26 | 2.3 | | |
| | | Croatian People's Party-Liberal Democrats | 1.27 | 2.39 | | |
| | | Croatian Peasant Party | 1.07 | 2.1 | | |
| | | Croatian Party of Pensioners | 2.62 | 3.25 | | |
| | | Croatian Party of Rights | 1.35 | 2.63 | | |
| | | Croatian Social Liberal Party | 0.67 | 2.37 | | |
| | | Istrian Democratic Assembly | 0.45 | 2.42 | | |
| Hungary | 1998 | Hungarian Socialist Party | 1.31 | 2.67 | 1.001 | 2.351 |
| | | Alliance of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Party | 0.89 | 2.23 | | |
| | | Independent Smallholder's Party | 0.97 | 2.89 | | |
| | | Alliance of Free Democrats | 0.82 | 2.21 | | |
| | | Hungarian Justice and Life Party | 0.95 | 2.08 | | |
| | 2002 | Hungarian Socialist Party | 1.06 | 2.51 | 1.057 | 2.184 |
| | | Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Party | 1.03 | 2.15 | | |
| | | Alliance for Free Democrats | 1.29 | 2.12 | | |
| Iceland | 1999 | Independent Party | 1.15 | 1.71 | 1.050 | 1.766 |
| | | Socialist Democratic Alliance | 0.94 | 2.07 | | |
| | | Progressive Party | 0.95 | 1.55 | | |
| | | Left Greens | 1.49 | 2.2 | | |
| | 2003 | Independent Party | 1.19 | 1.56 | 1.048 | 1.746 |
| | | Socialist Democratic Alliance | 1.15 | 1.94 | | |
| | | Progressive Party | 0.71 | 1.74 | | |
| | | Left-Green Movement | 0.93 | 1.62 | | |
| | | Liberal Party | 0.83 | 1.93 | | |
| | 2007 | Independence Party | 1.16 | 1.65 | 1.171 | 1.805 |

Table Continued

| Country | Year | Party | Party Level | | System Level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Distance | Dispersion | Distance | Dispersion |
| | | Socialist Democratic Alliance | 0.93 | 1.83 | | |
| | | Left-Green Movement | 1.66 | 2.19 | | |
| | | Progressive Party | 1.05 | 1.61 | | |
| | | Liberal Party | 1.42 | 2.1 | | |
| | | Icelandic Movement | 0.89 | 2.28 | | |
| | 2009 | Socialist Democratic Alliance | 0.9 | 1.95 | 1.052 | 1.820 |
| | | Independence Party | 1.21 | 1.62 | | |
| | | Left-Green Movement | 1.36 | 2.04 | | |
| | | Progressive Party | 0.72 | 1.57 | | |
| | | Civic Movement | 0.85 | 1.72 | | |
| | | Liberal Party | 1.89 | 2.13 | | |
| Ireland | 2002 | Fianna Fail | 1.09 | 2.58 | 1.054 | 2.234 |
| | | Fine Gael | 1.04 | 2.22 | | |
| | | Labour | 1.27 | 2.42 | | |
| | | Sinn Fein | 1.41 | 3.78 | | |
| | | Progressive Democrats | 1.67 | 1.37 | | |
| | | Green | 1.47 | 2.4 | | |
| Israel | 1996 | Labour (Avoda) | 1.31 | 2.6 | 0.893 | 1.731 |
| | | Likud | 0.96 | 2.17 | | |
| | | Shas | 1.5 | 1.73 | | |
| | | Mafdal (National Religious Party) | 0.91 | 1.89 | | |
| | | Meretz | 0.92 | 1.63 | | |
| | 2003 | Likud | 1.18 | 1.99 | 1.037 | 1.710 |
| | | Labor (Avoda) | 1.52 | 2.47 | | |
| | | Shinui | 1.53 | 2.25 | | |
| | | Shas | 0.97 | 1.92 | | |
| | | National Union (Ihud Leumi) | 1 | 2.1 | | |
| | | Meretz | 1.68 | 2.15 | | |
| | 2006 | Kadima | 1.25 | 2.49 | 0.838 | 1.960 |
| | | Labor (Avoda) | 1.76 | 3.57 | | |
| | | Shas | 1.52 | 2.83 | | |
| | | Likud | 0.95 | 1.92 | | |
| | | Israel Beytenu | 1.17 | 2.15 | | |
| | | Ihud Leumi- Mafdal | 0.84 | 1.63 | | |
| Italy | 2006 | Forward Italy | 3.25 | 4.11 | 2.070 | 2.914 |
| | | Democrats of the Left | 1.77 | 2.56 | | |
| | | National Alliance | 3.68 | 4.51 | | |
| | | Daisy-Democracy is Freedom | 1.04 | 2.45 | | |
| | | Union of Christian and Centre | 1.9 | 3.7 | | |
| | | Communist Refoundation Party | 1.44 | 1.93 | | |
| Japan | 1996 | Liberal Democratic Party | 1.43 | 2.29 | 1.664 | 2.538 |
| | | New Frontier Party | 1.97 | 3.05 | | |
| | | Democratic Party of Japan | 2.23 | 2.84 | | |
| | | Japanese Communist Party | 1.65 | 2.56 | | |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 1.7 | 2.28 | | |
| | 2004 | Democratic Party of Japan | 1.43 | 2.13 | 1.543 | 2.250 |
| | | Liberal Democratic Party | 1.65 | 2.25 | | |
| | | New Komeito | 1.6 | 2.46 | | |
| | | Japanese Communist Party | 2.34 | 2.57 | | |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 1.42 | 1.86 | | |
| | 2007 | Democratic Party of Japan | 1 | 1.63 | 0.95 | 1.688 |
| | | Liberal Democratic Party | 1.04 | 2.06 | | |
| | | New Komeito | 0.95 | 2.02 | | |
| | | Japanese Communist Party | 2.02 | 2.52 | | |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 0.91 | 2.15 | | |
| Korea, South | 2000 | Grand National Party | 1.69 | 3.02 | 1.751 | 2.919 |
| | | Millennium Democratic Party | 1.92 | 3.13 | | |
| | | United Liberal Democrats | 1.92 | 2.04 | | |
| | 2004 | Our Party | 1.48 | 2.68 | 1.314 | 2.559 |

Table Continued

| Country | Year | Party | Party Level | | System Level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Distance | Dispersion | Distance | Dispersion |
| | | Grand National Party | 1.15 | 2.54 | | |
| | | Democratic Labor Party | 1.4 | 2.6 | | |
| | | Millennium Democratic Party | 1.66 | 2.73 | | |
| | 2008 | Grand National Party | 1.35 | 2.26 | 1.389 | 2.283 |
| | | United Democratic Party | 1.87 | 2.82 | | |
| | | Liberal Forward Party | 1.52 | 2.82 | | |
| | | Pro-Park Geun-hye Alliance | 1.31 | 2.57 | | |
| | | Democratic Labor Party | 1.46 | 2.7 | | |
| | | Renewal of Korea Party | 1.54 | 2.56 | | |
| | | New Progressive Party | 1.86 | 2.01 | | |
| Latvia | 2010 | Unity | 1.57 | 2.51 | 1.519 | 2.615 |
| | | Harmony Centre | 1.37 | 2.79 | | |
| | | Union of Greens and Farmers | 1.51 | 2.78 | | |
| | | All for Latvia-For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK | 1.84 | 2.3 | | |
| | | For a Good Latvia | 1.56 | 2.27 | | |
| Mexico | 1997 | Institutional Revolutionary Party | 1.64 | 3.32 | 1.931 | 3.683 |
| | | National Action Party | 2.09 | 3.56 | | |
| | | Democratic Revolution Party | 2.4 | 4.67 | | |
| | | Mexican Ecological Party | 2.5 | 4.14 | | |
| | 2000 | National Action Party | 1.54 | 3.57 | 1.883 | 3.592 |
| | | Institutional Revolutionary Party | 2.48 | 3.98 | | |
| | | Democratic Revolution Party | 2.12 | 4.46 | | |
| | 2003 | National Action Party | 1.78 | 3.27 | 1.789 | 3.795 |
| | | Institutional Revolutionary Party | 1.73 | 3.89 | | |
| | | Democratic Revolution Party | 1.99 | 4.45 | | |
| | | Mexican Green Ecological Party | 2.25 | 4.87 | | |
| | | Labor Party | 1.18 | 3.19 | | |
| | 2006 | National Action Party | 1.32 | 2.51 | 1.27 | 3.110 |
| | | Democratic Revolution Party | 1.73 | 5.3 | | |
| | | Institutional Revolutionary Party | 1.38 | 3.38 | | |
| | 2009 | Institutional Revolutionary Party | 1.38 | 2.5 | 1.466 | 2.754 |
| | | National Action Party | 1.39 | 2.14 | | |
| | | Democratic Revolution Party | 2.12 | 4.42 | | |
| | | Mexican Green Ecological Party | 1.48 | 3.18 | | |
| | | Labor Party | 2.92 | 4.91 | | |
| | | New Alliance Party | 2.47 | 3.97 | | |
| Netherlands | 1998 | Labour Party | 0.99 | 2.29 | 0.833 | 1.781 |
| | | People's Party for Freedom | 0.74 | 1.51 | | |
| | | Christian Democratic Appeal | 0.9 | 1.97 | | |
| | | Democrats 66 | 0.74 | 1.84 | | |
| | | Green Left | 0.65 | 0.97 | | |
| | | Socialist Party | 1.28 | 2.72 | | |
| | 2002 | Christian Democratic Appeal | 1.05 | 2 | 0.926 | 1.712 |
| | | List Pim Fortuyn | 0.69 | 1.61 | | |
| | | People's Party for Freedom and Democracy | 0.94 | 1.36 | | |
| | | Labour Party | 1.06 | 1.97 | | |
| | | Green Left | 0.77 | 1.07 | | |
| | | Socialist Party | 1.04 | 1.7 | | |
| | | Democrats 66 | 0.77 | 1.6 | | |
| | | Christian Union | 1.12 | 2.48 | | |
| | | Political Reformed Party | 1.04 | 1.99 | | |
| | 2006 | Christian Democratic Appeal | 1.05 | 1.83 | 1.107 | 1.884 |
| | | Labour Party | 1.15 | 2.31 | | |
| | | Socialist Party | 1.43 | 2.1 | | |
| | | People's Party for Freedom and Democracy | 0.84 | 1.26 | | |
| | | Party for Freedom | 1.53 | 2.12 | | |
| | | Green Left | 1.19 | 1.62 | | |
| | | Christian Union | 0.73 | 2.25 | | |

Table Continued

| Country | Year | Party | Party Level | | System Level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Distance | Dispersion | Distance | Dispersion |
| | | Democrats 66 | 0.88 | 1.54 | | |
| | | Political Reformed Party | 0.67 | 1.34 | | |
| | 2010 | People's Party for Freedom and Democracy | 1.11 | 1.56 | 1.214 | 2.143 |
| | | Labour Party | 1.01 | 2.32 | | |
| | | Party for Freedom | 1.85 | 3.08 | | |
| | | Christian Democratic Appeal | 1.08 | 2.17 | | |
| | | Socialist Party | 1.46 | 2.34 | | |
| | | Democrats 66 | 1.17 | 1.9 | | |
| | | Green Left | 1.11 | 1.39 | | |
| | | Christian Union | 0.89 | 2.55 | | |
| | | Political Reformed Party | 0.52 | 1.81 | | |
| New Zealand | 1996 | National | 0.87 | 1.87 | 1.140 | 2.166 |
| | | Labour | 1.31 | 2.44 | | |
| | | New Zealand First | 1.45 | 2.79 | | |
| | | Alliance | 1.39 | 2.19 | | |
| | | Act New Zealand | 0.98 | 1.48 | | |
| | | Christian Coalition | 1.05 | 2.83 | | |
| | 2002 | Labour | 1.35 | 3.05 | 1.083 | 2.382 |
| | | National | 0.91 | 1.86 | | |
| | | New Zealand First | 1.48 | 2.73 | | |
| | | Act New Zealand | 0.67 | 1.15 | | |
| | | Green Party | 1.12 | 3.47 | | |
| | 2008 | National | 0.95 | 1.88 | 1.107 | 2.311 |
| | | Labour | 1.3 | 2.95 | | |
| | | Green Party | 1.18 | 2.22 | | |
| | | New Zealand First | 1 | 2.66 | | |
| | | Act New Zealand | 1.06 | 1.86 | | |
| | | Maori Party | 1.13 | 2.89 | | |
| | | Jim Anderton's Progressive Party | 2.62 | 2.98 | | |
| Norway | 1997 | Labour Party | 1.26 | 2.44 | 1.012 | 1.900 |
| | | Progress Party | 1.27 | 2.05 | | |
| | | Conservative Party | 0.66 | 1.19 | | |
| | | Christian People's Party | 0.83 | 1.81 | | |
| | | Center Party | 0.86 | 1.79 | | |
| | | Socialist Left Party | 0.95 | 1.38 | | |
| | 2001 | Labour Party | 1.19 | 2.39 | 0.841 | 1.559 |
| | | Conservative Party | 0.9 | 1.34 | | |
| | | Socialist Left Party | 0.9 | 1.84 | | |
| | | Christian People's Party | 1.04 | 1.88 | | |
| | | Center Party | 0.8 | 1.6 | | |
| | | Liberal Party | 1 | 1.95 | | |
| | 2005 | Labour Party | 1.13 | 2.35 | 1.064 | 1.974 |
| | | Progress Party | 1.33 | 2.25 | | |
| | | Conservative Party | 1.03 | 1.36 | | |
| | | Socialist Left Party | 0.7 | 1.4 | | |
| | | Christian People's Party | 1 | 1.54 | | |
| | | Center Party | 0.73 | 1.44 | | |
| | | Liberal Party | 0.76 | 1.95 | | |
| | 2009 | Labour Party | 0.98 | 2.1 | 0.963 | 1.705 |
| | | Progress Party | 1.1 | 1.61 | | |
| | | Conservative Party | 0.86 | 1.24 | | |
| | | Socialist Left Party | 0.88 | 1.61 | | |
| | | Center Party | 0.67 | 1.33 | | |
| | | Christian People's Party | 1.05 | 1.45 | | |
| | | Liberal Party | 0.85 | 1.73 | | |
| Peru | 2000 | Peru 2000 | 1.38 | 2.7 | 1.342 | 2.480 |
| | | Possible Peru | 2.38 | 3.98 | | |
| | | We Are Peru | 1.4 | 2.76 | | |
| | | American Popular Revolutionary Alliance | 1.55 | 3.4 | | |

Table Continued

| Country | Year | Party | Party Level | | System Level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Distance | Dispersion | Distance | Dispersion |
| | 2001 | Possible Peru | 1.66 | 3.83 | 1.361 | 2.934 |
| | | American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Partido Aprista) | 1.4 | 4.14 | | |
| | | National Unity (Unidad Nacional) | 1.72 | 2.5 | | |
| | | Moralizing Independent Front | 2.11 | 2.75 | | |
| | 2011 | Peru Wins (Gana Peru) | 2.05 | 3.68 | 1.83 | 3.253 |
| | | Force 2011 | 1.44 | 3.04 | | |
| | | Possible Peru | 1.88 | 2.76 | | |
| | | Alliance for the Great Change | 2.04 | 3.08 | | |
| | | National Solidarity Party | 1.82 | 3.13 | | |
| | | American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Partido Aprista) | 1.86 | 3.4 | | |
| Poland | 1997 | Solidarity Election Action | 1.29 | 2.26 | 1.418 | 2.436 |
| | | Democratic Left Alliance | 1.49 | 2.57 | | |
| | | Freedom Union | 1.64 | 2.6 | | |
| | | Polish People's Party | 1.55 | 2.84 | | |
| | | Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland | 1.67 | 2.16 | | |
| | 2001 | Coalition Of The Alliance Of Democratic Left and Union Of Labor | 1.58 | 2.41 | 1.634 | 1.994 |
| | | Citizen's Platform | 1.48 | 2.46 | | |
| | | Self Defense Of The Polish Republic | 2.15 | 3.65 | | |
| | | Law And Justice | 1.82 | 2.84 | | |
| | | Polish People's Party | 1.66 | 2.89 | | |
| | | League of Polish Families | 1.33 | 2.7 | | |
| | 2005 | Law And Justice | 1.58 | 2.48 | 1.628 | 2.679 |
| | | Citizen's Platform | 1.53 | 2.51 | | |
| | | Self Defense of The Polish Republic | 1.7 | 3.49 | | |
| | | Democratic Left Alliance | 1.84 | 2.6 | | |
| | | League of Polish Families | 1.41 | 3.02 | | |
| | | Polish People's Party | 2.29 | 2.94 | | |
| | | Democratic Party | 1.08 | 2.36 | | |
| | | Social Democracy of Poland | 1.83 | 2.36 | | |
| | 2007 | Citizen's Platform | 1.53 | 2.62 | 1.393 | 2.576 |
| | | Law And Justice | 1.08 | 2.51 | | |
| | | Left and Democrats | 1.85 | 2.73 | | |
| | | Polish People's Party | 1.39 | 2.5 | | |
| Portugal | 2002 | Social Democratic Party | 0.77 | 1.97 | 0.889 | 2.044 |
| | | Socialist Party | 1.01 | 2.04 | | |
| | | Popular Party | 1.11 | 2.48 | | |
| | | Unitary Democratic Party Coalition | 0.93 | 2.4 | | |
| | | Left Bloc | 0.13 | 1.72 | | |
| | 2005 | Socialist Party | 1.08 | 2.3 | 1.193 | 2.096 |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 1.28 | 2.27 | | |
| | | Unitary Democratic Coalition | 1.56 | 2.66 | | |
| | | Popular Party | 1.11 | 1.87 | | |
| | | Left Bloc | 1.62 | 2.28 | | |
| | 2009 | Socialist Party | 1.2 | 2.61 | 1.126 | 2.554 |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 0.91 | 2.35 | | |
| | | Democratic and Social Centre - People's Party | 1.17 | 2.66 | | |
| | | Left Bloc | 1.14 | 2.47 | | |
| | | Unitary Democratic Coalition | 1.75 | 3.19 | | |
| Romania | 1996 | National Peasant - Christian Democratic Party | 1.58 | 2.84 | 1.730 | 2.995 |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 1.95 | 4.41 | | |
| | | Democratic Party | 2.08 | 2.77 | | |
| | | Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania | 2 | 2.23 | | |
| | | Romanian Party for National Unity | 2.14 | 1.93 | | |

Table Continued

| Country | Year | Party | Party Level | | System Level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Distance | Dispersion | Distance | Dispersion |
| | 2004 | National Alliance (Social Democratic Party - Humanist Party of Romania) | 1.78 | 3.44 | 1.808 | 3.002 |
| | | Truth and Justice Alliance (National Liberal Party - Democratic Party) | 2.01 | 2.55 | | |
| | | Greater Romania Party | 1.42 | 3.07 | | |
| | | Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania | 1.75 | 2.48 | | |
| Russia | 1999 | Communist Party of the Russian Federation | 1.7 | 3.95 | 1.136 | 2.290 |
| | | Unity Inter-regional Movement Social Democrats | 1.62 | 3.04 | | |
| | | Fatherland All Russia | 1.5 | 2.72 | | |
| | | Union of Right Forces | 1.38 | 1.76 | | |
| | | Zhirinovsky Bloc | 1 | 3.1 | | |
| | | Yabloko | 1.75 | 2.93 | | |
| | 2004 | United Russia | 1.64 | 3.06 | 1.447 | 2.780 |
| | | Communist Party of the Russian Federation | 2.05 | 3.86 | | |
| | | Liberal Democratic Party of Russia | 1 | 3.82 | | |
| | | Homeland People's-Patriotic Union | 1.38 | 3.47 | | |
| | | Union Right Forces | 1.43 | 2.11 | | |
| | | Russian Democratic Party - Yavlinski Bloc | 1.29 | 2.34 | | |
| Slovakia | 2010 | Direction - Social Democracy | 1.57 | 3.21 | 1.479 | 2.658 |
| | | Slovak Democratic And Christian Union - Democratic Party | 1.46 | 2.15 | | |
| | | Freedom And Solidarity | 1.6 | 2.35 | | |
| | | Christian Democratic Movement | 1.21 | 2.42 | | |
| | | Most Hid | 1.08 | 2.21 | | |
| | | Slovak National Party | 1.7 | 2.27 | | |
| | | Party Of The Hungarian Coalition | 0.77 | 2.18 | | |
| | | People's Party - Movement For a Democratic Slovakia | 2.17 | 2.92 | | |
| Slovenia | 1996 | Liberal Democracy of Slovenia | 1.6 | 3.11 | 1.353 | 2.555 |
| | | Slovenian People’s Party | 1.63 | 3.01 | | |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 1.55 | 2.82 | | |
| | | Christian Democrats | 1.19 | 2.75 | | |
| | | United List of Social Democrats | 1.61 | 2.55 | | |
| | 2004 | Slovenian Democratic Party | 1.51 | 2.8 | 1.078 | 2.193 |
| | | Liberal Democracy of Slovenia | 1.36 | 2.53 | | |
| | | United List of Social Democrats | 1.06 | 2.63 | | |
| | | New Slovenia-Christian People's Party | 0.92 | 1.73 | | |
| | | Slovenian National Party | 0.5 | 2.7 | | |
| | 2008 | Social Democrats (ex-ZLSD) | 1.53 | 2.69 | 1.224 | 2.430 |
| | | Slovenian Democratic Party | 1.29 | 2.41 | | |
| | | For Real-New Politics Party | 1.03 | 2.3 | | |
| | | Democratic Party of Pensioners | 1.25 | 3.21 | | |
| | | Slovenian National Party | 1.65 | 3.15 | | |
| | | Liberal Democracy of Slovenia | 0.69 | 2.87 | | |
| South Africa | 2009 | African National Congress | 2.21 | 3.14 | 2.072 | 3.100 |
| | | Democratic Alliance | 1.62 | 3.45 | | |
| | | Congress of the People | 2.11 | 3.3 | | |
| | | Inkatha Freedom Party | 3.45 | 3.02 | | |
| | | Independent Democrats | 2 | 3.89 | | |
| | | Freedom Front Plus | 1.1 | 2.62 | | |
| Spain | 1996 | Popular Party | 1.02 | 2 | 0.797 | 1.700 |
| | | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | 0.59 | 1.55 | | |
| | | United Left | 0.94 | 1.76 | | |
| | | Convergence and Union | 0.65 | 1.3 | | |
| | | Basque Nationalist Party | 1.5 | 1.49 | | |
| | 2000 | Popular Party | 0.74 | 1.75 | 0.639 | 1.512 |
| | | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | 0.59 | 1.44 | | |

Table Continued

| Country | Year | Party | Party Level | | System Level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Distance | Dispersion | Distance | Dispersion |
| | | Unite Left | 0.68 | 1.63 | | |
| | | Convergence and Union | 0.68 | 1.22 | | |
| | 2004 | Spanish Socialist Party | 0.82 | 1.67 | 0.966 | 1.644 |
| | | Popular Party | 1.32 | 1.9 | | |
| | | United Left | 0.74 | 1.51 | | |
| | | Convergence and Union | 0.45 | 1.24 | | |
| | 2008 | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | 1 | 1.7 | 0.994 | 1.683 |
| | | Popular Party | 1 | 1.73 | | |
| | | Convergence and Union | 1.32 | 1.74 | | |
| | | Basque Nationalist Party | 1.12 | 1.44 | | |
| | | Republican Left of Catalonia | 0.65 | 1.85 | | |
| | | United Left | 0.8 | 1.27 | | |
| | | Galician Nationalist Party | 1.73 | 1.8 | | |
| | | Union Progress and Democracy | 0.6 | 0.6 | | |
| Estonia | 2011 | Estonian Reform Party | 1.57 | 2.14 | 1.478 | 2.526 |
| | | Estonian Centre Party | 1.48 | 3.12 | | |
| | | Pro Patria and Res Publica Union | 1.27 | 2.27 | | |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 1.23 | 2.62 | | |
| | | Estonian People's Union | 1.09 | 3.41 | | |
| | | Estonian Greens | 1.19 | 3.14 | | |
| Sweden | 1998 | Social Democrats | 1.05 | 2.19 | 0.959 | 1.696 |
| | | Moderate Party | 1.27 | 1.27 | | |
| | | Left Party | 0.89 | 1.55 | | |
| | | Christian Democrats | 0.67 | 1.74 | | |
| | | Center Party | 0.79 | 1.67 | | |
| | | People's Party Liberals | 0.67 | 1.42 | | |
| | 2002 | Social Democrats | 0.93 | 2.26 | 0.898 | 1.729 |
| | | Conservative Party | 1.15 | 1.36 | | |
| | | People's Party Liberals | 0.6 | 1.31 | | |
| | | Christian Democrats | 1.16 | 1.66 | | |
| | | Left Party | 1 | 1.58 | | |
| | | Centre Party | 0.85 | 1.73 | | |
| | 2006 | Social Democrats | 1.27 | 2.32 | 1.098 | 1.780 |
| | | Conservative Party | 1.24 | 1.47 | | |
| | | Centre Party | 0.76 | 1.45 | | |
| | | People's Party Liberals | 0.5 | 1.18 | | |
| | | Christian Democrats | 0.88 | 1.57 | | |
| | | Left Party | 1.23 | 1.62 | | |
| | | Green Party | 0.73 | 1.58 | | |
| Switzerland | 1999 | People’s Party | 1.23 | 1.94 | 1.036 | 1.885 |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 1.21 | 2.13 | | |
| | | Free Democratic Party | 0.93 | 1.77 | | |
| | | Christian Democrats | 1.19 | 2.44 | | |
| | | Green Party | 1.13 | 2.56 | | |
| | 2003 | People's Party | 1.3 | 1.75 | 0.879 | 1.832 |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 1.44 | 2.26 | | |
| | | Free Democratic Party | 1.01 | 1.92 | | |
| | | Christian Democratic People's Party | 1.2 | 1.91 | | |
| | | Green Party | 1.11 | 2.32 | | |
| | 2007 | People's Party | 1.42 | 2.14 | 1.258 | 2.083 |
| | | Social Democratic Party | 1.49 | 2.49 | | |
| | | Free Democratic Party | 1.01 | 1.83 | | |
| | | Christian Democratic People's Party | 1.1 | 2.09 | | |
| | | Green Party | 1.45 | 2.28 | | |
| | | Protestant People's Party | 1.07 | 1.67 | | |
| | | Liberal Party | 0.67 | 1.6 | | |
| Taiwan | 1996 | Kuomintang | 1.2 | 2.5 | 1.397 | 2.731 |
| | | Democratic Progressive Party | 1.91 | 3.57 | | |
| | | Chinese New Party | 1.37 | 2.4 | | |

Table Continued

| Country | Year | Party | Party Level | | System Level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Distance | Dispersion | Distance | Dispersion |
| | 2001 | Democratic Progressive Party | 1.36 | 2.49 | 1.198 | 2.363 |
| | | Kuomintang | 1.29 | 2.72 | | |
| | | People's First Party | 1.03 | 2.38 | | |
| | | Taiwan Solidarity Union | 1.17 | 2.49 | | |
| | 2004 | Democratic Progressive Party | 1.1 | 2.86 | 1.167 | 2.495 |
| | | Kuomintang | 0.96 | 2.3 | | |
| | | People First Party | 0.87 | 2.28 | | |
| | | Taiwan Solidarity Union | 4.96 | 4.01 | | |
| Thailand | 2007 | People Power Party | 1.32 | 3.08 | 1.318 | 2.686 |
| | | Democrat Party | 1.53 | 2.93 | | |
| | | Thai Nation Party | 2.18 | 2.67 | | |
| Turkey | 2011 | Justice and Development Party | 1.09 | 2.32 | 0.989 | 2.314 |
| | | Republican People's Party | 1 | 2.22 | | |
| | | Nationalist Movement Party | 1.04 | 1.94 | | |
| | | Peace and Democracy Party | 1.39 | 3.18 | | |
| Uruguay | 2009 | Broad Front | 1.42 | 2.74 | 1.402 | 2.772 |
| | | National Party | 1.27 | 2.8 | | |
| | | Colorado Party | 1.75 | 3.16 | | |
| United States | 2004 | Republican Party | 1.21 | 2.03 | 1.183 | 2.644 |
| | | Democratic Party | 1.16 | 3.36 | | |
| | 2008 | Democratic Party | 1.46 | 3.75 | 1.512 | 3.180 |
| | | Republican Party | 1.58 | 2.36 | | |

APPENDIX B

POMPER'S (1967) CATEGORIES AND EXAMPLES FROM SOUTH KOREAN PARTY PLATFORMS

## Rhetoric and Fact

"The 21st century is an era of women." (DP-New Politics of National Conference, 1995)

## Evaluation of the Parties' Past

"We, the New Politics National Conference, are the party of the authentic national/democratic forces, who inherited the legitimacy of national independence movement and have led the democratization and unification movement in this country." (DP-New Politics of National Conference, 1995)

## Future Policies

### Rhetorical

"We encourage the virtues of helping each other based on ethics, and pursue a trustful community which is governed by justice and conscience with laws and orders being respected." (GNP-Democratic Liberal Party, May 1990)

### General

"We seek an effective government which serves citizens by securing safety and basic human rights, by playing an active role in the up-and-coming issues of science technology, globalization, and welfare, and by expanding the range of civil service." (DP-United Democratic Party 2008)

**Continuity**

N/A

**Goals and Concerns**

"We seek to facilitate and/or support the reform and opening of North Korea, and will endeavor to support its human rights improvement and transition to a liberal democratic regime." (GNP, Jan 2006)

**Action**

"We will drastically increase the benefits to and aid for men of national merit." (GNP, March 2004)

**Details**

"We will revoke the investigative authority and information control oversight of the National Security Planning Agency, will only allow the National Security Planning Agency to maintain responsibility for the collection of intelligence information and security tasks, and require it to be subject to oversight and budget approval by the National Assembly." (DP-Democratic Party 1992)

# APPENDIX C

## CODING SCHEMES FOR ISSUE VARIABLES

I present coding schemes for only two issues—the range of social service (the coding schemes were developed by Harmel and Janda's Party Change Project) and North Korea/unification—among the four issues used for analyzing the platforms of South Korean parties in this study. Each coding scheme assigns values based on what the issue-related statements in a platform communicate.

**Social Services: Range (excludes education)**

-5 (PRO-strong) Favors a very broad range of governmental provision of social services, covering health care, social welfare for the needy, care for the aged/infirm, family (parent/child) assistance, pensions, unemployment benefits, and more; tends to favor expansion of such programs, even where the range is already very broad.

-3 (PRO-moderate) Advocates a "middle" range of social services provided by the government, seeing some areas as more appropriately provided for in the private sector, where some regulation may still be necessary; will include favoring governmental provision of many, but not all, of the programs listed under -5 above.

-1 (PRO-weak) Strongly advocates direct government provision of a few of the items listed under -5 above, but also sees many areas in which the government's direct role should be nil or limited; tends to favor governmental regulation to assure good treatment of citizens rather than direct government provision/ownership of the programs.

0 (NEUTRAL) Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue.

+1 (ANTI-weak) Accepts the need for government to be engaged in directly providing for one or a few of the items above, but would clearly see the government's role in providing social services as a very limited one; strongly prefers regulation to direct provision when a governmental role is necessary; tends to support incremental reductions in many social services.

+3 (ANTI-moderate) May grudgingly accept the need for government to directly provide just one of the items listed under -5 above, but tends not to support increases even in that area; prefers regulation to direct provision, but prefers that even the regulatory role be used sparingly; tends to oppose any expansion of the range of social services already provided.

+5 (ANTI-strong) Advocates that government provide no social services; prefers that these areas be handled completely by the private sector, without government regulation.

**North Korea/Unification**

The coding scheme for the North Korea/unification issue was devised using the following four criteria: (1) to what extent is North Korea considered as a threat to the national security? (2) to what extent are communication and cooperation favored in political/military areas? (3) to what extent are communication and cooperation favored in non-political/military areas? (4) are the communication and cooperation unconditional or conditional on reciprocity from North Korea?

-5 (PRO-strong) Does not consider North Korea to be an enemy or threat to the national security, and strongly advocates a significant increase in unconditional communication and cooperation with North Korea, including in political/military areas in any forms without delay.

-3 (PRO-moderate) Does not consider North Korea to be a primary enemy or threat to the national security (but considers it to a potential enemy or threat); does not admit to the possibility of war with relation to North Korea for any reasons, and advocates for a significant increase in unconditional communication and cooperation, mainly those in non-political/military areas, and a moderate increase in political/military areas with specified limits.

-1 (PRO-weak) Does not consider North Korea as a primary enemy or threat to the national security (consider it to be a potential enemy or threat); admits to the possibility of war with North Korea, and advocates a moderate increase in unconditional communication and cooperation in non- political/military areas while maintaining the current level in political/military areas.

0 (NEUTRAL) Has contradictory positions on North Korea that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue; favors the policy of "No cooperation and no conflict," and maintains the status quo.

+1 (ANTI-weak) Considers North Korea to be a primary enemy or threat to the national security, while not expecting a war in a foreseeable future, but admits to the need of communication and cooperation with North Korea at a moderate level (because the relationship with North Korea is critical to the national security) but without any

changes from status quo. Communication and cooperation that are conditional on reciprocal acts by North Korea are preferable.

+3 (ANTI-moderate) Considers North Korea to be a primary enemy or threat to the national security, with the expectation that a war with North Korea is possible, and advocates communication and cooperation only in exchange for reciprocal gestures, such as arm reduction, participation in dialog or investigation of weapons.

+5 (ANTI-strong) Considers North Korea to be a primary enemy or threat to the national security, with the expectation that a war with North Korea is imminent, and rejects any kinds of communication and cooperation with North Korea.

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE DISTRICTS FROM SOUTH KOREA AND MONGOLIA

## Mongolia

### Arkhangai

In Mongolia, party activists in two electoral districts with contrasting economic conditions, Arkhangai and Orkhon, participated in the survey. Arkhangai is one of the 21 aimags (provinces) of Mongolia, located slightly west to the center of the country. While its population density (as of 2007) is 1.45 per sq.km, the 8th largest among Mongolia's 21 aimags, the urban population of Arkhangai, measured by population of the aimag center, is only 20.3 percent, ranked the 20th. The revenue of the aimag government (3344 mln. tog), is relatively lower than that of any other aimag government, with an average of the revenue of an aimag government being 4748 mln. tog. The most important industry of Arkhangai is agriculture, predominantly animal husbandry, contributing about 80 percent to the aimag's GDP. These demographic and economic facts underscore the poor and rural nature of this electoral district. The GDP per capita of Arkhangai is just about half of the national GDP per capita, as shown in the last column of Table D-1.

A research sponsored by World Bank in the mid-2000s points out that the aimag center, Tsetserleg, has suffered an increase in poverty as well as population loss due to out-migration, and also that only eight percent of the population in Tsetserleg live in

apartments with access to utility services.[34] Furthermore, there is no air route or railway connecting this region to other cities. Located in 490 km west of Ulaanbaatar, Tsetserleg had long been difficult to access. The road pavement between the aimag center and the country capital has only recently been completed, although the road condition still requires frequent repairs. While Tsetserleg is the main site where the Party Activist Survey was conducted, some party activists living in the Tsenkher soum (about 45 minutes away by car from Tsetserleg; it is a village with neither water nor sewage facilities)[35] also participated in the survey. The district magnitude, or the number of legislative seats assigned to a district, of Arkhangai is two.

**Orkhon**

The other district I selected as a sample, Orkhon, is the smallest in aimag size, but is the most densely populated one among all the aimags in Mongolia, with 100.11 per sq. km compared to 1.68 per sq. km for Mongolia total as of 2007. The urban population consists of 92.8 percent of the aimag population, the largest among the 21 aimags. The aimag center of Orkhon, Erdenet, is widely considered to be a wealthy town. As shown in the fourth column of Table D-1, Orkhon's local government revenue is substantially higher than that of other aimags. Nearly 70 percent of the aimag revenue comes from the Erdenet Mining Corporation which was founded in 1975 as a joint Russian and Mongolian venture. As one of the largest copper mines in Asia, the open pit copper mine in Erdenet, produces 14 percent of national GDP and 69.3 percent of

[34] PADCO 2005 Mongolia City Development Strategies for Secondary Cities: Final Report
[35] A soum is a second level administrative subdivision of Mongolia. Arkhangai is divided into 19 soums and the aimag center. Most of the soum centers are homes of herder families.

Orkhon aimag GDP.[36] In addition to the mine, the largest carpet manufacturer in Mongolia (Erdenet Hivs) is also located in Erdenet.

As a city strategically established as an industrial center between Ulaanbaatar and the Russian border, Erdenet is well connected to/from the country capital, China and Russia through paved roads and railroads. Despite a generally much higher level of income in Erdenet due to the mine, on the hills surrounding the downtown area about 30 percent of the population of Erdenet live in ger communities in which utility services are inadequate.[37] In other words, the population that lives in apartments with access to full utility services is about 70 percent, higher than all the other aimag centers, reflecting the relatively well-developed infrastructure of the city. Considering such population distribution, I conducted surveys in the ger communities as well as in the Erdenet downtown area during the Party Activist Survey so that the survey responses would not be seriously biased to residents of modern housing. Like the electoral district of Arkhangai, the citizens of Orkhon have two representatives in the State Great Khural.

[36] PADCO 2005 Mongolia City Development Strategies for Secondary Cities: Final Report.
[37] PADCO 2005 Mongolia City Development Strategies for Secondary Cities: Final Report. However, the proportion of the ger residents is now expected to be higher than the 30 percent in the mid-2000s, due to the consistent increasing of the population of Erdenet and the chronic lack of housing in the downtown area (Erdenet's Current Housing Situation, http://www.mad-mongolia.com/resources/investment-ideas-opportunities/erdenet-housing-project/).

Table D-1 Varying Levels of Modernization in Mongolia, by Aimags and the Capital

| | Agricultural Share of GRDP (%) | Urban (%) | Revenue of Local Government (mln.tog) | GRDP per capita (thous. tog, at current prices) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arkhangai | 83.4 | 20.3 | 3344.4 | 742.09 |
| Bayankhongor | 67.8 | 31.2 | 3357.8 | 588.90 |
| Bayan-Olgii | 83.4 | 29.8 | 2816.8 | 494.06 |
| Bulgan | 78.6 | 26.0 | 3519.3 | 844.01 |
| Darkhan-Uul | 19.3 | 82.6 | 3387.3 | 661.07 |
| Dornod | 63.3 | 53.7 | 3110.8 | 556.33 |
| Dornogovi | 49.0 | 56.2 | 4343.6 | 408.61 |
| Dundgovi | 75.1 | 21.0 | 2699.0 | 797.18 |
| Govi-Altai | 67.8 | 30.7 | 3571.9 | 765.30 |
| Govisumber | 48.5 | 60.5 | 1200.4 | 903.59 |
| Khentii | 77.7 | 37.7 | 3658.4 | 702.36 |
| Khovs | 78.6 | 32.1 | 3481.8 | 715.26 |
| Khovsgol | 78.6 | 31.6 | 4335.9 | 656.39 |
| Omnogovi | 30.7 | 31.6 | 7899.6 | 1,533.65 |
| Orkhon | 1.0 | 92.8 | 24188.7 | 8,482.81 |
| Ovorkhangai | 70.5 | 21.7 | 3818.6 | 562.20 |
| Selenge | 46.9 | 26.9 | 5082.3 | 1,006.34 |
| Sukhbaatar | 26.8 | 22.5 | 3377.0 | 2,386.37 |
| Tov | 74.5 | 15.8 | 5520.7 | 871.49 |
| Uvs | 70.5 | 27.3 | 3447.6 | 676.77 |
| Zavkhan | 78.6 | 20.4 | 3544.6 | 697.91 |
| Ulaanbaatar | 0.9 | 100.0 | 52369.2 | 1,866.91 |
| Total | 20.6 | 60.8 | 152076 | 1,440.7 |

*Note.* Source: Compiled from Mongolian Statistical Yearbook 2007[38] and Mongolia Regional Dataset (Oct 2013) [39]

[38] http://researchguides.library.wisc.edu/yearbooks.

[39] Mongolia Regional Dataset, Oct 2013 (http://knoema.com/guifxld/mongolia-regional-dataset-october-2013), an original provider of data source: The National Statistical Office of Mongolia. The GRDP per capita in 2006 is the latest one available.

## South Korea

### Boeun/Okcheon/Youngdong, Chungbuk-Do

Boeun-Gun, Okcheo-Gun, and Youngdong-Gun are located on the outskirts of a Daejeon metropolitian city. The electoral district consisting of the three *Gun*s,[40] being a mounteneous retion, has several characteristics of the rural, underdeveloped countryside. The average financial independence of local government of this district in 2012 is 14%, lower than that of other Guns in Chungbuk-Do (an average of about 20.0%).[41] About 25 percent of the population are seniors over age 65,[42] and most of the land consists of forest and farming areas. While the information on their average income is not available, this district is regarded as predominantly rural.

### Pyeongtaek-Si Gap, Gyeonggi-Do

Pyeongtaek-Si Gap is one of the two electoral districts in Pyeongtaek-Si, Gyeonggi-Do. Geographically, 64.7 percent of the land of Pyeongtaek-Si is farming or forested area.[43] The average monthly household income of Pyeongtaek-Si (2,095,000 won as of 2009) is relatively low compared to other *Si*s (counties) in Gyeonggi-Do.[44] While several factories of major manufacturing firms located in this city have provided

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[40] Gun refers to an administrative subdivision of a province. Generally, it has a smaller population and less densely populated than a Si or Gu (a subdivision of Si), while it is more rural in character.
[41] E-Local Indicators, Korean Statistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr/). The financial independence of local government is calculated by {(local tax + other local revenue) / local government budget} *100. The financial independence of local government can be used as an indicator of the extent to which a local government is financially dependent upon the national government.
[42] E-Local Indicators, Korean Statistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr/).
[43] The 2011 Statistical Yearbook of Pyeongtaek (http://www.pyeongtaek.go.kr/New2012/pyeongtaekintroduce_referenceroom_statisticalyearbook.jsp?LeftCodeNo=7&LeftSubCodeNo=1&sUrl=BoardView.jsp%3Fp_id1%3D48453%26p_id3%3Dclick%26q_bbsid%3DCA_12)
[44] Gyeonggi Statistical Information Service (http://www.gg.go.kr/archives/2205110).

jobs, its living standard is markedly lower than that of suburban, commuter-shed towns such as Boondang and Yongin. The financial independence of the local government of Pyeongtaek-Si is also relatively low, with 52.7 percent (as of 2011).

**Jungwon-Gu, Sungnam-Si, Gyeonggi-Do**

Jungwon-Gu is one of the four electoral districts and of the three *Gu*s in Sungnam-Si. Unlike Boondang-Gu which was planned and developed by the initiative of the national government from the early 1990s, the establishment process as a residential town of the other two Gus has been a well-known example of random development. The national government strategically installed and initially developed the two Gus during the 1970s, for the purpose of accommodating the exploding population of Seoul. These new towns were filled with people who were deported from the squatter areas in Seoul. The average monthly household income of Jungwon-Gu (2,182,000 won as of 2011) is ranked the lowest among the three Gus in Sungnam-Si, and is nearly half the income of the wealthiest, Bundang-Gu (4,195,000 won as of 2011).[45]

**Icheon-Si, Gyeonggi-Do**

The average monthly household income of the electoral district of Icheon-Si (2,112,000 won) is significantly lower than the average of Gyeonggi (3,124,000 won) as of 2009.[46] About 77 percent of the land is consists of farming or forested areas, although there is a major factory of a semiconductor firm in Icheon as well asmultiple small-sized

[45] The average household income of three Gus of Sungnam-Si is estimated based on survey results of the 3rd Sungnam Sahoi Josa conducted in July 8-22, 2011 (http://stat.seongnam.go.kr/stat_zip/sub41.asp?id=stat_library&mode=view&idx=77&page=2). The average household income of Sungnam-Si in 2009 is 3,597,000 won (Gyeonggi Statistical Information Service (http://www.gg.go.kr/archives/2205110)).
[46] Gyeonggi Statistical Information Service (http://www.gg.go.kr/archives/2205110).

ceramic-making firms. The financial independence of the local government of Yicheon-Si is 47.9 percent (as of 2011), which is relatively lower than that of other neighborhood cities in Gyeonggi-Do.

**Uijeongbu-Si Gap, Gyeonggi-Do**

Uijeongbu-Si Gap is one of two electoral districts in Eujungbu-Si, Gyeonggi-do. With the average monthly household income of 2,875,000 won (as of 2009)[47] and the convenient transportation infrastructure to the center of Seoul by metro and public bus, this town is somewhat economically heterogeneous. Still, its location in north of Seoul, and the presence of US and Korean military bases in the city make it reasonable to regard Uijeongbu-Si as less economically blessed. The score of financial independence of local government of Eujungbu-Si also indicates low to mediocre economic conditions, with 41.4 percent (as of 2011).

**Yongin-Si Byoung, Gyeonggi-Do**

The average monthly household income of Yongin-Si is much higher than the average household income of other cities in Gyeonggi-Do, with about 3,782,000 won (as of 2009).[48] When the development project in Boondang was nearing the end, an originally rural and agricultural town, Yoingin, began to be strategically developed as a commuter-shed town, and at the same time, as a city satisfying the economic and cultural needs of its residents. Compared to the old town of Yongin, Yongin Byoung, in particular, is a highly urbanized area in which planned-development began and has been

[47] Gyeonggi Statistical Information Service (http://www.gg.go.kr/archives/2205110).
[48] Gyeonggi Statistical Information Service (http://www.gg.go.kr/archives/2205110).

completed within the last 10 years.[49] The financial independence of the local government of Yoingin-Si is 69.4 percent (as of 2011),[50] the topmost among all the cities in Gyeonggi-Do.

**Boondang-Gu Gap, Sungnam-Si, Gyeonggi-Do**

Boondang-Gu Gap is one of the two electoral districts in Boondang-gu, Sungnam-si. The average monthly household income of Bundang-Gu was about 4,195,000 won in 2011.[51] Almost equal to that of the wealthiest district (Gwacheon-Si) in Gyeonggi-Do, the level of income of the citizens in Boondang-Gu is apparently much higher than that of any neighboring districts. The district of Boondang Gap includes Pangyo. Pangyo is a new town planned and established as an eco-friendly village, and at the same time, as a high-tech economic center by the national government's project of the mid-2000s. The national plan cleated the Pangyo Techno Valley, an industrial complex focusing on biotech, information technology and cultural technology. With the metro taking only 15 minutes to Gangnam, Pangyo is the most well-connected to the wealthiest area of South Korea and the country's financial center than any other towns

[49] The households who earn more than 3,000,000 won per month are 69 percent in Yongin Byoung, whereas the proportion of such households in the other two districts in Yongin is only 51 percent for Yongin Ul and 26% for Yoingin Gap in 2011 (The Sixth Yongin-Si Sahoi Josa, http://www.estat.go.kr/data/01_report_02_view.asp?category=&rmode=view&endcode=005010&board_idx=728&gotopage=1).

[50] E-local indicator, provided by the Korean Statistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1YL7903&vw_cd=MT_GTITLE01&list_id=101_076&seqNo=&lang_mode=ko&language=kor&obj_var_id=&itm_id=&conn_path=E1#).

[51] The average household income of three Gus of Sungnam-Si is estimated based on the survey results of the 3rd Sungnam Sahoi Josa conducted in July 8-22, 2011 (http://stat.seongnam.go.kr/stat_zip/sub41.asp?id=stat_library&mode=view&idx=77&page=2).

surrounding Seoul. The financial independence of local government of Sungnam-Si is 67.1% (as of 2011),[52] almost on a par with that of Yongin-Si.

**Seo-Gu Eul, Daejeon-Si**

Seo-Gu Eul is one of the six electoral districts in Daejeon. Being only 50 minutes away from Seoul by high speed train and connecting Seoul and other major cities in the south, Daejeon Metropolitan City serves as a hub of transportation. Daejeon has also served almost like a second administrative center of the country, supplementing the functions of Seoul. Several national government offices are located in Seo-Gu Eul, forming the National Government Complex. The average household income of residents in Seo-Gu was 3,096,000 won a month in 2012, slightly above the average household income of Daejeon (3,058,000 won).[53] Yet, it is significantly higher than that of any district in Chungbuk-Do surrounding Daejeon-Si, most of which are rural, agricultural, or mountainous. Although the financial independence of local government for Seo-Gu is only 26.2 percent (as of 2011),[54] this is nearly twice higher than that of the rural neighborhood districts.

[52] E-local indicator, provided by the Korean Statistical Information Service.
[53] Social Indicators of Daejeon (2012) by Daejeon-Si (http://www.daejeon.go.kr/sta/).
[54] E-Local Indicators, provided by the Korean Statistical Information Service (http://kosis.kr/).

# APPENDIX E

# DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES AND THE CORRESPONDING SURVEY QUESTIONS

| Variable and Question | Response Category | | Coded Value | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gender<br>"Please indicate your gender." | Female | | 0 | 155 |
| | Male | | 1 | 144 |
| Age<br>"What is your age range?" | Under 25 | | 1 | 55 |
| | 25–29 | | 2 | 30 |
| | 30–34 | | 3 | 34 |
| | 35–39 | | 4 | 18 |
| | 40–44 | | 5 | 45 |
| | 45–49 | | 6 | 44 |
| | 50–54 | | 7 | 28 |
| | 60–64 | | 8 | 30 |
| | 55–59 | | 9 | 7 |
| | 65 and over | | 10 | 8 |
| Household Income<br>"Please estimate your household income." | Mongolia (monthly) | South Korea (annual) | | |
| | Under 199,999 tog | Under 10,000,000 won | 1 | 37 |
| | 200,000 – 299,999 tog | 10,000,000 – 19,999,999 won | 2 | 37 |
| | 300,000 – 399,999 tog | 20,000,000 – 29,999,999 won | 3 | 48 |
| | 400,000 – 499,999 tog | 30,000,000 – 39,999,999 won | 4 | 48 |
| | 500,000 – 599,999 tog | 40,000,000 – 49,999,999 won | 5 | 25 |
| | 600,000 – 699,999 tog | 50,000,000 – 59,999,999 won | 6 | 27 |
| | 700,000 – 799,999 tog | 60,000,000 – 69,999,999 won | 7 | 16 |
| | 800,000 – 899,999 tog | 70,000,000 – 79,999,999 won | 8 | 22 |
| | 900,000 tog and over | 80,000,000 won and over | 9 | 29 |
| Economic Satisfaction | Very bad | | 1 | 2 |
| | Bad | | 2 | 56 |

Table Continued

| Variable and Question | Response Category | Coded Value | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| "As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today?" | So so (neither good nor bad) | 3 | 180 |
| | Good | 4 | 49 |
| | Very good | 5 | 11 |
| Left-Right Ideology "In politics, people sometimes talk about the 'progressive' and the 'conservative.' Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the progressive and 10 means the conservative?" | 0 | 0 | 49 |
| | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| | 2 | 2 | 20 |
| | 3 | 3 | 31 |
| | 4 | 4 | 13 |
| | 5 | 5 | 48 |
| | 6 | 6 | 8 |
| | 7 | 7 | 13 |
| | 8 | 8 | 13 |
| | 9 | 9 | 12 |
| | 10 | 10 | 39 |
| Political Efficacy "In your opinion, how much are you able to influence this party's policy programs?" | Not at all | 1 | 21 |
| | Very little | 2 | 48 |
| | Somewhat | 3 | 140 |
| | Very much | 4 | 70 |
| Exposure to policy programs or electoral platforms of the party "Have you ever read the platform or election manifestos of this party?" | I have thoroughly read it. | 2 | 154 |
| | I have come across it but have not thoroughly read it. | 1 | 111 |
| | I have not read it at all. | 0 | 32 |
| Exposure to newsletters via email or mail from the party "Before you joined this election campaign, did you regularly receive and read this party's newspaper, leaflet, or email newsletter?" | Regularly or at least three times a year | 2 | 127 |
| | Occasionally or at least once a year | 1 | 103 |
| | Rarely or Not at all | 0 | 64 |
| Voting experience "Did you vote last election?" | No | 0 | 42 |
| | Yes | 1 | 254 |
| Participated in campaigning activities "Did you participate in campaigning activities in any of previous elections?" | I participated in election campaigning of other parties. | -1 | 22 |
| | This is my first participation in election campaigning. | 0 | 109 |

Table Continued

| Variable and Question | Response Category | Coded Value | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| | I participated in election campaigning of this party. | 1 | 160 |
| Have participated in protest<br>"Have you ever participated in a protest or demonstration?" | No | 0 | 172 |
| | Yes | 1 | 125 |
| Have attended local party meetings<br>"Have you attended the meetings of the local branch of this party before this election campaign?" | Regularly or at least twice | 2 | 125 |
| | Occasionally or at least once | 1 | 63 |
| | Not at all | 0 | 108 |
| Have attended national party meetings or participated in the candidate selection process<br>"Have you attended a National Party Congress or presidential primary of this party?" | Yes, at least twice | 2 | 71 |
| | Yes, once | 1 | 52 |
| | Not at all | 0 | 172 |
| Status in the party hierarchy<br>"Which of the following describes best your current position with respect to this party?" | Management or staff of central party organizations | 6 | 16 |
| | Management or staff of party organizations or elected representative at the province level | 5 | 29 |
| | Management or staff of party organization or elected representative at the county level | 4 | 43 |
| | Delegates of National Party Congress | 3 | 4 |
| | I am working for this party only temporarily for this election, with an official title with respect to this party or this election camp. | 2 | 46 |
| | I am working for this party only temporarily for this election, without an official title with respect to this party or this election camp. | 1 | 134 |

APPENDIX F

INDIVIDUAL FACTORS AND POLITICAL MOTIVES

Table F-1 through Table F-12 provide information on the relationship between individual-level factors and political incentives—selective (self-enhancement) incentives and policy (purposive) incentives—to supplement Table 13 in which only the average levels of variables for each incentive category were provided. Entries are the proportion of activists in each of the levels of micro factors falling into each of the incentive categories.

Table F-1 Age and Selective Incentives

| | Age | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Under 30 | 30–39 | 40–49 | 50–59 | 60 and over |
| Bottom 33% | 32 | 34 | 37 | 30 | 27 |
| Middle 33% | 24 | 34 | 32 | 48 | 46 |
| Top 33% | 45 | 32 | 32 | 23 | 28 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (85) | 100 (52) | 100 (89) | 100 (58) | 100 (15) |

Table F-2 Age and Policy Incentives

| | Age | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Under 30 | 30–39 | 40–49 | 50–59 | 60 and over |
| Bottom 33% | 25 | 23 | 33 | 40 | 20 |
| Middle 33% | 40 | 33 | 28 | 42 | 60 |
| Top 33% | 36 | 40 | 40 | 19 | 21 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (85) | 100 (52) | 100 (89) | 100 (58) | 100 (15) |

Table F-3 Individual Wealth and Selective Incentives

| | Income | | | Economic Satisfaction | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1–3 | 4–6 | 7–9 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Bottom 33% | 32 | 33 | 34 | 50 | 30 | 31 | 31 | 73 |
| Middle 33% | 37 | 28 | 33 | 50 | 29 | 36 | 33 | 27 |
| Top 33% | 31 | 39 | 33 | 0 | 41 | 33 | 37 | 0 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (112) | 100 (100) | 100 (67) | 100 (2) | 100 (56) | 100 (180) | 100 (49) | 100 (11) |

Table F-4 Individual Wealth and Policy Incentives

| | Income | | | Economic Satisfaction | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1–3 | 4–6 | 7–9 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Bottom 33% | 26 | 34 | 30 | 0 | 34 | 31 | 22 | 36 |
| Middle 33% | 34 | 37 | 40 | 100 | 36 | 38 | 35 | 9 |
| Top 33% | 41 | 29 | 30 | 0 | 30 | 31 | 43 | 55 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (122) | 100 (90) | 100 (67) | 100 (2) | 100 (56) | 100 (180) | 100 (49) | 100 (11) |

Table F-5 Political Attitudes and Selective Incentives

| | Left-Right Ideology | | | | | | | | | | | Political Efficacy | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Bottom 33% | 47 | 50 | 20 | 61 | 31 | 33 | 25 | 15 | 23 | 33 | 26 | 24 | 40 | 34 | 36 |
| Middle 33% | 18 | 25 | 40 | 19 | 31 | 44 | 13 | 46 | 46 | 33 | 28 | 38 | 31 | 35 | 23 |
| Top 33% | 35 | 25 | 40 | 19 | 38 | 23 | 63 | 38 | 31 | 33 | 46 | 38 | 29 | 31 | 41 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (49) | 100 (8) | 100 (20) | 100 (31) | 100 (13) | 100 (48) | 100 (8) | 100 (13) | 100 (13) | 100 (12) | 100 (39) | 100 (21) | 100 (48) | 100 (140) | 100 (70) |

Table F-6 Political Attitudes and Policy Incentives

| | Left-Right Ideology | | | | | | | | | | | Political Efficacy | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Bottom 33% | 12 | 25 | 20 | 32 | 54 | 54 | 38 | 46 | 46 | 25 | 23 | 52 | 35 | 29 | 27 |
| Middle 33% | 41 | 0 | 25 | 42 | 31 | 21 | 25 | 31 | 31 | 67 | 31 | 24 | 35 | 40 | 29 |
| Top 33% | 47 | 75 | 55 | 26 | 15 | 25 | 38 | 23 | 23 | 8 | 46 | 24 | 29 | 31 | 44 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (49) | 100 (8) | 100 (20) | 100 (31) | 100 (13) | 100 (48) | 100 (8) | 100 (13) | 100 (13) | 100 (12) | 100 (39) | 100 (21) | 100 (48) | 100 (140) | 100 (70) |

Table F-7 Exposure to Party Programs and Selective Incentives

| | Reading party programs | | | Reading party news | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Bottom 33% | 34 | 35 | 32 | 39 | 30 | 34 |
| Middle 33% | 41 | 36 | 29 | 41 | 30 | 29 |
| Top 33% | 25 | 29 | 40 | 20 | 40 | 37 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (32) | 100 (111) | 100 (154) | 100 (64) | 100 (103) | 100 (127) |

Table F-8 Exposure to Party Programs and Policy Incentives

| | Reading party programs | | | Reading party news | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Bottom 33% | 72 | 35 | 19 | 58 | 37 | 12 |
| Middle 33% | 25 | 39 | 35 | 33 | 39 | 33 |
| Top 33% | 3 | 26 | 46 | 9 | 24 | 55 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (32) | 100 (111) | 100 (154) | 100 (64) | 100 (103) | 100 (127) |

Table F-9 Political Participation and Selective Incentives

| | Voting | | Campaigning | | | Protesting | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 1 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Bottom 33% | 33 | 33 | 36 | 36 | 31 | 30 | 38 |
| Middle 33% | 33 | 34 | 32 | 30 | 35 | 37 | 29 |
| Top 33% | 33 | 33 | 32 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (42) | 100 (254) | 100 (22) | 100 (109) | 100 (160) | 100 (172) | 100 (125) |

Table F-10 Political Participation and Policy Incentives

| | Voting | | Campaigning | | | Protesting | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 1 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Bottom 33% | 43 | 28 | 41 | 38 | 24 | 38 | 21 |
| Middle 33% | 36 | 36 | 36 | 37 | 36 | 38 | 33 |
| Top 33% | 21 | 36 | 23 | 26 | 41 | 24 | 46 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (42) | 100 (254) | 100 (22) | 100 (109) | 100 (160) | 100 (172) | 100 (125) |

Table F-11 Intra-party Activism and Selective Incentives

| | Local Party Meeting | | | National Party Meeting | | | Status within Party | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1–2 | 3–4 | 5–6 |
| Bottom 33% | 31 | 33 | 34 | 30 | 40 | 37 | 37 | 12 | 37 |
| Middle 33% | 40 | 25 | 30 | 35 | 29 | 31 | 34 | 52 | 20 |
| Top 33% | 29 | 41 | 35 | 35 | 31 | 32 | 29 | 37 | 43 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (108) | 100 (63) | 100 (125) | 100 (172) | 100 (52) | 100 (71) | 100 (180) | 100 (47) | 100 (45) |

Table F-12 Intra-party Activism and Policy Incentives

| | Local Party Meeting | | | National Party Meeting | | | Status within Party | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1–2 | 3–4 | 5–6 |
| Bottom 33% | 54 | 21 | 15 | 38 | 29 | 13 | 38 | 31 | 12 |
| Middle 33% | 34 | 43 | 33 | 37 | 37 | 32 | 31 | 24 | 47 |
| Top 33% | 15 | 33 | 52 | 25 | 35 | 55 | 32 | 45 | 42 |
| Total (Obs) | 100 (108) | 100 (63) | 100 (125) | 100 (172) | 100 (52) | 100 (71) | 100 (180) | 100 (47) | 100 (45) |